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ABSTRACT 
 
Political culture research focuses on the relationship between individual-level orientations 
and system-level institutions. Three approaches within this line of research suggest 
different sets of orientations that are understood to support democracy. Yet, very little is 
known about what underlines these pro-democratic orientations. Focusing on two potential 
bases, generation and social class, the present research asks: ‘What are the generational 
and class bases of pro-democratic culture in Turkey?’ The research tests the theoretical 
predictions of both Karl Mannheim’s theory of generations and Seymour Martin Lipset’s 
working class authoritarianism thesis to examine whether there are differences in pro-
democratic culture across generational and class categories. The findings do not lend 
complete support to either theory. The analysis reveals that Turkish respondent`s pro-
democratic attitudes do not follow generational lines. However, an indirect effect of 
generation is revealed when social class is included in the analysis. The findings show that 
for those generations which have come of age under authoritarian politico-juridical orders, 
social classes are homogenized with respect to their pro-democratic attitudes. On the other 
hand, for those generations socialized under non-authoritarian governments, the findings 
lend support to the modernization theory’s classification of the social classes challenging 
that of Lipset’s theory. Three types of regression techniques are applied to cross-sectional 
data from the 1990, 1996, 2001, 2007 and 2011 waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) 
for Turkey. The overall thesis is composed of eight chapters. The first chapter introduces 
the main arguments and hypotheses. The second chapter gives a brief overview of the 
recent history of Turkey to provide the necessary background for making sense of the 
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analysis. The third chapter outlines the theoretical framework of the research. The fourth 
chapter introduces the data and the methodology used for the analysis. The following three 
chapters present the empirical findings of the research. Finally, the eighth chapter provides 
a brief summary of the findings and discusses their wider implications.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The current thesis is primarily designed to investigate the generational bases of pro-
democratic culture in Turkey. This investigation is important for a number of reasons. It 
was widely understood in Turkey that the 1980 military coup was aimed at preventing a 
potential civil war and of securing the future of democracy by producing a generation that 
would not contest the political order. Arguably, it was believed by those who staged the 
coup that a suppressed, obedient and non-political young generation would not repeat the 
same ‘mistakes’ of their predecessors that had brought Turkey to the brink of civil war. 
The members of such a generation would only be faithful to the country, not external 
‘demonic’ ideologies that would lead them to fight with each other. However, the analysis 
of the present thesis revealed that the generation which came of age after 1980 is not 
necessarily more pro-democratic than its successors. Yet, it would not be right to argue that 
the period of socialisation of a generation does not influence pro-democratic orientations at 
all. Instead, results presented in this thesis show that the generational influences on pro-
democratic attitudes are largely indirect, operating through the social class structure. It is 
shown in the present thesis that while for the previous generation which was not exposed 
to system level authoritarianism, social classes exhibit significantly different levels of pro-
democratic attitudes, for the post-1980 generation, social classes are not sharply 
differentiated, showing generally a lower level of pro-democratic orientations. It seems 
that while the military coup leaders’ aim of producing a generation of depoliticized, like-
 2 
 
minded individuals seems to have worked, but this has not necessarily been for the benefit 
of democracy.  
 
These findings, beyond providing an answer to our particular research question, have also 
theoretical implications. The present thesis adopts Karl Mannheim’s ‘theory of 
generations’ and Seymour Martin Lipset’s ‘working class authoritarianism thesis’ as the 
two main theoretical guides while investigating the generational and class bases of pro-
democratic culture in Turkey. The analysis reveals that Mannheim’s theory of generations 
is not applicable in our particular case. On the other hand, Lipset’s working class 
authoritarianism seems to hold true when generational dividing lines are ignored. The 
analysis of the pooled data showed that the manual class, which corresponds to Lipset’s 
working class, is less pro-democratic than the non-manual class when generation is 
ignored. However, the picture changes comprehensively when generations are considered. 
For the generation which was socialized under system level authoritarianism, social 
classes’ pro-democratic orientations are homogenized, thus challenging Lipset’s thesis. 
This finding poses a ‘generational challenge’ to the static working class authoritarianism 
thesis of Lipset. What is more, for the generation which was not socialized by system level 
authoritarianism and for which we expect to find Lipset’s thesis hold true, the social 
classes produce significantly different levels of pro-democratic attitudes, yet the findings 
are still different from how Lipset would predict. Unlike Lipset’s expectation, for this 
generation the manual class does not appear to be less pro-democratic than the non-manual 
class. Instead, the members of these two social classes together with those of the 
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service/self-employed class were found to be more pro-democratic than the members of the 
unemployed and farmer classes. In other words, those classes which take part in modern 
production, regardless of whether it is manual or non-manual, are more pro-democratic 
than those who remain out of it. This finding lends support to modernization theory that 
posits a positive relationship between the transformation of the traditional modes of 
production into modern ones and democracy. 
The idea of discovering the bases of pro-democratic culture in Turkey originates from the 
famous ‘how to make democracy work’ question, which has spawned an enormous amount 
of scholarly attention in the 20
th
 century political science literature. A large and growing 
body of literature has investigated the factors that provide support for democracy. The 
political culture research is one of those approaches seeking an answer to this question. 
Three separate approaches operate within the political culture research: the legitimacy 
approach, the communitarian approach and the human capital approach. While the 
legitimacy approach prioritizes legitimization of democracy and delegitimization of its 
autocratic alternatives, the communitarian approach focuses on orientations reflecting 
strong community belonging and the human development approach gives precedence to 
values reflecting strengthening of the individual (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 245-71). 
Although its known that all these three approaches emphasize different types of 
orientations as important for democracy, very little is known about their underlying 
dynamics. Many different factors could be at work. This research sketches a model where 
three different ways of measuring democratic attitudes lie at the dependent end of the 
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relationship as a function of two bases: generation and social class. Generation has long 
been a question of great interest in the political science and sociology literatures. 
Replacement of generations is viewed as a fundamental property of social change. 
According to Ryder (1965: p. 843), ‘The lives and deaths of individuals are, from the 
societal standpoint, a massive process of personal replacement, which may be called 
‘demographic metabolism’. Labelled either as ‘demographic metabolism’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 
843-4) or as ‘social rejuvenation’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 296), the process which is 
more widely known as ‘generational replacement’ corresponds to the renewal of society as 
well as its values and orientations. Therefore, although it is a biology-based concept, its 
further attitudinal and behavioural implications locate it at the heart of a social scientific 
study. Today, various strands of evidence in the literature lend support to the belief that 
generational location is responsible for a range of human attitudes and behaviours. The 
generational phenomenon was first treated systematically by Karl Mannheim. Mannheim’s 
theory of generations, as a well-entrenched system of thought, aimed to bring a scientific 
and comprehensive explanation to the generation problem. Mannheim laid down all the 
aspects of his theory in his seminal 1927 essay, The Problem of Generations. In this essay 
Mannheim raised arguments that are inspiring for those wanting to study generation 
phenomenon quantitatively. Although, Mannheim’s theory did not remain free of criticism 
and controversy in the following years, it is still an important point of reference for 
understanding the generation phenomenon. According to Mannheim, in addition to being 
contemporary, the members of a generation must have been exposed to the same formative 
events. Nevertheless, it is also implied by Mannheim that sharing the same birth year and 
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being exposed to the same formative events are still not enough in themselves for a 
generation to emerge. According to him, only if the same memories are collected during 
the early years in life, can we speak of a generation. Derived from the theories of the 
development of the human mind, Mannheim asserts that trends peculiar for a generation 
are moulded in the years before its members embark on adulthood. Mannheim specifies a 
period around the age of 17 in this regard, since this is the age which the individuals are 
the most impressionable. According to Mannheim; about this age, young individuals are 
old enough to engage with the life and the societal culture, but still too young and 
vulnerable to its formative effects. The core values, as suggested by Mannheim, acquired 
by young individuals about this age are so deep and strong that they remain impervious to 
change and shape later attitudes and behaviour (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 300; see also 
Ghitza & Gelman, 2014).  
The work that is outlined in the above lines matters not only because it tests two prominent 
theories in the Turkish political context and because it is the first  to our knowledge  
attempt to evaluate Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis from a generational 
perspective, but also because it accounts for some country specific issues which deserve a 
scrutiny.  The lack of quantitative research on generations is an important deficiency in 
Turkish political science literature. Therefore, it is believed that advancing knowledge on 
Turkish generations through a sophisticated use of empirical data and quantitative methods 
will fill an important void in the literature. Moreover, the analysis of the thesis may also 
provide some information in regards to the ‘new rising Turkish generation’ question which 
was frequently asked after the 2013 Gezi Protests. However, a far-reaching answer to this 
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question should not be expected because we do not have the data to directly analyse this 
generation that is currently in its youth. We can only speculate based on the insights from 
the evidence for socialisation that we will have uncovered for the other generations. The 
first empirical chapter tackles with this question as a part of political participation issue in 
Turkey. On the other hand, the second and third empirical chapters employ democracy 
preference and out-group tolerance as dependent variables. Studying these two orientations 
is important not only because they are known to be significant predictors of system level 
democracy, but also because Turkey ranks very highly in the former and very lowly in the 
latter amongst the other countries of the world. Therefore, the findings of this work may be 
an answer to the underlying mechanisms of high overt support democracy and low 
tolerance in Turkey. Last but not the least, studying pro-democratic culture in Turkey can 
provide an answer to the noted ‘compatibility of Islam and democracy’ question. Although 
our findings regarding this inquiry must be treated with caution since our analysis does not 
delve directly into that matter, but, by extension only, this research may provide a general 
perspective on the underlying mechanisms of pro-democratic orientations in a country with 
a predominantly Muslim population.  
Questions naturally arise regarding the selection of Turkey as the case study. Turkey 
constitutes an unprecedented case to carry out such an investigation due to several reasons. 
First, Turkish public’s high acclamation of democracy as well as low out-group tolerance 
and political participation make Turkey an interesting case for a study on pro-democratic 
attitudes. Although these three attitudes are well-distributed (for democracy preference in a 
positive and for political participation and out-group tolerance in a negative way) across all 
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segments of the society, this research is a proof that, with careful specifications and fine-
tuned analysis, variability between class and generational categories can be captured. On 
the other hand, Turkey’s developing economy,1 remarkably uneven distribution of the 
resources
2
, fierce application of the market economy model together with it’s young and 
dynamic population as well as regime changes are expected to produce large attitudinal 
differences across class and generational categories which makes Turkey a potential 
appropriate case to study attitudinal gaps across class and generational categories. In 
addition to these, the traditional culture and low class awareness in Turkey, which may 
potentially counterbalance the first group of factors make Turkey an interesting test case. 
However, it should be noted that, despite it takes the form of a case-study of Turkey, the 
models sketched in the analysis are generalizable for all societies experiencing similar 
conditions. Countries with large attitudinal gaps across socioeconomic groups, high tempo 
of long-term socioeconomic development and intermittent political histories would be 
fruitful locations for replication studies testing generalizable conditions. It can also be 
applied cross-culturally within a comparative setting, nevertheless a comparative research 
was particularly avoided in this thesis since interpreting the results adequately requires 
profound knowledge about the political history of the country that is researched. 
A quantitative approach was employed in this research. Quantitative based methods enable 
social scientists to study common forms, trends and patterns of behaviours in a more 
rigorous way. Multivariate logistic regression, ordinary least squares (linear least squares) 
                                                 
1
 The Turkish economy grew by 4.89% between 2001 and 2015.  
2
 The inequality in income distribution in Turkey is one of the highest amongst the OECD countries.  
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and ordered logistic regression (ordered logit) models are adopted in the three respective 
empirical chapters. WVS data for Turkey were recruited in the analyses. The selection of 
the WVS is underlined by the fact that it is the only available data for Turkey involving the 
variables of interest. In the lack of panel data, five waves of cross-sectional WVS data for 
Turkey spanning over twenty years accomplished our aim to treat the notorious 
age/period/cohort (APC) identification problem.  
Before introducing the remaining chapters, let us briefly touch upon some key concepts 
that will be further discussed in the course of the thesis. Throughout the thesis, ‘pro-
democratic culture’ will refer interchangeably either to a latent concept providing support 
for democracy or to its three particular measures employed in each empirical chapter, 
namely democracy preference, political participation and out-group tolerance. The term 
‘generation’ is used in the meaning of generation as a cohort. The term ‘social class’ refers 
to an objective class measurement and the term ‘modernization theory’ is used to refer to 
the classical modernization theory. The term ‘out-group’ refers to Inglehart and Welzel`s 
(2005) usage and is used to denote those who fall outside of one`s physical and cultural 
ascribed circle. In this connection, the term ‘out-group tolerance’ corresponds to one`s 
readiness to welcome his/her out-group members. 
The overall thesis takes the form of eight chapters. The remaining part of the thesis 
proceeds as follows. The second chapter is designed as a background chapter. It provides 
an overview of the 20th century Turkish politics in order to justify the delineation of three 
subsequent Turkish generations. This chapter divides the recent-era Turkish political 
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history into three periods, namely foundation, interim and post-1980 by referring to two 
landmark events, the 1960 and the 1980 military coups. The selection of the two events is 
due to their significant influence on economic, social and political life in Turkey. The third 
chapter presents an overview of the extant theory and serves a theoretical background for 
forthcoming empirical chapters. It pays particular attention to the three theoretical pillars 
of the thesis, namely the pro-democratic culture, the theory of generations and working 
class authoritarianism. The fourth chapter introduces the data and the methods that are 
employed in the analysis. The next three chapters provide the empirical investigations of 
the thesis. In the first empirical chapter, democracy preference, in the second, political 
participation and in the third, out-group tolerance are employed as the dependent variables 
to examine the three different facets of pro-democratic attitudes highlighted by theoretical 
accounts. Save for minor changes in the controls, roughly the same model is run for all the 
three empirical chapters. Finally, the last chapter develops on the wider implications for 
the literature of our results as well as indicating fruitful avenues for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2. THREE PHASES OF THE 20
th
 CENTURY 
TURKISH POLITICAL HISTORY 
 
The aim of the present chapter is twofold. First, to present an overview of the 20
th
 century 
Turkish political history in order to familiarize the reader with the recent era Turkish 
political agenda and second, to help the reader grasp the logic underlying the periodization 
of the Turkish political history, and the delineation of the three Turkish political 
generations accordingly. With these objectives in mind, this chapter divides the 20th 
century Turkish political history into three periods: the foundation, the interim and the 
post-1980. The chapter supports the view that while the foundation and the post-1980 
periods can be labelled as authoritarian and the interim period can be labelled as non-
authoritarian with respect to the character of their relevant incumbent governments and the 
legislation in power. This chapter also implies that system level authoritarianism reflected 
on the outlook of the governments and the legislation has left their unique mark on relevant 
generations. High political events including the two military coups and others, which are 
thought to be important, are discussed in the following sections. The chapter covers a 
period which starts from 1914, the formative year of the oldest respondent, and extends to 
2009, the formative year of the youngest respondent in our sample. A chronological order 
was followed throughout the chapter.
3
 
 
                                                 
3
 The documentary movies; ‘Demirkırat’, ’12 Mart İhtilalin Pençesinde Demokrasi’, ’12 Eylül’ and ‘Özallı 
Yıllar’ were heavily relied on in the structuring of this chapter. 
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The foundation period starts with the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic by the 
end of the First World War and extends through the years during which the country was 
governed by the single party governments and the DP. During this period, Turkish 
governments fought against economic challenges stemming from the First World War, the 
global economic crisis and the mobilization for the Second World War. Another challenge 
that the Turkish governments faced during this period was reactionary and separatist 
rebellions. Those groups which did not accept the reforms and the new political regime, 
armed and rebelled against the governments. All these challenges compelled the 
governments to take authoritarian measures while governing the country. It should also be 
noted that the rising authoritarianism in the world during the first years of the foundation 
period and lack of democratic tradition among the ruling elites and the members of the 
society also played a role in the authoritarianism of the Turkish governments. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the governments’ authoritarian methods during the 
single party period was challenged by the opposition party executives, the same 
authoritarian methods including closing the political parties, oppressing the opposition and 
the media, restricting social and economic rights were used by them to consolidate their 
power in the first years of the multi-party era.  
The interim period started with the overthrow of an elected government by means of a 
military coup and continued until another coup in 1980. Although the interim period 
started with a military coup, the military government introduced a relatively liberal legal 
system in order to prevent the establishment of authoritarian governments. The new 
constitution recognized a series of economic, social and political rights, including, the right 
to assembly and demonstration, to strike and sign labour agreement, to establish trade 
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unions. With the new constitution, political parties gained legal status and the tenure of the 
judges were strengthened. On the system level, the new constitution envisaged the 
separation of powers and establishment of autonomous state organs, including the 
Constitutional Court, National Security Council, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (MGK) and the 
State Planning Organisation, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (DPT). The universities and the 
national television company gained autonomy with the new constitution. Yet, when 
compared with the previous period, the governments between 1960 and 1980 were weak to 
prevent the establishment of juntas within the army and the rise of violence in the streets.  
The post-1980 period started with the military coup of 12 September 1980 and continued 
taking effect on the political, economic, social and intellectual environment in Turkey 
down to present. The military government introduced a highly authoritarian system. Many 
journalists, intellectuals, left and right wing party members were put in prison and face 
maltreatment and torture, and some even lost their lives in prison. Many economic, 
political and social rights given by the 1961 constitution were suspended by the new 
constitution. The new constitution had a clear aim of centralizing the power in the hands of 
the government. By means of the strictly hierarchical system the government gained the 
control over the universities, the media and the political parties. The military government 
controlled the universities by higher education law and a supreme education board 
established in accordance with the law. Many daily newspapers were either closed or 
censored. The new political parties law envisaged MGK’s approval for the establishment 
of political parties. An electoral system which favours big political parties was also 
introduced by the law. Even after decades following the civil governments came to power, 
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many authoritarian legal provisions introduced by the military government remained in 
force.  
2.1. The Foundation Period 
This section attempts to introduce to the reader a period which started with the foundation 
of the modern Turkish Republic following the Turkish War of Independence that took 
place immediately after the First World War. The section includes four sub-sections:  (a) 
the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, (b) The independence war and the foundation 
of modern Turkish Republic, (c) The single-party period and (d) The beginning of the 
multi-party era. During this period, the Turkish governments faced serious economic 
difficulties as well as political and social turmoil. To tackle these, a series of authoritarian 
measures were taken, including suspending political, economic and social rights. 
2.1.1. The Ottoman Empire in the First World War 
The First World War, which was then called the Great War, began with the assassination 
of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by a nationalist Serb in 
Sarajevo on 28 July 1914. In general, the war was between the Central powers; Germany, 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers; the Great 
Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Italy and, following 1917, the United States (U.S.). In 
addition to these countries, many from European, Asian, American and Australian 
continents were involved in the war. In total, over 115 million of combatants and civilians 
died in the war. The Turkish army fought against the Allied powers in five main 
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campaigns: Caucasus, Sinai and Palestine, Mesopotamian, Persian and Gallipoli. Turkish 
forces were backed by Kurds, Chechens, Circassians and Turcomans (Keegan, 2014).  
After the Tripolitanian War with Italy in 1912 and the Balkan Wars with the Balkan 
countries, Montenegro, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania in 1912 and 1913, the 
Ottoman army was war-weary. In order to have its army modernized, receive financial 
support and weaponry, the government sought to make an alliance with a European power. 
Following the out-break of the war, the government signed the secret Ottoman-German 
Alliance with German Empire in 1914. The government’s aim was to have its armed forces 
modernized by means of German aid and recapture three provinces; Kars, Artvin and 
Ardahan from the Russian occupation. On the other hand the German Empire wanted to 
ally with the Ottoman Empire to use the Anatolian territory to reach its African colonies, to 
conduct its operations in the Middle East and to prevent Russian access to the underground 
resources around the Middle East and the Caspian Sea (Karal, 1988).  
The Ottoman entry into the war was triggered by two cruisers bombing Russian ports. In 
1914, a dreadnought named Rio de Janerio, which was initially built upon Brazil’s order in 
British navy yards, was not sent to Brazil due to problems with the payment. The Ottomans 
were already interested in buying two dreadnoughts and sent the payment to Great Britain 
in advance. Rio de Janerio was renamed as Sultan Osman I and another dreadnought called 
Reşadiye was built. However, following the Ottoman Empire’s alliance with the German 
Empire, the British Empire seized the two dreadnoughts and did not send neither the ships 
nor the payment. About the same days, two cruisers of the German Empire, the battle-
cruiser SMS Goben and the light cruiser SMS Breslau were pursued by British forces in 
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Mediterranean offshore waters. Escaping from the British forces, the two cruisers passed 
through the Dardanelles and anchored in the İstanbul Bosphorus. It was declared that the 
two cruisers are bought from the German Empire in substitution for Sultan Osman I and 
Reşadiye. The two cruisers, which were renamed as Yavuz and Midilli, sailed into the 
Black Sea and bombarded the Russian ports, Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossisk and 
Fedosya on 29 October 1919. After this, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire.  The 
Ottoman Empire’s declaration of war on Russia was followed by the British Empire’s and 
France’s declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire (Erdem, 1992).   
During the war, about 400,000 Ottomans lost their lives and about a million of them were 
injured or taken captured. At the end of the war, the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk with Russia on 4 June 1918, the Treaty of Batum with the three trans-
Caucasus countries, First Republic of Armenia, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and 
Democratic Republic of Georgia on 4 June 1918 and the Armistice of Mudros with Great 
Britain as the representative of all the Allied powers involved it the war with the Ottoman 
Empire on 30 October 1918 (Sonyel, 1994; Sofuoğlu, 2002). The Mudros Armistice called 
for the most severe terms. Under its terms,  the demobilization of the Ottoman armed 
forces (article 5), the withdrawn of the Ottoman army from Tripoli, Benghazi, Persia, 
Hejaz, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Caucasus (articles 11, 16, 17, 18), the right given to the 
Allied powers to occupy six Armenian provinces in case of disorder (article 24) and 
strategic points in the Ottoman territory in the event of they perceive a threat (article 7) and 
confiscation of the Ottoman railways, war vessels, telegraph systems (articles 6, 12, 15) 
were regulated (Mudros Agreement, 1918). It was obvious that the Allied powers paved 
the way for full occupation of the Ottoman territory. As expected, first Italy occupied 
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Antalya on the plea of the violation of the article 7 and then in Paris Peace Conference, a 
decision was made for the occupation of İzmir by the Greek army.  
2.1.2. The Independence War and the foundation of modern Turkish Republic 
In the Turkish history, Mustafa Kemal’s (who was then honoured with the surname 
Atatürk, father of the Turks) arrival in the province of Samsun is referred to as the 
beginning of the Turkish war of independence. Rejecting the conditions imposed by the 
Allied powers, the Turkish nationalists were organized all over the country under a 
countrywide resistance organization called Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri and organized 
the fight against the occupation forces. During the Independence War, the fighting force of 
the nationalists, Kuva-yi Milliye, fought against Greek, Armenian, French, British forces as 
well as reactionary forces in the country. At the end of the war, the Treaty of Sèvres was 
abandoned. On 24 July 1923, the foundation of the modern Turkey was declared with the 
Lausanne Treaty, which was a peace treaty signed by Turkey, British Empire, France, 
Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania and Serb-Croat-Slovene State.  Following the treaty, Turkey 
was declared as a republic on 29 October 1923.  
Born out of the ashes of WWI-defeated Ottoman Empire, the modern Turkish Republic 
was founded as a sovereign state. Just after the foundation, Mustafa Kemal, the 
commander-in-chief of the Turkish Independence War, and high-level bureaucrats of the 
Ottoman Empire who supported the Independence War were organized under People’s 
Party, Halk Fırkası (Partisi) which was then called Republican People’s Party, Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi (CHP). Atatürk was elected as the first President of the country and he 
assigned his comrade in arms, İsmet İnönü as the Prime Minister (PM). İnönü was a 
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venerated commander, who defeated the Greek army in the Independence War. The CHP 
governed the country from 1923 to 1950 under the leadership of İnönü, except for a short-
term leadership of another CHP Deputy Ali Fethi Okyar from late 1924 to early 1925. This 
period is known in the literature as the single-party period (Tuncay, 1981; Öztoprak, 2002).   
2.1.3. The single-party period 
Although Atatürk led an Independence War against imperial countries of the West, his 
ultimate objective was to build a western-type, secular nation state and a modern society. 
With his objective in mind, Atatürk introduced a broad range of social, economic, political, 
and legal reforms which are known as ‘Atatürk’s Reforms’. The laws concerning the 
abolition of the sultanate (1922) and the caliphate (1924), the closure of the dervish lodges 
(1925), the Latinization of the alphabet (1928), clothing reforms (1934) the surname law 
(1934), and adoption of secularism in the constitution (1937) aimed uprooting monarchic 
and fanatical commitments and establishing a western-style socioeconomic and political 
system. The civil code, which was a slightly modified version of the Swiss civil code, was 
adopted in 1926. With the new civil code, polygamy was forbidden and women were given 
right to divorce. Long before many countries in the world, the suffrage was extended to 
women. Women were given the right to vote and stand for elections for municipal 
elections in 1930, for village council elections in 1933 and for parliamentary elections in 
1934. In 1931, old systems of measurement were standardized which eased the commercial 
transactions with foreign countries (Eroğlu, 1982; Aybars, 1984).  
Nevertheless, some ethnic and religious segments of the society, i.e. the pro - Sultanate and 
pro-Caliphate reactionary movements and pro-Kurdish forces, showed resistance to the 
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implementation of the reforms. In 1925, Sheikh Said and a group of the former Ottoman 
commanders who were uncomfortable with the abolition of the Caliphate agreed on a plan 
to fight against the newly established regime. Sheikh Said called all the Muslims in the 
country to fight against the government forces. He collected about 10.000 armed men and 
attacked four South-eastern provinces, Diyarbakır, Bingöl, Mardin and Elazığ. Although, 
the rebellion has started with an anti-secular notion, it gradually gained a pro-Kurdish 
character. Ali Fethi Okyar, the incumbent PM did not consider the riot as a serious 
rebellion and thought it can be suppressed by means of martial law. Thereupon, Atatürk 
demanded Ali Fethi Okyar’s resignation and asked İsmet İnönü to form the new 
government. Following the rebellions, the regime took a series of authoritarian measures to 
protect the newly established order. The parliament adopted a law, Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu, 
immediately and equipped the new government with extraordinary power. With this power 
in hand, the government forces suppressed the rebellion shortly. Sheikh Said and the 
leaders of the rebellion were executed by newly established Independence Courts, İstiklal 
Mahkemeleri in 1925. It is widely believed that the United Kingdom masterminded the 
rebellion with the purpose of founding a sovereign Kurdish state and protecting its interests 
in the Middle East, especially in the Mosul province (Toker, 1968; Mumcu, 1991; Olson, 
2013).  
From the foundation of the country, Atatürk had a multi-party system in mind and urged 
the establishment of two opposition parties during the single-party period. However, both 
attempts to establish a multi-party system failed. The first attempt came from Kazım 
Karabekir, a former General of the Independence War and a group of Atatürk’s civil and 
veteran friends. Progressive Republican Party, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (TCF), 
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was established in 1924 and closed in 1925 after the Sheikh Said rebellion. The second 
attempt came from Ali Fethi Okyar. Urged by Atatürk, Okyar, the former ambassador of 
Turkey to Paris, founded the Liberal Republican Party, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (SCF), 
in 1930. It was declared in SCF’s party program that the party was going to be an advocate 
of liberal economy. However, the party was closed by Okyar in the same year, on the 
grounds that it became a focus of reactionary groups which refused to accept the secular 
characteristic of the new regime (Okyar, 1987; Yetkin, 1982; Koçak, 2006; Zucher & 
Çağalı-Güven, 2010). After Atatürk’s death on 10 November 1938, İsmet İnönü, the 
Chairman of the CHP was elected by the parliament as the second President of Turkey. 
During İnönü’s presidency the Second World War broke out. The economic situation in 
Turkey worsened during the war. The poor economic conditions and Atatürk’s death 
encouraged opposition groups. In particular, the government’s land reform invoked an 
intra-party opposition movement in the CHP. The movement consisted of those deputies 
who felt their interests were threatened by the reform program. Four deputies, Celal Bayar, 
Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, Refik Koraltan and Adnan Menderes gave a memorandum called 
the Memorandum of the Four, Dörtlü Takrir to their own party on 7 June 1945. With this 
manifesto, they challenged the authoritarian practices of the incumbent government and 
requested the adoption of a system giving people further democratic rights and freedoms. 
İsmet İnönü urged the four deputies to form a new political party and oppose the CHP 
government. The CHP administration first expelled Mehmet Fuad Köprülü and Adnan 
Menderes and then Refik Koraltan from the party and Celal Bayar resigned from 
parliamentary membership. Four former CHP deputies established the Democratic Party, 
Demokrat Parti (DP), a moderate right-wing political party on 7 January 1946. The DP 
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attracted the attention of peripheral masses with its liberal party program and challenged 
the single party government’s authoritarian practices (Kongar, 1998; Akandere, 2003). 
2.1.4. The beginning of the multi-party era 
By the end of the war, İnönü realized that a multi-party system had to be established in the 
country in order to gain acceptance in the new international economic and political system. 
On the other hand, Stalin’s rejection to renew the 1925 Soviet-Turkish Treaty of 
Friendship and Neutrality in 1945 also played a role in taking this decision (Gürün, 1991; 
Bilge, 1992). On 26 May 1946 local elections were held, but the DP boycotted the 
elections. However, upon the DP’s boycott the turnout rates remained low in the elections. 
This showed the DP’s potential power in the upcoming general elections (Akandere, 1998; 
Kayış, 2008). On 21 July 1946, the first multi-party elections were held and the CHP 
preserved its ruling position, but it was widely speculated that the CHP owed the victory to 
open balloting and secret counting of the votes (Akşin, 1997). Thus, the turnout rate and 
the distribution of the votes remained uncertain. It was declared that the CHP received 85.4 
and the DP received 13.1 percent of the votes. In terms of seats in the Parliament, the CHP 
gained 397 seats, the DP gained 61 and the independents gained 7 (TBMM, elections). 
Following the elections, İsmet İnönü was elected as the President for the fourth time on 5 
August 1946.  İnönü assigned Recep Peker as the PM and the new government was 
established on 7 August 1946 (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers). The DP’s gerrymander 
claims and hard-liner Peker’s criticism of the opposition party and its leaders raised the 
tension gradually in the Parliament in 1946 and 1947. After rising tension between Peker’s 
CHP and Celal Bayar’s DP, İnönü declared his neutral position between the two parties in 
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the Parliament with a declaration on 12 July 1947 (Akın, 2005; Dünya Bülteni, 2009). The 
majors in the provinces, who were also provincial chairmen of the governing CHP, were 
asked to maintain a neutral position. After rising tension, İnönü requested Recep Peker to 
resign and gave the mandate to Hasan Saka to form the new government (Prime Ministry, 
Prime Ministers). In 1947, Turkey has become a member of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank and Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
(Burçak, 1979; Haytoğlu, 2006).  
Despite the non-combatant position was preserved thanks to the PM İnönü, the general 
mobilization for the Second World War disrupted the war-torn Turkish economy, which 
was also further pressed by the financial depths of the overthrown Ottoman Empire. The 
challenging economic situation sparked reactions in society. Towards 1950s, poor 
economic conditions, high inflation and taxes, shortage of critical goods and bureaucratic 
and inefficient practices of the government decreased people’s support for the government. 
General elections were held on 14 May 1950. In the elections, a single member plurality 
voting system was adopted and the votes were cast secretly and counted openly.  The DP 
gained a landslide victory in the election, especially with the electoral support that came 
from rural habitants. The majority of the DP’s votes came from peasants from the 
countryside, agricultural labourers, merchants and petit bourgeois of the small towns. The 
DP symbolized change for those who were unhappy with 27 years of governance of the 
CHP. Owing to the majority voting electoral system with party lists and large 
constituencies, the DP gained 416 seats in the Parliament with 55.2 percent of the votes. 
On the other hand, the CHP gained only 69 seats with 39.6 percent of the votes (TBMM, 
elections). The CHP and especially the PM İsmet İnönü took all the necessary measures to 
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pass on the reigns of government to the DP peacefully. This was an unprecedented political 
movement when revolutionary cadres’ resistance for staying in power in other countries is 
considered (Timur, 1991; Akandere, 1998).  
Two names were put forward for the prime ministry seat in the new government, Mehmet 
Fuad Köprülü and Adnan Menderes. Although Celal Bayar favoured Menderes over 
Köprülü for this position, Menderes became the PM of the 19th government of Turkey on 
22 May 1950. Fuad Köprülü became the minister of foreign affairs and the same day, Celal 
Bayar was elected by the new parliament as the third President of Turkey (Presidency of 
the Republic of Turkey, Presidents). Although the founders of the DP were former CHP 
deputies, the DP was quite different than the CHP with respect to its approach to the 
economy and acquisitions of the Republic. The CHP’s late attempts concerning the 
liberalisation of the economy were further implemented by the DP government. One of the 
first practices of the Menderes government was to appoint new people to the office of 
commander in chief and service commands. This decision was taken upon the rise of the 
rumours that the army was preparing to stage a coup to overthrow the newly formed 
government.  
From 1950 to 1953 the DP had its golden period; this however did not prevent the budget 
give deficits from the first year of DP’s government. The economy grew at a faster rate 
than it had under the CHP government. During this period, as part of the Marshall Plan, 
Turkey and Greece received 400 million dollars of grants from the US. This grant was 
mostly used in mechanisation and supporting peasants. Low interest loans, high tariffs, 
removal of the quota restrictions and mechanisation gave quick results and agricultural 
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production expanded remarkably between 1950 and 1953. By means of newly constructed 
roads and highway, agricultural products reached to the cities more easily (Cumhuriyet 
Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 1983; Erhan, 1996; Özer, 2014).  
Relying on its electoral power and popularity, the DP government did not refrain from 
taking some controversial decisions in the domestic and international politics. In 1950, 
chanting of the call to prayer in its previous Arabic form which was banned in 1932, was 
allowed, religious classes started in the schools and construction of the mosques 
accelerated. These controversial steps were regarded as a counter-revolution by pro-CHP 
circles and the army. Sending troops to the Korean War was another controversial decision 
of the DP government. Following the North Korean forces’ crossing of the 38th parallel and 
invasion of the South Korean territory on 25 June 1950, the US and United Nations (UN) 
decided to send troops to assist the South Korea. In response to this, the North Korea was 
supported by China and the conflict between the two countries instantly raised global 
tension. The potential Soviet threat felt by the Turkish government after Stalin rejected to 
renew the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality underlined the government’s 
decision to take a stand in support of the Western bloc. By sending troops to the Korean 
War, the government wanted to show its solidarity with the Western coalition and become 
a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to face the potential Soviet 
threat. The government sent troops without the decision being discussed in the Parliament. 
A brigade consisting of about 5.000 soldiers and officers was dispatched. Following 
Turkish involvement in the war, Turkey was invited to join NATO and became the 
member on 18 February 1952 (Sarınay, 1988; Kongar, 1998; Uslu, 2003).  
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From 1953 onwards, the public’s high economic expectations with respect to the DP 
government yielded their place to disappointment. The balance of payments equilibrium 
and trading equilibrium were disrupted. Agricultural mechanization produced high 
numbers of landless peasants in the Eastern provinces which triggered the first wave of 
domestic migration in Turkey. Metropoles with large industrial investments, İstanbul in the 
first place, attracted large numbers of people owing to the better employment opportunities 
they provided. The government’s failure to reinvigorate the economy and establish social 
peace, however, increasingly gave rise to rising authoritarian sentiment. This is the point 
where the DP began to turn away from democratic reforms. Although the DP challenged 
the strict authoritarianism of the single-party government and claimed to be the protector 
of peripheral populations against central elites, it did not refrain from using the same 
authoritarian controls to suppress intra-party opposition movements, the rival political 
parties, left-wing organizations and the press. In 1953, the DP Chairman and the PM 
Adnan Menderes started attacking harshly the CHP and especially its leader İsmet İnönü, 
for all the troubles and poverty that the nation had faced. He started regarding all types of 
criticism to his government as equal to treason. The government increased its control over 
the opposition parties. The DP government passed a bill to hand over all the assets of the 
CHP to the state treasury, i.e., People’s Houses, Halkevleri, a state sponsored institution 
aiming social transformation of the people and the CHP’s official newspaper Ulus (Karpat, 
1963). University administrations and senior bureaucrats were targeted on the grounds that 
they supported the CHP in the elections. The DP government continued its oppression of 
the opposition following the 1954 elections. Because of his high level of public support, 
the Republican Nation Party’s leader Osman Bolükbaşi’s electoral city Kırşehir’s province 
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status turned into district and Bolükbaşi was imprisoned for insulting the Parliament in 
1956. Adnan Menderes explained the logic of this status change by saying that it was an 
answer to ‘abnormal’ voting practice in the city (Eroğlu, 1990). In the 1954 elections, the 
DP won the 57.61 percent of the votes and won 503 seats in the Parliament. The CHP, on 
the other hand, had 35.36 percent of the votes and 31 seats in the Parliament (TBMM, 
elections). The DP government’s authoritarian policies started to disturb the DP’s party 
group in the Parliament. The tension peaked after a group of the DP deputies gave a 
proposal to the Parliament regarding ‘the right to prove’. According to the law which was 
then in force, when a journalist asserted a claim about a minister and the claim was brought 
to the court, the journalist was not given the right to prove his claim. The law was clearly 
providing an unjust immunity to the executives of the governing party. The proposal was 
not accepted, but protesting against the gradually rising authoritarianism of the 
government, nineteen deputies of the governing DP resigned and founded the Liberty 
Party, Hürriyet Partisi (HP) (Çakmak, 2008). This caused the resignation of the 
government. During his address to the DP group in the Parliament, Menderes made one of 
his most controversial statements which sparked reactions. While trying to express that he 
recognizes the power of the party group, Menderes said to DP deputies that they could 
bring back the caliphate if they desired so (Sirmen, 2013). This speech was then considered 
as one of the foremost events provoking the army’s reaction.   
On 6/7 September 1955, the tension between the Turks and Greeks in Cyprus triggered 
conflicts in İstanbul. The September riots, 6/7 Eylül Olaylari, a series of organized attacks 
against the Greek minority in İstanbul sparked after a rumour was spread that the house in 
which Atatürk was born in Saloniki was bombed. The pro-government newspaper, İstanbul 
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Express’s provocative news telling that Istanbulite Greeks were financially supporting 
Cypriot guerrilla forces to fight against the Cypriot Turks also played a role in the rising 
tension. The government responded to the events with martial law and arrested over five 
thousand people. Yet, in fear of the attacks, a large portion of the Greek population fled 
from İstanbul (Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 1983; Kuyucu, 2005). In 1956, 
the DP increased its pressure on the press. A new press law was adopted. Based on the new 
law, criticizing the government was criminalized and journalists were imprisoned. The law 
on meetings and demonstrations was amended and political rights were limited. Even 
opposition party officials were detained upon exercising their political rights (Yıldız, 
1997).  
Rising authoritarianism, censorship, bans on the opposition and the worsening economic 
situation eroded the popularity of the DP in the eyes of the public. The Turkish lira was 
devaluated several times as a result of which the American dollar-Turkish Lira exchange 
rate tripled. The supporters of the DP saw that many of their expectations were not 
satisfied. The low-rank officers in the army were not also happy with the DP government. 
In 1957 a coup plot led by Lieutenant Colonel Faruk Güventürk was prevented. However, 
this attempt caused the government to realize the opposition developing within the army 
(Eroğlu, 1990). On 27 October elections the DP had 47.88 and the CHP had 41.09 percent 
of the votes. With these results, the DP received 424 and the CHP received 178 seats in the 
Parliament (TBMM, elections). The governing DP did nothing to defuse the tension among 
the people, instead fuelled it by polarizing society. In 1958, a political campaign was 
launched by the DP, called Fatherland Front, Vatan Cephesi. This campaign was based on 
drawing bold lines between DP supporters and the supporters of the opposition implying 
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that while DP supporters work to achieve the interests of the country, the others betray the 
country just because they do not support the DP government (Uyar, 2001).  
In early 1960, the Committee of Inquest, Tahkikat Komisyonu was established by 15 DP 
deputies for a period of three months and soon turned into a mechanism to suppress the 
opposition and the press. The committee investigated CHP deputies and the press. It 
worked as a juridical body and even sentenced some defendants to imprisonment. İsmet 
İnönü criticized the establishment of the committee and its actions and warned the DP 
deputies in the Parliament that they were forcing the limits of democracy and paving the 
way for military coup (Bulut, 2009). After these authoritarian steps, university students 
mobilized large-scaled protests against the government in İstanbul and Ankara. On 5 May 
1960, an anti-DP demonstration was organized in Kızılay square, Ankara, called 555K, 
symbolizing the date, time and the place of the demonstration. The students met the PM in 
the square and the PM remained between the demonstrators. The government wanted to 
recruit the army to oppress the protests, but the army refused to take an action against the 
students. PM Menderes accused the professors of provoking the students and tried to 
demonise them in the eyes of the public (Dündar & Çaplı, 2006).  
As can be seen from above, during the foundation period, both the single party and the DP 
governments faced economic, political and social challenges. In order to tackle these 
challenges, the governments took strict measures, including economic, political and social 
restrictions to oppress the opposition parties, public opposition, the media and minorities. 
At times, the extent of these measures was exaggerated, which caused the interruption of 
the democratic progress of Turkey. 
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2.2. The Interim Period 
The interim period starts with the overthrown of the DP government by a military coup on 
27 May 1960. The main reason for the coup, as it was declared to the public, was the rising 
despotic practices of the DP government. In order to prevent the establishment of 
authoritarian governments in the future, the junta adopted a new constitution, which 
guaranteed economic, political and civil rights. The 1961 constitution recognized the right 
to assembly, the right to demonstrate, for workers the right to strike, sign labour agreement 
and establish trade unions. The constitution also strengthened the separation of executive, 
legislative and judicial powers. The constitution envisaged new autonomous government 
bodies as well as strengthened autonomy of the existing institutions, including the 
universities and the media. Taken together, the period, which starts with the 1960 military 
coup and extends through the 1960s and the 1970s, is hypothetically different than the 
preceding period with respect to the level of authoritarianism of the governments in power 
and the legal system in force. 
From the Ottoman era to the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic, the Turkish 
military has always remained a strong presence in Turkish politics. Nevertheless, Atatürk’s 
and İsmet İnönü’s emphasis on the neutrality of the military in politics and the army’s 
reliance on their control over the country kept the army neutral in the day-to-day political 
struggles. However, Atatürk’s death in 1938, İnönü’s overthrow from the government in 
1950, and in addition to these, a series of factors, including the DP government’s gradually 
rising authoritarianism and its relationship with reactionary segments of the society, the 
PM’s harsh statements targeting the army and the opposition parties, all sparked reactions 
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within the army. On 27 May 1960, the first military coup in modern Turkey’s political 
history came. The military`s coup interrupted democratic life. Thirty-seven middle and 
low-rank military officers, who called themselves the National Unity Committee, Milli 
Birlik Komitesi (MBK), acted outside the hierarchical chain of the military and overthrew 
the government on 27 May 1960. Alparslan Türkeş, one of the powerful images of the 
junta, who later founded the far-right Nationalist Action Party, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, 
(MHP) announced the coup to the public (Gerçek Tarih Sayfası, 2015). Following the 
Committee’s seizing of power, the commander of the Third Army Ragıp Gümüşpala, who 
was forced to retire from the army and became one of the cofounders and the first 
Chairman of the Justice Party, Adalet Partisi (AP), threatened that if the leader of the junta 
has a lower rank than himself, he will walk to Ankara with his army (Yürekli, 2012). After 
this threat, a well-respected retired General Cemal Gürsel replaced the leader of the junta, 
Cemal Madanoğlu and became the Chairman of the committee. The junta declared its aims 
in the 6
th
 and 13
th
 notifications as to save the country from those politicians accused of 
leading the country towards crisis and disaster, and to prevent a potential civil war. One of 
the first actions of the junta government was to abolish the constitution and the Parliament. 
A group of academics was requested by the committee to set up a commission in order to 
write a new constitution.  The committee has assigned ministers to the Council of 
Ministers, Bakanlar Konseyi, and used the executive power by means of this institution. 
The committee used the legislative power directly and the judiciary power remained 
independent. The executives of the overthrown DP were sent to Yassıada, an island long 
used to send political prisoners into exile. During their imprisonment, the ex-executives of 
the DP faced maltreatment and violence. On 14 October 1960, the Yassıada trials were set 
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to judge the executives of the overthrown government. The hearings lasted about a year 
and the judgement of the court was declared on 15 September 1961. A series of 
accusations were directed to the ex-DP executives, relating to treason, corruption and 
authoritarian practices of the government. The high court sentenced 15 defendants to death. 
The National Unity Committee endorsed the execution of three of them, PM Adnan 
Menderes, Foreign Secretary Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan 
(Kayalı, 1994; Aydemir, 1984).   
The 1961 constitution replaced the 1924 constitution and remained in force until 1980. In 
fact, although the constitution was introduced by a junta government, it had a liberal 
outlook to such an extent that it was likened to ‘a loose shirt’ tailored for weak Turkish 
democracy (Aldıkaçtı, 1973; Öymen, 2007). Two draft constitutions were written, one by 
İstanbul University, Faculty of Law and another by Ankara University, Faculty of Political 
Sciences. They were called the İstanbul and Ankara drafts. The İstanbul draft envisaged a 
weak executive and the Ankara draft prescribed strong executive power. On 6 January 
1961, a constituent assembly was established and 20 members of the assembly formed a 
constitutional committee. The constitutional committee used the İstanbul draft as the main 
text and the Ankara draft as the subsidiary text, however the final text resembles more the 
latter than it does to the former (Aldıkaçtı, 1973). A constitutional referendum was held on 
9 July 1961 and the constitution was approved by 61.7 percent of the votes (TÜİK, 2008).  
The constitution involved a series of reforms in the state structure and in fundamental 
rights and liberties. In the legislative sphere, a two-chambered Parliament was established 
and a constitutional court was founded to supervise the constitutionality of the laws (art. 
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63). The principles of state of law and social state were recognized in the constitution (art. 
2). Tenure of the judges was strengthened (1961 Turkish Constitution, art. 137). 
Restrictions on political rights i.e. the right to assembly and hold demonstration without 
prior authorization lessened (art. 28); workers’ rights i.e. the right to strike and to sign 
labour agreement (art. 47) and the right to establish trade unions (art. 46) were approved. 
In the executive sphere, government bodies, i.e. the MGK (art. 111) and the DPT (art. 129) 
were established. The state authority was decentralized by giving more autonomy to 
institutions, i.e. the National Radio and Television Cooperation (TRT) and the universities 
(art. 120, 121). The political parties were given a legal status (art. 56). 
As the ban on political parties lifted, new parties were established. Four parties entered the 
elections. The CHP was re-established under the leadership of İsmet İnönü. The political 
legacy of the closed DP was claimed by three political parties; Republican Villagers 
Nation Party, Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (CKMP), Justice Party, Adalet Partisi 
(AP) and New Turkey Party, Yeni Türkiye Partisi (YTP). CKMP was established as a 
fusion of two former parties; Turkey Villagers’ Party, Türkiye Köylü Partisi (TKP), and 
Republican Nation Party, Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi (CMP). The Chairman of the AP was 
Ragıp Gümüşpala who was forced to retire by the committee members following an 
unsuccessful coup. On 15 October 1961 general elections were held. While the CHP 
received 36.74 percent of the votes, the AP, despite ex-President Celal Bayar’s explicit 
support, had 34.79 percent. The two minor parties, namely the YTP and the CMKP both 
had about 13 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). The three successor parties of the 
DP had enough electoral support to form a coalition government. However, the army did 
not favour this option. A junta within the armed forces led by the Military Academy 
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Commander, Colonel Talat Aydemir was particularly concerned about it. The first clash 
sparked on the presidential elections. The three parties prepared to nominate Prof. Ali Fuat 
Başgil, who was a name which was not favoured by the army. The Generals and junta 
members had a long meeting in İstanbul and agreed on a new military coup and signed the 
21 October Protocol. However, İsmet İnönü was informed about the plan and he stood up 
against the coup plot.  İnönü had the Chief of the General Staff General Cevdet Sunay’s 
support. Sunay convinced the junta members on a plan involving İnönü’s prime ministry 
and a popular General Cemal Gürsel’s presidency. İnönü’s strong stance prevented the 
coup and once again saved Turkish democracy (Birand, Dündar & Çaplı, 1994).  
On 25 October 1961 the Parliament was re-opened. Its first task was to elect the President. 
Cemal Gürsel, as agreed before, has become the fourth President of the Turkish Republic. 
The President Cemal Gürsel gave the authority to establish the government to İsmet İnönü. 
The first coalition government in the Turkish history was formed between the CHP and the 
AP (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers). The CHP-AP coalition lasted for only seven 
months. During the CHP-AP government, İsmet İnönü played an important role in the 
suppression of another coup plot led by Colonel Talat Aydemir on 22 February 1962 
(Demir, 2006).  İnönü split in opinion with the AP on granting an amnesty for the 
imprisoned ex-DP deputies and resigned from the government. However, İnönü was given 
authority by the President to establish the government for the second time. The first round 
of talks did not end up with a coalition. Under pressure from the army, a coalition 
government was established between the CHP, the YTP, the CKMP and independent 
deputies (Birand, Dündar & Çaplı, 1994). On 21 May 1963, former Colonel Talat Aydemir 
attempted to stage another coup, but it was suppressed. Talay Aydemir and his friends put 
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on a trial and Aydemir and his fellow soldier major Fethi Gürcan were executed a year 
later (Demir, 2006). In the 1963 local elections, the CHP received 36.22 percent and the 
AP received 45.48 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). The two minor partners of the 
coalition, namely the YTP and the CKMP linked their failure in the elections to their 
coalition partnership with the CHP and pulled out of the coalition government. İnönü 
established the first minority government of Turkey with independent deputies (Prime 
Ministry, Prime Ministers).  
One of the first important incidents the new government faced was the rising tension 
between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus. The Turkish and Greek parties had meetings in 
London Conference but achieved no solution regarding the Cyprus problem at the 
meetings. This fuelled the antagonism between the parties. There was a strong community 
pressure on the Turkish government to send soldiers to the island. İnönü knew that the 
army did not have necessary technical equipment to succeed in such an operation. Yet, he 
had a meeting with the American ambassador and asked him to inform the American 
government about the government’s intervention plan. As soon as the American President 
Lyndon B. Johnson was informed, he sent a letter to İnönü. In the letter, Johnson stated 
that the US government does not agree on the use of the American weaponry in Turkey in 
this intervention. Johnson also warned the Turkish government that if Turkish intervention 
caused a Soviet intervention in Turkey, NATO allies might not be able to protect Turkey 
(Şahin, 2002).  
The Chairman of the AP, Ragıp Gümüşpala died in 1964 and Süleyman Demirel was 
elected as the Chairman of the AP. On 13 February 1965, the CHP’s budget law was voted 
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in the Parliament and upon its refusal İnönü resigned from the government. The elections 
were held and the AP, under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, won 52.87 and the CHP 
won 28.75 percent of the votes in the elections (TBMM, elections). Thanks to the national 
remainder electoral system, even the smallest parties got into the Parliament. The most 
surprising result was the success of Mehmet Ali Aybar’s socialist Workers Party of 
Turkey, Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP). TİP’s 2.97 percent vote gained the party 16 seats in the 
Parliament (TBMM, elections). Demirel formed the government and won a vote of 
confidence (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers).  
The conflict-ridden environment of the Cold War increased the tension between the right 
and left wing parties in the Parliament in 1968. At times, the TİP and the AP deputies 
involved in fights in the general assembly. Fuelled by the tension in the Parliament the 
clashes intensified between right and left-wing student groups. Armed left and right-wing 
student groups were boycotting the classes and occupying university buildings. In order to 
protest against American involvement in the Cyprus problem and the Vietnam War, an 
anti-American protest was held on 17 July 1968. The police wanted to arrest the student 
leaders before the protests and one student died during the clashes with the police. On 18 
July 1968, blaming them for their friend’s death, left-wing students attacked the mariners 
of the 6
th
 Fleet that was anchored in the Bosphorus and threw them overboard. Another 
anti-American movement took place on 6 January 1969. During the American Ambassador 
Robert W. Komer’s visit to the President of the Middle East Technical University 
(ODTÜ), his car was fired by a group of left-wing students. Komer was targeted because 
of his previous anti-Viet Cong operations in the South Vietnam as a CIA member. The 
responsible left wing students were expelled from the school, which further radicalized 
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them. A group of them went to Palestine to receive guerrilla training and following their 
return, organized under a left-wing armed organisation called Dev-Genç (Birand, Dündar 
& Çaplı, 1994). On the other hand, right-wing students were recruited and trained to be 
para-military forces by Alparslan Türkeş’s MHP. A confrontation between the two 
militarized groups in İstanbul’s Taksim Square on 16 February 1969, which is known as 
Bloody Sunday, Kanli Pazar was particularly dramatic. The left wing student group 
organized an event to protest the existence of the 6
th
 Fleet in the Turkish territorial waters. 
The right wing group’s arrival at the square and their attack to the leftist students turned 
the Taksim Square into a battleground. Both groups were trained and organized which 
increased the causalities. Two people were killed and over a hundred got injured in the 
confrontation. The Bloody Sunday was the most important milestone in the transformation 
of the ideological opposition into a narrow-scoped civil war (Kabacalı, 1992).  
Before the 1969 elections, in order to prevent TİP deputies’ parliamentary membership, the 
electoral system was changed. The national remainder system was replaced with D’Hont 
method (Erdoğan, 2007). The new electoral system supported parties with high votes rates 
over those with low vote rates, therefore, although the TİP largely preserved the number of 
its votes, it only had two seats in the Parliament. On the other hand, the AP had 46.55 and 
the CHP had 27.37 of the votes (TBMM, elections). The street fights further increased 
after the exclusion of the socialist TİP from the Parliament. On 4 March 1971 four aviation 
officers were kidnapped by People’s Liberation Army of Turkey, Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş 
Ordusu (THKO). The security forces clashed with the members of the group in ODTÜ and 
the four officers were released. However, the armed left-wing para-military group has 
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already drawn the attention of the generals and hold responsible for the rising tension in 
the country.  
The disturbance concerning the rising violence was growing amongst the members of the 
armed forces. Many secret juntas were formed to overthrow the AP government, which 
was regarded as responsible for the rising violence. The widely accepted view among the 
army members was that the 1960 coup had not obtained its goals because the military 
government left the administration to the civilians too early. This view was also shared by 
some opposition deputies, some journalists and representatives of some non-governmental 
organisations. These groups were holding meetings and broadcasting their ideas 
concerning the policies that were going to be implemented following a potential coup. A 
junta led by the chief of the air staff General Muhsin Batur and the commander of the land 
forces General Faruk Gürler made all the preparations for a coup that was going to be 
staged on 9 March 1971. According to the plan, Gürler was going to be the President and 
Batur the PM. Although, the low rank Generals were willing to overthrow the elected 
government and take charge of the country, the Generals were against a total coup. The 
two commanders in chief of the armed forces and the chief of staff Memduh Tağmaç were 
agreed on a memorandum to be given to the government on 12 March 1971. In the 
memorandum text, the armed forces listed a series of actions to be taken by the 
government and expressed their determination to stage a coup unless they were 
implemented. The President Cevdet Sunay, who was informed about the memorandum, 
requested the PM Demirel to resign from the government. Demirel, decided to require a 
vote of confidence from the government and consolidate his power to stand against the 
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coup. However, he was not supported by the AP groups and resigned from the government 
(Arcayürek, 1985).  
The President charged Nihat Erim, a CHP Deputy, to establish a new government. Erim 
formed his government with deputies from the AP and the CHP. He held the view that the 
1960 constitution gave more than necessary rights to the individuals. Thus, one of the first 
actions of the new government was to declare martial law in some cities to struggle with 
the radical right and left wing groups. The right to strike and collective bargaining right for 
the workers were abolished. The powers of the autonomous state organs were decreased. 
Some left-wing newspapers and youth organisations were closed. On 17 May 1971, 
Elfraim Elron, the consul general of Israel, was kidnapped by the Turkish People’s 
Liberation Party/Front, Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi (THKP/C). Those who 
kidnapped Elron asked the government to release their arrested friends in exchange to 
Elron’s life. The government rejected this and soon afterwards, Elron was found dead. 
After Elron’s death, the new government increased the pressure on the left wing groups. 
An operation, called Sledgehammer, Balyoz Harekatı was carried and thousands of left 
wing students, including 23 members of THKP/C, intellectuals, professors, journalists, 
authors, army members, politicians were arrested and put on trial. They were found guilty 
of violating the constitution art. 146/1 regulating the crime of ‘aiming to abolish the 
constitutional order by arm’. Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Huseyin İnan, the three 
members of the THKP/C, were executed on 6 May 1972. Following the executions it is 
widely speculated that these three young left wing student leaders were executed in 
retaliation for the executions of the three members of the right wing government in 1961 
(Birand, Dündar & Çaplı, 1994).  
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After İnönü’s resignation in 1972, the General Secretary of the party, Zonguldak Deputy 
and ex-Minister of Labour of the previous three coalition governments, Bülent Ecevit was 
elected as the new Chairman of the CHP. In the 1973 elections, Bülent Ecevit’s CHP won 
33.30 and Demirel’s AP 29.82 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). The election 
results confirmed that Ecevit’s novel ideological doctrine, Left-of-Centre, Ortanın Solu 
was approved by the people. However, none of the parties were able to establish the 
government solely. Thereupon, Ecevit established the government with Necmettin 
Erbakan’s pro-Islamist National Salvation Party, Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP) which 
received 11.80 percent of the votes in the elections (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers 
TBMM, elections).  
On 15 July 1974, Nikos Sampson, the leader of the EOKA-B movement staged a coup in 
Cyprus, overthrew Archbishop Makarios’ government and declared himself as the 
President of the Hellenic Republic of Cyprus. EOKA/B was a paramilitary organisation 
established by General George Grivas in order to unite Cyprus with Greece. Turkey, 
together with Greece and the United Kingdom, was one of the guarantor countries of the 
1959 Zurich and London Agreements, the agreements stipulating the foundation of Cyprus 
as an independent state. After the coup, the MGK issued a decision regarding a military 
intervention in Cyprus called Operation Attila. On 20 July 1974, Turkish naval and air 
forces were dispatched to the island. The operation was met with weak resistance from the 
Greek Cypriot forces. After political pressures coming from the US and the UK, Turkey 
stopped the operation. A ceasefire was declared between the parties and the island was 
divided, de facto, into two. However, the Turkish operations secured Turkish minority 
interests in Cyprus. Two conferences were held in Geneva, the first one between the 
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foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and the UK, and the second was between the leader of 
the new civil Cypriot government, Glafcos Clerides and the leader of the Turkish 
population, Rauf Denktaş who then became the President of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus. At the Geneva conferences, the Turkish-Cypriot party was first 
recognized politically by the Greek Cypriots. However, the parties did not come to an 
agreement. In order to protect the Turkish population in the island, the Turkish forces 
occupied the 35 percent of the island’s territory. A buffer zone was established by the UN 
between the two territories which is known today as the Green Line (Eroğlu, 1975; 
Kalelioğlu, 2009; Alasya, 1987).  
The PM Ecevit greatly enjoyed the popularity of the intervention and consolidated his 
political power. However, the intervention was perceived badly in the West, especially the 
US. In addition to Ecevit’s left-wing background and his government’s permission for 
opium poppy plantation, Turkish military intervention to Cyprus further damaged Turkey’s 
bilateral relations with the US severely. The American senate imposed an arms embargo on 
Turkey. Oil supply had already been low due to the embargo of the members of the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries and now the American embargo 
caused a further unease in the Turkish economy. As a result of these embargos, many of 
the goods went on the black market and inflation rose in Turkey (Erhan, 1996). Following 
the fall of the CHP-MSP coalition government on 17 November 1974, a new coalition 
government was established by Demirel’s AP and three minor right wing parties; the MSP, 
the MHP and the Republican Reliance Party, Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (CGP) (Prime 
Ministry, Prime Ministers). The coalition government was also known as the Nationalist 
Front, Milliyetçi Cephe (MC) which had a clear anti-leftist perception. The government’s 
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aim was to prevent another CHP-led government, which was thought to be responsible of 
the rising tension in the country.  
The weakness of the public authority in the second half of the 1970s provided a fertile 
environment for terrorist organizations to carry out violent actions against Turkey. Two of 
those organizations which will stage the bloodiest attacks for decades emerged during 
these years. One of them is the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia 
(ASALA) and the other one is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). ASALA was founded 
to force the Turkish governments to recognize the clashes between the Turkish and 
Armenian parties during the First World War as genocide. After recognition of the alleged 
genocide, the plan was to claim reparations and then territory of Turkey. The problem 
dates back to the First World War. During the war, the Armenians made an alliance with 
the Allied Powers. They were organized under a series of military organizations, including 
the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (also known as Dashnaktsutyun) and Social 
Democrat Hunchakian Party and fought with Russia and France against the Ottoman 
Empire. At the end of the war, the Paris Peace Conference started and the Armenians 
attended to the conference. Their main argument was that tens of thousands of Armenians 
fought with the Allied Powers and in exchange for their service they deserved reparations 
and an independent state. They demanded 19 billion francs for reparations. In addition to 
that, they claimed a territory, involving a great portion of the Eastern and Southern East 
Anatolia. Against the Armenian thesis, the Turkish thesis was that a small territory could 
be given to Armenians in Caucasus. They argued that for those cities that were claimed by 
the Armenians, the Armenians had never been the majority segment of the society and 
therefore, an independent Armenian state could not be established in those cities. The 
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Armenian issue was discussed in the London and San Remo Conferences. At the end of the 
discussions, the Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920. The treaty appointed the 
American President Woodrow Wilson to determine the boundaries of an Armenian country 
which was agreed to be established broadly in Erzurum, Van, Bitlis and Trabzon 
provinces. Since the Treaty of Sevres was signed by the Ottoman executives, the Turkish 
Independence War invalidated this agreement. As such, after about half a century, ASALA 
was founded to revive these claims. ASALA’s main target was carrying out terrorist 
activities against Turkish diplomats and politicians abroad. ASALA’s first attack targeted 
the Turkish ambassador to Vienna, Danış Tunalıgil on 22 October 1975. From 1975 to 
1990s a total number of 46 people (many of them were senior diplomats) were killed and 
299 were injured in the attacks staged by ASALA (Kurz & Merari, 1985; Dugan et. al. 
2008).  
The 1970s also witnessed the rise of the PKK. The political struggle of Abdullah Öcalan, 
the co-founder and current imprisoned chief of the PKK, dates back to the foundation of 
Ankara Democratic-Patriotic High Education Association, Ankara Demokratik Yurtsever 
Yüksek Ögrenim Birliği (ADYÖD) which was founded in 1975. In 1975, ADYÖD was co-
founded by Öcalan and some of the other future leaders of the PKK as one of the first 
university-based associations after the 12 March memorandum. Öcalan occupied the 
Secretary-General of the association. Öcalan and his 16 friends from ADYÖD founded 
another organization called Apocus, Apocular, the followers of Apo, a nickname derived 
from Öcalan’s first name. The organization evolved into PKK in the following years. The 
PKK was officially founded on 27 November 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan and a group of his 
friends. In the beginning, PKK’s ideology was based on Marxism and Leninism. Its 
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ultimate aim was to promote a proletarian revolution, overthrow the capitalist economic 
system and replace it with a communist one. However, in the following years the PKK 
specified its ultimate aim as to establish an independent Kurdish state in the East and 
Southeast of Turkey. In the first years, the PKK fought against other pro-Kurdish 
movements and local feudal tribes collaborating with the central government in Ankara. 
From its foundation, the PKK used armed conflict as a means to achieve its ultimate aim. 
The PKK’s first important assassination attempt targeted Mehmet Celal Bucak, a Şanlıurfa 
Deputy of the AP and a member of the Bucak tribe. During about forty years of fighting 
between the PKK and Turkey, about 35.000 people, including the members of the security 
forces and common citizens were killed (Crisis, 1995; Sayarı, 1997).  
Turkey entered the end of the 1970s with worsening economic conditions, high inflation, 
international embargos, ideological tension and terrorism. The tension between the right 
wing coalition government and the left wing main opposition party, the CHP was also 
high. One of the most important sources of the tension was the establishment of the State 
Security Courts, Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri (DGMs). The DGMs were special courts 
established to judge terror cases. The Revolutionary Confederation of Labour Unions, 
Devrimci İşçi Sendikalari Konfederasyonu (DİSK), the most powerful workers union with 
a total number of 500.000 members, was supporting the CHP in this conflict. On Mayday 
in 1976, the DİSK organized a rally and thousands of its members walked to the Taksim 
Square to protest the DGMs. The demonstrations started peacefully; however, the fire 
which was suddenly commenced from the surrounding buildings of the square caused a 
panic among the protesters. That day 34 people were killed and hundreds of them were 
injured in Taksim Square (İkinci, 2003; Mavioğlu & Sanyer, 2007). 
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In the 5 July 1977 elections, Bülent Ecevit’s CHP received 41.38 and Süleyman Demirel’s 
AP received 36.89 percent of the votes, while none of the minor parties exceeded ten 
percent. With these election results, the CHP had 213 and the AP had 189 seats in the 
Parliament (TBMM, elections). Ecevit was given the mandate to form the government. 
After Ecevit’s failure to win a vote of confidence from the Parliament, another right wing 
government was established by the AP, the MSP and the MHP, which was labelled as the 
second Nationalist Front government (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers). In the following 
days after the foundation of the second Nationalist Front government, Ecevit promised 
ministry seats to 11 AP Deputies and established the new government. This political 
bargain was named as Güneş Motel Event, deriving its name from the place where the 
negotiations between Ecevit and the 11 AP Deputies were held (Altındağ & Mocan, 2015). 
Neither left wing nor right wing governments were able to stop the violence in the street. 
The whole country, including the police and the army, was divided ideologically. The 
division was so deep that the radicals from each camp took up arms and formed liberated 
areas that the members of the opposite camps were not allowed to enter. The right wing 
groups organized dramatic attacks on the left wingers in İstanbul University and 
Bahçelievler and Balgat districts in Ankara. On the other hand armed left-wingers were 
fighting against the right-wing groups and the other factions within the left-wing camp. In 
addition to these, pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist groups started taking up arms too. On 6 
September 1980, a meeting was organized in Konya, a central Anatolian province, by MSP 
supporter Islamists to protest Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem and declaration of it as its 
capital. At the end of the demonstrations, the MSP supporters organized violent attacks to 
tourists hotels and workplaces that sell alcohol, protested the Turkish National Anthem and 
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shouted Islamist and reactionary slogans (Güzel, 2006). The conflict between the left and 
the right wing groups also gained an ethnic dimension. In Kahramanmaraş, Sivas, Malatya 
and Çorum provinces, hundreds of Alawites were slaughtered and their workplaces were 
vandalized by right wingers. Everyday tens of people were being killed and the country 
was being dragged into a civil war. The ex-PM Nihat Erim and ex-Minister of Customs, 
Monomopolies and Vice Chairman of MHP Gün Sazak, Journalist Abdi İpekçi were 
among those who were assassinated in these days (Birand, Dündar & Çaplı, 1994). 
Beside crisis in the domestic politics, very important developments also took place in the 
international arena these days. The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the Islamic 
revolution in Iran made protecting the stability in Turkey, more of an issue for global 
peace. Turkey was indebted to the IMF creditor countries and was not able to pay its debt. 
New credit agreements between Turkey and the IMF were signed and loans were activated 
on a series of conditions, including the adoption of the free market economy, the 
devaluation of the Turkish Lira, the implementation of austerity measures, introduction of 
export incentives and adoption of the daily exchange rate system. To respond to these 
requests, a series of decisions concerning the general state of the economy were taken on 
24 January 1980. They are known as January 24 Decisions, 24 Ocak Kararlari. These 
decisions constituted a paradigm shift in the Turkish economic administration. The state-
led economy was transformed into a market-oriented one. The import-substitution 
industrialization were abandoned. The subventions were removed and foreign trade was 
liberalized. The decisions also involved the devaluation of the Turkish Lira and the selling 
of the state enterprises. The AP government assigned Turgut Özal as the general director of 
the Electric Power Resources Survey and Development Administration, who was then 
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going be the Chairman of the Motherland Party, Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) between 1983 
and 1989, and the President of Turkey from 1989 to 1993, to carry out the reforms 
(Başkaya, 1986; Sönmez, 1982).  
The presidential election was an important date on the agenda ahead of Turkey in 1980. 
The President Fahri Korutürk’s term was ending on 6 April 1980 and the Parliament was to 
elect a new President. None of the parties had enough seats to elect the new President and 
they failed to come to an agreement to designate a joint candidate. Beginning from 22 
March to 11 September, the Parliament held a total number of 114 rounds of meetings but 
failed to elect the new President (Güreli, 2007). During this six-month period Senate 
Chairman İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil acted as a Deputy President (Presidency of the Republic 
of Turkey, Presidents).   
Considering the points mentioned in the above pages, it can be assumed that the political 
and the legal outlook of the interim period is relatively less authoritarian than that of the 
foundation period. Weak governments, liberal 1961 constitution, the conflict-ridden 
environment of the Cold War era can be discusses as potential reasons underlying this. The 
final section looks at the events that marked the Turkish political history between the 1980 
military coup and late 2000s. 
2.3. The Post-1980 Period 
The post-1980 period starts with the 12 September 1980 military coup which left its mark 
on economic, political and social environment in Turkey in the 1980s, the 1990s and to a 
lesser extent even in the 2000s. Some of its influences can still be seen in the legal 
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procedures, including the political parties and anti-terror laws. The influence of the coup is 
such an extent that many macro and individual level economic and social indicators swing 
sharply after 1980. With the aim of establishing the lost public authority, the military 
government established a highly hierarchical order. The whole state system was 
centralized. The government and the President were given exceptional powers. The 
universities, media, political parties, workers’ unions and non-governmental organizations 
were controlled by the central authority. All those who were thought to be opposed to the 
military government were held responsible for the pre-1980 violence and were either sent 
to prison and faced maltreatment and torture and even sentenced to death or at least fired 
from their jobs or blacklisted. For all these reasons and many others that will be elaborated 
in the following pages, the post-1980 period is considered different with respect to the 
character of the governments in power and legal procedures in effect than its preceding 
period.  
Weak governments and collapsed public authority failed to respond effectively to the 
violence in the streets as well as separatist and reactionary movements. All these brought 
Turkey at the end of another democratic period. On 12 September 1980, the Turkish 
democracy succumbed to another military coup. In fact, the coup was planned to be staged 
on 11 July 1980 but the Süleyman Demirel’s AP government won a vote of confidence 
which precluded its happening. The Chief of the General Staff General Kenan Evren 
declared to the public in the state television that the aim of the coup was to protect the 
integrity of the country and the nation, to re-establish democracy and the public authority 
(Uğur, 2007). Immediately after the coup, the government and the Parliament were 
dissolved and the leaders of the four major parties were detained and sent into exile. Unlike 
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in 1960, this time the military has staged the coup through the chain of order and 
command. Five army commanders, General Kenan Evren the Chief Commander of the 
General Staff, General Nurettin Ersin the commander of the land forces, General Nejat 
Tümer the commander of the naval forces, General Tahsin Şahinkaya the commander of 
the air forces and General Sedat Celasun the commander of the gendarmerie forces formed 
the governing body of the military rule, the MGK.  Kenan Evren was attained as the head 
of the state and retired admiral Bülend Ulusu was appointed as the PM. Ulusu formed a 
government with retired army members and civilians, which was approved by the 
Committee.  Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry and the State Planning Organization of 
the 43th government Turgut Özal, who was going to be the 8th President of the Turkish 
Republic, became the Deputy PM with responsibility for the economy. It was speculated 
that Özal’s assignment to this post reflects the military-led government’s commitment to 
the January 24 decisions. 
In order to control the entire political, economic and social system, the military 
government replaced the mayors, the general directors of public economic enterprises, 
bureaucrats with military officers. Martial law was declared in 13 regions throughout the 
country.  The military coup did not face a serious resistance from the armed groups, most 
of their members surrendered themselves. The others were detained and the detention 
period was increased from 15 days to 90 days. A total number of 210 thousand claims were 
filed in the courts and 230 thousands of people were put on trial. Dev-Sol, MHP, Barış 
Derneği were the most popular cases. Attorneys sought the death penalty for about 7 
thousands of people. Among them, 517 people were sentenced to death, but 50 of them 
were executed. Especially the execution of Erdal Eren, who was only 17 years old at the 
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time of the crime, was widely condemned. Thousands of left and right wingers were sent to 
prison and faced maltreatment and even torture.  More than 300 people died in prison, 171 
of which died because of torture. In accordance with the law no: 1402, 30,000 people were 
fired from their jobs including 120 academics. While 14,000 Turkish citizens were 
expatriated, 30,000 people fled abroad and requested asylum from foreign countries. All 
types of political and associational activities were banned and important daily newspapers, 
Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet and Milliyet were closed for about a year. As it is seen, the military 
government maintained the domestic tranquillity at the expense of individual economic, 
social and political rights. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the coup and the military 
government’s repression were undemocratic, the coup was welcomed by the majority of 
the public, especially because it put an end to the violence in the streets (Birand, 1987; 
Mazıcı, 1989). 
The military-led government took a series of controversial steps both in the international 
and domestic politics. Greece’s return to NATO had long been vetoed by Turkey. The 
Rogers plan was accepted, which was suggested by NATO’s supreme allied commander 
Bernard William Rogers as a plan to allow Greece to return to NATO. Another important 
step in the international arena was the military government’s ban on opium poppy 
plantation which was allowed by Ecevit’s government. More controversial steps were 
taken in domestic politics. The military government aimed to depoliticise the people of the 
country. The government declared both the right and left wing ideologies as the ‘demonic’ 
and started a campaign to produce a depoliticized generation with no ideological leaning. 
With this objective in mind, education was used as a tool. The government controlled the 
universities by means of the Higher Education Law, no: 2547. In accordance with the law, 
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a supreme body called the Council of Higher Education, Yükseköğretim Kurulu (YÖK) 
was founded on 6 November. The council had twenty-one members two thirds of them 
were elected by the President and the council of ministers and one third of the members 
were elected by Inter-University Council which was composed of two academics from 
each university. Professor İhsan Doğramacı was attained as the first President of YÖK. 
Doğramacı was widely criticized in the following years, especially due to his collaboration 
with the military government to indoctrinate the young. YÖK was given the authority to 
determine the content of the university lectures, assign the university lecturers and make 
strategic planning of the university education. In universities, compulsory Turkish 
Language and Ataturk’s Principles and History of Turkish Revolution lectures and in high 
schools, national security and obligatory religion lessons were put in the syllabus (Higher 
Education Law, 1981).  
The military government established a constitutional committee to write a new 
constitution. A draft constitution was written on 23 September 1982 and approved in the 
constitutional referendum on 7 November 1983 by 91.4 percent of the votes (Gözler, 2000; 
TÜİK, 2008). The first three articles of the constitution were designed as non-amendable 
ones. The fourth article forbade the amendment of the first three articles and also 
legislative proposals given to amend them. In the first three articles the type of the regime 
was defined as a Republic, the state was described as democratic, secular, social state of 
law, the integrity of the country and the nation was mentioned, the official language, the 
flag, the National Anthem and the capital of the Turkish Republic were mentioned. 
According to the related articles of the constitution, the legislative power was given to the 
Parliament of Turkey, the executive power to the President and the Council of Ministers 
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and the judiciary power to the independent courts. The first temporary article of the 
constitution regulated Kenan Evren’s presidency for seven years. The fourth temporary 
article banned all types of political activities of the pre-coup politicians (1982 Turkish 
Constitution, art. 1/2/3/4, temp. art. 1/4). The council of ministers was given authority to 
issue statutory decrees and to declare two types of state of emergency, mobilization and 
war (1982 Turkish Constitution, art. 121/122).  
One of the military government’s most controversial regulations was the Political Parties 
Law. According to the law, the permission for the establishment of the political parties had 
to be provided by the MGK. Before the upcoming elections in 1983, the MGK gave 
permission for the establishment of only three parties. They were Turgut Sunalp’s 
Nationalist Democracy Party, Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (MDP), Necdet Calp’s Populist 
Party, Halkçı Parti, (HP) (which claims the political legacy of the CHP) and Turgut Özal’s 
ANAP. While the MDP was under the auspices of the military regime, the HP was a social 
democrat and the ANAP was a centre-right party. On the other hand, a series of parties, i.e. 
Social Democracy Party, Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi, (SODEP) of Erdal  İnönü, the son of 
İsmet  İnönü, first Ali Fethi Esener’s Great Turkey Party, Büyük Türkiye Partisi, (BTP) 
and then Ahmet Nusret Tuna’s True Path Party, Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP) (which claims 
the political legacy of the closed AP), Welfare Party, Refah Partisi (RP) (which claims the 
political legacy of the closed MSP) of Ahmet Tekdal and Conservative Party, Muhafazakar 
Parti (MP) (which claims the political legacy of the closed MHP) of Mehmet Pamak were 
rejected by the MGK (Kabasakal, 2013). 
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On 10 June 1983 the new electoral law, no 2839 was approved. The law stipulated a 
modified version of the plain D’Hondt system by adding two (one for each constituency 
and one for the whole country) 10 percent thresholds. The elections were held on 6 
November 1983. Three parties entered the elections: Retired General Turgut Sunalp’s 
MDP, former Deputy Minister in Charge of the Economy in the Bülend Ulusu government, 
Turgut Özal’s ANAP and former Undersecretary of the Prime Ministery in the Bülend 
Ulusu government, Necdet Calp’s HP which claimed the political legacy of the closed 
CHP. The military government supported the MDP explicitly. However, the Özal’s ANAP 
received 45.14, the HP received 30.46 and the MDP received 23.27 percent of the votes. 
With this election result, the most voted party, the ANAP had 211, the HP had 177 and the 
MDP had 71 seats in the Parliament (TBMM, elections).  
Turgut Özal, the Chairman of the victorious ANAP, was the Deputy PM with 
responsibility for the economy and the coordination of the pre-coup January 24 decisions 
in the military led-Ulusu government. Özal resigned from the Ulusu government after the 
bankers’ crisis. However, the President Kenan Evren warned the public against the ANAP 
and his Chairman Turgut Özal on 4 November, just two days before the elections. 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent, instead, further encouraged the public to vote for 
ANAP. This was interpreted as a reaction against the military government. Özal was given 
the mandate by President Kenan Evren to form the government. Özal formed his 
government on 13 December 1983 and won a vote of confidence from the Parliament on 
24 December 1983 (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers).  
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Although the ANAP was established as a catchall party with the aim of reconciling four 
major political streams in the country, namely conservatives, liberals, nationalists and 
social democrats, it was a strong supporter of economic liberalism, entrepreneurship, 
privatization, the right of private property. Therefore, the ANAP received most of its 
electoral support from then-newly growing middle classes, i.e. petit bourgeois and the 
peasantry living in the central Anatolian towns and cities. Accordingly, during the first 
ANAP government, the January 24 decisions and IMF directions were strictly followed 
and economic reconstruction programmes were developed. The government aimed 
downsizing of the state and fought against bureaucratic barriers slowing down the 
implementation of the economic reforms. One of the first implications of the government 
to abolish the law regarding the protection of the value of Turkish currency, which was, in 
practice, used as a mechanism to prevent inflow of foreign currency to the country. 
According to the law, Turkish citizens were allowed to go abroad every other year and in 
each visit they could carry maximum 200 dollars with them. Hoarding foreign currency 
was regarded as a crime. With the abolition of the law, the free exchange rate system was 
introduced and individuals were allowed to buy and sell foreign currency and open a 
foreign currency account. Import and export regimes were liberalized and tariffs were 
reduced. An export-originated industrialization plan was promoted and export tax rebate 
was introduced in order to promote export. The PM Turgut Özal invited businessmen to 
accompany his official overseas visits. Industrial estates and free zones were established. 
Under Özal’s Prime Ministry, a series of changes were introduced in the daily lives of the 
average citizen. Electricity and telecommunications were made available throughout the 
country, including distant villages. Foreign products penetrated into the market freely and 
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credit card usage became widespread which dissolved the black market. In order to fund 
large-scaled investments, high taxes were imposed and state economic enterprises that 
were established during the first years of the republic were sold owing to their inefficient 
economic performance. Value added tax was introduced, public participation, housing 
development and defence industry support funds were launched and revenue sharing bonds 
were sold. With these economic sources, infrastructural investments were made to ease 
marine, airline and land transportation, energy and communication. New highways, 
airports, power plants were established.  
Although the post-1980 governments did not apply strict control over the economy the 
authoritarian character of the state largely remained in place. The imprisonment of the 
journalists, authors and intellectuals, publication ban on literary works, torture were still 
widespread. No serious step was taken to enhance democracy, fundamental rights and 
freedoms apart from economic ones. Turgut Özal was widely criticized over his previous 
MSP candidacy and relationship with reactionary religious cults especially the Naqshbandi 
cult. Another criticism levelled against Özal was his hesitation in combatting the rising 
terrorist attacks. Starting from 1984, PKK escalated its attacks to Turkish security forces in 
the Southeast region. On 15 August 1984, PKK organized raids to police stations and 
public buildings in Eruh and Şemdinli districts. The PKK broadcasted propaganda from the 
mosques in these two districts for hours. These two raids marked the beginning of the 
PKK’s large-scaled terrorist actions and uprising plan (Birand & Yalçın, 2007; Ünal, 
2012).   
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During the first ANAP government, the government forged close ties with the EU. An 
application to accede to the European Economic Community, which then became the 
European Union, was made by the government on 14 April 1987 (Erhan & Arat, 2001). 
The government decided to hold a referendum on 6 September 1987 to ask people, whether 
the political ban should be lifted. Although, the military-led government introduced a 10-
year political ban on former politicians, the political leaders did not obey the ban and kept 
organizing rallies starting from the first years. Therefore, there was no point in not lifting 
such a ban which was tarnishing the image of the Turkish democracy. Throughout the 
campaign period, Turgut Özal tried to convince the public to vote against the ban. A few 
hours before the referendum results were made public, the PM Özal declared that the 
government was holding an early election on 29 November 1987.  Özal wanted to catch the 
opposition leaders unprepared for the elections. The referendum results showed that 50.16 
percent of the participants voted in favour of the abolition of the ban against 49.84 percent 
(Milliyet, 2016). In the 29 November elections, Turgut Özal’s ANAP received 36.31, Erdal  
İnönü’s SHP 24.74 and Süleyman Demirel’s DYP 19.14 percent of the votes (TBMM, 
elections). With these elections results Özal formed the second ANAP government 
(TBMM, governments).  
Özal was assassinated, but survived during his speech in the general assembly of the 
ANAP on 18 June 1988. The assassin, Kartal Demirağ, fired two gunshots and shot Özal. 
After the assassination attempt, Demirağ was arrested. He was first condemned to the 
death penalty, then it was commuted to 20 years of imprisonment and Özal pardoned him 
in 1992 during his presidential term. It was speculated that Demirağ had links with the 
Counter-Guerrilla but the Turkish branch of Operation Gladio and Özal, who knew this, 
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did not want to carry the investigation further. In the 1989 local election, the ANAP 
received only 21.80 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). Following the end of the 
presidential term of Kenan Evren, Özal run for the presidential elections. Özal received his 
party’s support in the Parliament and became the 8th President of Turkey on 9 November 
1989 (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Presidents). Yıldırım Akbulut, ex-President of 
the Assembly, became the PM of the third ANAP government (TBMM, governments).  
In the first months of Özal’s presidency, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Turkey played an important 
role in the US-led coalition forces established against the invasion. Özal’s willingness to 
play a leading role in a war against Saddam Hussein was underlined by his aim to have a 
voice in the post-war scenarios. Thus, Turkey could prevent the foundation of a Kurdish 
state in the northern Iraq and claim the two former Ottoman provinces, Kirkuk and Mosol. 
However, the members of the MGK, the Chief of the General Staff General Necip 
Torumtay and the PM Yıldırım Akbulut as well as many members of the Parliament were 
not willing to invade Northern Iraq. After the clash with the President, General Necip 
Torumtay submitted his resignation. Following the US-led coalition forces attack on Iraq, 
Saddam withdrew the Iraqi army from Kuwait. However, defeated Saddam Hussein 
launched attacks against Kurds living in the Northern Iraq. To escape from Saddam’s 
attacks about 300.000 Kurds fled to Turkey. A no-fly zone was declared to protect the 
Kurds, which, in the following years, facilitated the development of the Kurdish region in 
Iraq (Gözen, 2000; Kalkan, 1991; Cevizoğlu, 1991).  
In the general assembly of the ANAP on 15-16 June 1991, Mesut Yılmaz, a Rize Deputy 
and Deputy PM, was elected as the new leader of the party and established the new 
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government (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers). General elections were held on 20 October 
1991. Mesut Yılmaz’s ANAP fell from the government and became the main opposition 
party. Six parties entered the 1991 general elections. Süleyman Demirel’s DYP received 
27.03, Yılmaz’s ANAP 24.01, Erdal İnönü’s SHP 20.75, Necmettin Erbakan’s RP 16.87 
and Bülent Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party, Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) 10.74 percent of 
the votes. While the DYP had 178, the ANAP had 115 and the SHP had 88 seats in the 
Parliament (TBMM, elections). A coalition government was established by Süleyman 
Demirel’s DYP and Erdal İnönü’s SHP on 30 November 1991. Demirel became the PM 
and Erdal İnönü became the state minister and the Deputy PM (Prime Ministry, Prime 
Ministers).  
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991, a series of Turkic 
republics, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
were founded in central Asia. Turkey recognized these newly-founded republics 
immediately. President Özal organized an overseas trip to these countries. Right after this 
long and tiring trip, on 17 April 1993 President Turgut Özal died from a heart attack 
(Laçiner, 2009). Süleyman Demirel, the PM and the Chairman of the DYP, became the 9th 
President of Turkey on 16 May 1993 (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Presidents). 
Following Demirel’s election as the President, the coalition partner SHP’s Chairman Erdal 
İnönü became the PM. In DYP’s general assembly on 13 June 1993, Tansu Çiller was 
elected as the new Chairman of DYP. Çiller, a brilliant professor of economics at Boğaziçi 
University, started her political career in DYP as the Vice Chairman with responsibility for 
the economy. In the 1991 general elections, Çiller was elected as a member of the 
Parliament and became minister of state with responsibility for the economy. Çiller was 
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given the mandate by the President Demirel to form the government. Tansu Çiller’s DYP 
and Erdal İnönü’s SHP formed the 50th government and Çiller became the first female PM 
of Turkey on 25 June 1993 (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers).  
A dramatic event called attention to the rise of radical Islamism in Turkey. To 
commemorate Pir Sultan Abdal, a classical Turkish Alawite folk poet who lived in the 15
th
 
and 16
th
 centuries, Alawite groups organized a meeting in the Sivas province of Turkey in 
the summer of 1993. Prominent Alawite intellectuals, writers, singers, folk poets went to 
the event. Aziz Nesin, a prominent intellectual and humourist, who translated the Satanic 
Verses book of Salman Rushdie into Turkish, was the most renowned guest of the event. 
The tension started rising in the city several days before the event. Inhabitants of the city 
were provoked by the local media and some pro-Islamic circles against the event and its 
participants especially Aziz Nesin. Groups of angry people started gathering around the 
Madımak Hotel, where the guests were staying, and protesting against the participants of 
the event. The local security forces failed to take necessary measures of safety and the 
number of protesters increased to thousands rapidly. The protesters chanted pro-Islamist 
slogans and threw stones at the walls of the hotel. Soon after, the hotel was set alight. A 
total number of 59 people, including Aziz Nesin survived with injuries, but 35 people 
burned to death (Gölbaşı, 1997; Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2005).  
Terror started to increase in Turkey from the beginning of 1990s. In addition to separatist 
PKK terrorism, Turkey now faced increased Islamic terrorism. Hezbollah (also known as 
Turkish or Kurdish Hezbollah, which is a different group from the Lebanese Shi’a Islamist 
Hezbollah) was established as a result of a conflict between two fractions of an Islamist 
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group called Union Movement, Vahdet Hareketi in 1987. Hezbollah targeted secular 
intellectuals, including prominent journalists Uğur Mumcu and Çetin Emeç and a series of 
academics. It has been argued that the Hezbollah was supported by the security forces in 
the war against the PKK (Nugent, 2004; Harvey, 2011).  
In 1994, Turkey was also hit by an economic crisis. Macroeconomic equilibrium was not 
maintained. The current deficit rose up to 6.4 billion dollars and the inflation rates reached 
its historic peak of 150 percent. The interest rates increased and the Turkish Lira was 
devaluated against the US dollar by as much as 100 percent. To overcome the economic 
crisis a series of decisions were taken which were known as April 5 Decisions, 5 Nisan 
Kararları. The decisions aimed at developing strict austerity measures in order to control 
rising inflation, levying new taxes, selling public economic enterprises or shutting them 
down, protecting the value of the Turkish Lira and increasing growth rates (Celasun, 
2002). It is likely that these strict economic measures eroded public support for the 
governing party in the elections. Necmettin Erbakan’s pro-Islamist RP increased its votes 
in the 1994 local elections. The elections were held on 27 March 1994. In the elections, 
Tansu Çiller’s DYP received 21.40, Mesut Yılmaz’s ANAP received 21.08 and Necmettin 
Erbakan’s RP received 19.13 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). An increase in the 
RP’s vote rate was particularly remarkable. Economic crisis victims were attracted by the 
RP’s populist campaigns. ‘Just Order’ was the slogan used to engage the more deprived 
classes in Turkey by the RP which claimed to be their representative. The RP ran an 
unusual election campaign. Housewives organized and canvassed door to door especially 
in the disadvantaged regions of metropolises. However, the RP’s leader Necmettin 
Erbakan’s provocative statements disturbed the secular public. Erbakan wondered in his 
 59 
 
address to the party group in the Parliament on 13 April 1994, ‘whether the transition to 
the RP government and Just Order will be peacefully or by bloodshed’ (Ebubekir60, 2012).  
Under the DYP-SHP government, Turkey accessed to the Custom’s Union in 1995. The 
Ankara agreement which was signed between the Turkish Republic and the European 
Economic Community on 12 September 1963 envisaged three phases before the full 
succession; the preparatory phase, the transition phase and the completion phase. The 
preparatory phase started from 1964 and lasted until 1970, the transition phase, started 
from 1973 and lasted until 1995 and the final completion phase started from 1996 and 
envisaged to last until the full economic integration of Turkey to the European market. By 
2016, the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU stipulates the free trade 
of industrial goods and processed agricultural goods, but leaves the traditional agricultural 
goods outside its scope (European Commission, 2016).  
The second DYP-SHP government under Çiller’s prime ministry followed a strict security 
policy against the rising PKK. A series of measures were taken, i.e. the establishment of a 
Special Forces Command as an unconventional warfare force in order to combat the PKK 
and equipping the armed forces with new technology weapons. A village guard system was 
established and recruited personnel from Kurdish tribes. The right wing mafia was 
organized and urged to fight against Kurdish businessmen who provided economic support 
to the PKK. However, these groups committed unidentified murders and violated human 
rights in the region. Hundreds of local residents were killed in unsolved murders. On the 
other hand, the pro-Kurdish political parties, first the People’s Labour Party, Halkın Emek 
Partisi (HEP) and then Democracy Party, Demokrasi Partisi (DEP) were closed by the 
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constitutional court. The parliamentary immunity of the Kurdish politicians was lifted, they 
were tried and imprisoned as per Turkish Penalty Code article 168/2 regulating 
‘membership of an illegal organization’ (Mynet, 2005).  
Another problem that caused the Çiller’s government’s popularity to decrease was the Gazi 
Quarter Riots. On 12 March 1995 three cafés in Gazi Quarter that were frequently visited 
by Alawites were attacked by people with automatic guns. After provocations and police’s 
brutal response to the initial demonstrations, Alawite groups initiated a broad-scaled 
demonstration and clashed with the police. With the coup of the army and the declaration 
of curfew the riots were suppressed. During the riots 23 people died and hundreds were 
injured (Crisis, 1995; Birand, 2012).  
On 30 November 1995 Tansu Çiller’s DYP and Deniz Baykal’s CHP formed a coalition 
government (TBMM, governments). However, Baykal’s insistence on the further 
investigation of the Gazi Quarter Riots brought the DYP-CHP government to an end. The 
President Süleyman Demirel called for an early election and the elections were held on 24 
December 1995. In the elections, Necmettin Erbakan’s RP received 21.38, Mesut Yılmaz’s 
ANAP received 19.65, Tansu Çiller’s DYP received 19.18 and Bülent Ecevit’s DSP 
received 14.64 percent of the votes. The CHP also took part in the elections under the 
leadership of Deniz Baykal and barely passed the threshold by 10.71 percent (TBMM, 
elections). Although Erbakan’s RP was the most voted party in the elections, President 
Süleyman Demirel gave the mandate to form the government to Mesut Yılmaz, the leader 
of the ANAP, the second most voted party. Following the elections, a coalition government 
was established by the DYP and the ANAP which was called Ana-Yol on 6 March 1995. 
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The government won a vote of confidence from the Parliament. The two parties agreed on 
a rotating prime ministry and Mesut Yılmaz became the first PM of the government. 
However, the government did not last long. During their trials in the Supreme Court, the 
two leaders conflicted and this brought the Ana-Yol government to end (TBMM, 
governments).  
At the beginning of 1996, an international crisis erupted in Turkey`s shores. Turkey had a 
dispute with Greece on two minor inhabited rocky islets in the Aegean Sea called Kardak 
(Imia in Greek). Essentially the dispute on these small islets was related to the long-lasting 
dispute on the territorial waters between the two countries. The Lausanne treaty 
determined the territorial waters of the both countries as 3 nautical miles. In 1936, the 
Greek side increased them to 6 miles through a cabinet decree. Following the United 
Nation’s 1982 convention on the law of the sea, the Greek side wanted to increase 
territorial waters further to 12 nautical miles. This was rejected by the Turkish side since 
this could have advantaged Greece due to the higher number of Greek islands in the 
Aegean sea (Hasan, 2012). Following an accident of a civilian Turkish ship near the islets, 
a dispute arose between the two countries’ authorities on its salvaging operation. A 
technical dispute soon turned into a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Greece and the 
two NATO countries came to the brink of war. On 28 January 1996, a major and a priest 
from Greece went to the island and planted a Greek flag. Two days later a few Turkish 
journalists went to the islets and replaced the Greek flag with the Turkish one. The Greek 
naval forces were sent to the islets to plant the Greek flag again. Meanwhile, the two PMs, 
Tansu Çiller and Kostas Simitis escalated the tension with their vehement statements since 
both PMs were wary of the public’s reaction and did not want to take the political risk of 
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withdrawing their claims. After the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
İnal Batu’s wise plan, Turkey sent a team of commandos to the second islet. After this 
point, both countries withdrew its soldiers from the two islets under the United States’ 
mediation and a potential war was prevented (Şenkal, 2016; Ayman, 2011; Pratt & 
Schofield, 1996).  
A new coalition government, which was called Refah-Yol, was established between the RP 
and the DYP on 28 June 1996 (TBMM, governments). However, a pro-Islamist RP was 
not welcomed by the secular people in the country. The resistance was based in the belief 
that such a government would overturn the secular regime in Turkey.  Necmettin Erbakan 
and Tansu Çiller, the two leaders of the coalition government, agreed on a rotating prime 
ministry system in which each leader will serve as the PM for two years. The government 
won a vote of confidence and Erbakan became the PM of the government and Çiller 
became the ministry of foreign affairs and Deputy PM for the first two years. The PM 
Necmettin Erbakan made one of his first official overseas trip to Libya. The Libyan leader 
Muammar Gaddafi entertained the PM in his Bedouin tent. During the meeting, Gaddafi 
severely criticized Turkey’s counterterrorism policies, NATO membership, relationships 
with the US in front of the cameras. Erbakan’s failure to respond these criticisms sparked 
reactions in the secular segments of the Turkish public. Erbakan’s fast-breaking meal for 
cult leaders in the PM’s Office, the RP-led large-scaled demonstrations against the 
headscarf ban, a Jerusalem commemorative ceremony in which the invited speakers 
targeted the secular regime explicitly were some of the other events that drew attention 
from the army and the secular public. In addition to these, Erbakan’s criticism of the EU 
and his endeavours for the establishment of an international organization called D8 with 
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the regional countries as an alternative to it drew further reactions (Kongar, 2008: p. 281; 
Aksoy, 2000: p. 180).  
On 3 November 1996, a traffic accident near the Susurluk district of Balıkesir province 
caused one of the most prominent scandals in the Turkish modern history. In the accident, 
Hüseyin Kocadağ, Abdullah Çatlı and Gonca Us died and Sedat Edip Bucak survived with 
injuries. Hüseyin Kocadağ was the manager of Kemalettin Eröğe Police School, Abdullah 
Çatlı was the leader of the right-wing Grey Wolves criminal organization who was sought 
with red notice by the Interpol, Gonca Us was Abdullah Çatlı’s lover and a former beauty 
queen and Sedat Bucak was a DYP Şanlıurfa Deputy and the leader of a Şanlıurfa based 
feudal Kurdish clan. The accident caused rumours to spread concerning a dark alliance 
between the bureaucracy, politicians and mafia. Following this accident, the Deputy PM 
Tansu Çiller during the parliament group meeting made one of her controversial speeches 
by saying ‘those who have fired bullets for this state and those who got hit by it are all 
equally honourable persons’ (Huriyetdailynews, 1997). With this speech, she explicitly 
supported the use of the mafia in state’s dark affairs. A parliamentary commission was 
launched to investigate the matter. The government demanded the interior minister 
Mehmet Ağar’s resignation, but apart from that no serious action was taken. After being 
tried, Ağar received 5 years of imprisonment. The Susurluk accident sparked a 
considerable reaction in Turkish society. Artists, journalists, authors encouraged an action 
of civil disobedience which was called ‘one minute darkening for incessant enlightening’. 
Every night people in the cities switched off their lights for a minute to protest the 
government. The reaction’s emphasise on darkness had anti-RP sentiment too. The Chief 
of the General Staff and the Commanders in Chief of the armed forces in the MGK pressed 
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on the members of the government to take necessary steps to ease the rising reaction in the 
public. However, the government did not take serious steps to investigate the matter fully 
(Milliyet, 2001).  
The army launched a new strategy against the Refah-Yol government. In order to tarnish 
the government’s image in the eyes of the public, a psychological campaign was 
conducted. A new working group, Western Study Group, Batı Çalışma Grubu (BÇG) was 
launched within the body of the Office of Commander in Chief to manipulate the public 
opinion. The BÇG prepared video recordings of some government members targeting the 
secular Turkish Republic in the media. The commanders of the War Colleges organized 
seminars for prominent journalists, authors, judges, attorney generals to draw attention to 
the rising reaction. The army did not stop at this point and on 30 January 1997, military 
vehicles were seen in the streets of the Sincan district of Ankara. This was interpreted as an 
indicator of the upcoming military coup. This event was justified by the Deputy chief of 
the Turkish general staff General Çevik Bir by saying ‘We re-balanced democracy’ (Arsu, 
2012). In this tense environment, a MGK meeting was held on 28 February 1997. The non-
civilian members of the MGK criticized the government side severely in the meeting. The 
army accused the government members for not taking the necessary measures for blocking 
these reactionary movements. During the meeting, a final document was issued by the 
army members and conveyed to the government members. The document consisted of 18 
requests of the army members from the government side. Some of them were to ban illegal 
Quran courses and the cults, to increase the compulsory education from five years to eight 
and to stop the rise of Islamist capital. The change concerning the compulsory education 
was important because it meant the closure of the first three years of the religious 
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vocational high schools, İmam Hatip Lisesi which the executives of the RP saw as their 
electoral backyard. At the end of the MGK meeting, the PM Erbakan rejected signing the 
final document, but the document was leaked to the press. Erbakan signed the document on 
5 March 1997 but resisted in the implementation of the measures. However, the armed 
forces were decisive in the implementation of the matters written in the document. The 
historical MGK meeting became known to be ‘a post-modern coup’ in the following years 
(Birand, 2012; Akpınar, 2001; Alpat, 1999: p. 66-70).  
The government was also targeted by the judiciary power. The Supreme Court opened a 
closure case for the governing party, RP, on the grounds that it became a focus of anti-
secular activities. The prosecution process took eight months and the constitutional court 
decision was declared to the public on 16 January 1998. The party was closed and the 
executives of the party and its Chairman, Necmettin Erbakan, were banned from politics. 
However, a new party called Virtue Party, Fazilet Partisi, (FP) was established 
immediately by the ex-RP members. However, the newly established FP was also closed 
by the constitutional court on the grounds that it became a focus of anti-secular activities 
(Atacan, 2005: p. 188). Concerning for the future of democracy, a group of Deputies from 
the RP’s coalition partner DYP submitted their resignations and the coalition government 
fell. Although the coalition partners, the DYP and the RP, had the majority in the 
Parliament and the leaders of the two parties were ready to form the new government 
under the prime ministry of Tansu Çiller, the President Süleyman Demirel gave the 
mandate to form the new government to Mesut Yılmaz, the Chairman of ANAP. The 
Demirel’s decision was criticized from the RP and the DYP sides.  The new coalition 
government, known as Anasol-D was established by Mesut Yılmaz’s ANAP, Bülent 
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Ecevit’s DSP and Hüsamettin Cindoruk’s Democrat Turkey Party, Demokrat Türkiye 
Partisi, (DTP) on 30 June 1997. The government also received support from Deniz 
Baykal’s CHP during the vote of confidence in the Parliament. Yılmaz became the PM and 
Ecevit became the Deputy PM of the new government (TBMM, governments).  
In 1998, Turkey was on the brink of war with Syria where Abdullah Öcalan, the fugitive 
founding leader of the PKK was living in. Turkey was highly disturbed by Syrian’s 
protection of Öcalan. On 16 September, the commander of the land forces, Atilla Ateş, 
made a speech at the Turkish-Syrian border and criticized the Syrian government on this 
matter. The message of the commander’s speech was clear. It was implied that the Turkish 
army was ready for a war if the Syrian government kept protecting Öcalan in its country. 
The Turkish government and the President Süleyman Demirel released statements 
supporting the commander’s message. Öcalan was driven out of Syria and transferred to 
Greece on 9 October 1998. Fearing harming its bilateral relations with Turkey, the Greek 
authorities rejected his entrance to the country. Thereupon, Öcalan flew to Russia. After 
Turkish government’s pressure on Russian authorities, Öcalan was transferred under the 
protection of an Italian Communist Party Deputy Roman Mantovani to Rome. He was 
captured in Rome on 12 December 1998. Italy rejected giving him to Turkey on the 
grounds that the death penalty was then still in force in Turkey. Italy’s protection of Öcalan 
caused Turkish public’s boycotting Italian products. Turkish National Intelligence 
Organization (MİT) planned a bombed attack in the house where Öcalan was hiding in 
Rome. The US authorities were informed about the plan. Seeing Turkish authorities’ 
determination, the US increased pressure on the Italian government and Öcalan was forced 
by the Italian authorities to leave Italy. Öcalan flew from Italy to Russia again and then 
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from Russia to Greece. The Greek authorities issued him a new passport and send him to 
the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. In the following days Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) authorities contacted to MİT authorities and proposed to help in Öcalan’s capture in 
Kenya. With a joint operation run by the US and the Turkish intelligence forces and 
Kenyan authorities, Öcalan was captured. He was put in a Turkish jet by MİT agents and 
flew to Turkey on 15 February 1999 (Turkish Weekly, 2009; Varouhakis, 2009; Manaz, 
2015). The governing party DSP enjoyed the capturing of Öcalan in the elections. General 
elections were held on 18 April 1999. In the elections, the DSP received 22.19, the MHP 
received 17.89, the FP received 15.41 and the ANAP received 13.22 percent of the votes 
(TBMM, elections). A coalition government was established by the DSP, the MHP and the 
ANAP on 3 May 1999. DSP’s Chairman Bülent Ecevit became the PM, MHP’s Chairman 
Devlet Bahçeli became the Deputy PM and minister of state of the government (TBMM, 
governments).  
On 17 August 1999, Turkey’s Marmara region was hit by a 7.5 MW earthquake.  It was the 
most destructive earthquake in the recorded history of Turkey. About 17.000 people were 
died, 23.000 were injured; 500 people became permanently disabled and 300.000 houses 
and workplaces were damaged. It was predicted that the earthquake costed 6.2 billions of 
dollars to the Turkish economy (Salman, 2001). Thus, following the earthquake, an 
economic crisis hit the Turkish economy, which costed about 250 thousand billions of 
dollars to the country. The crisis was triggered by a dispute broke out between PM Bülent 
Ecevit and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in the National Security Council meeting on 19 
February 2001. In the meeting President Sezer wanted to assign the State Supervisory 
Council, Devlet Denetleme Kurulu (DDK) to inspect the bankrupt banks, which were 
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seized by the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund, Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu (TMSF). 
In fact, according to the government and the PM Ecevit, the fund was established to 
inspect the bankrupt banks and therefore another inspection, which was going to be run by 
the State Supervisory Council, was unnecessary. In the meeting, President Sezer criticized 
the government’s position on this matter. Sezer argued that according to the constitution, 
the President has an authority to inspect any state organ by using the DDK. Following this 
dispute, PM Bülent Ecevit and Deputy PM Mesut Yılmaz walked out of the National 
Security Council meeting. The PM Ecevit announced his argument with the President in a 
press release following the meeting. The immediate reaction of the markets was marked. 
The stock market dropped by 18 percent and the overnight interest rates rose up to 7500 
percent in the repo market. The American dollar-Turkish Lira parity doubled and 7.5 
billions of dollars were withdrawn from the Central Bank. In the long term, unemployment 
increased and growth displayed negative rates (Satışoglu, 2001). To tackle the devastating 
economic crisis, Kemal Derviş, a Turkish economist and the Vice President of the World 
Bank for the Middle East and North Africa, was invited to Turkey. His main task was to 
implement IMF and World Bank’s recovery programme. Derviş became the minister of 
state in charge of the economy in the Ecevit’s government. The recovery programme 
envisaged a series of structural reforms, i.e. the Public Treasury and the Central Bank were 
made autonomous, the banking system was strengthened, a transparent and accountable 
economy administration was established and corruption was fought. Following the 
implication of the recovery plan, the IMF and Turkey singed stand-by agreements and then 
the World Bank and the IMF credits were activated for Turkey (Celasun, 2002: p. 1-16).  
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The 2001 economic crisis shook people’s faith in the incumbent political parties. This 
environment facilitated the birth of the Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkinma 
Partisi (AKP). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the co-founder and the future leader of the AKP 
entered politics in Necmettin Erbakan’s MSP. He became head of the MSP’s Beyoğlu 
Youth Branch and İstanbul Youth Branch in 1976. Erdoğan was elected as the RP’s 
Beyoğlu District Head in 1984 and İstanbul Provincial Head in 1985. Erdoğan became a 
candidate in the 1986 parliamentary elections but was not elected as a member of the 
Parliament. He ran for local elections in the Beyoğlu district of İstanbul in 1989 but was 
not elected. Erdoğan won the 27 March 1994 local elections in İstanbul and became the 
mayor of İstanbul. Erdoğan’s Mayorship played an important role in the RP’s success in 
the 1995 general elections. 12 December 1997, Erdoğan read a poem in Siirt province and 
was tried in Diyarbakir’s DGM on the grounds that he violated article 312/2 of the Turkish 
Criminal Law which regulates hate speech. At the end of the trial, Erdoğan received a ten 
months of imprisonment. His political activities were banned and Mayorship was 
abolished. This imprisonment increased his popularity in the eyes of the public. After four 
months of imprisonment, Erdoğan was released from prison (Presidency of the Republic of 
Turkey, Presidents). 
A closure case was opened for the FP and the party was closed on the grounds that it 
became a focus of anti-secular activities on 22 June 2001 (Turhan, 2002). Following the 
closure of the party, the followers of the National Vision tradition established a new party 
called Felicity Party, Saadet Partisi (SP) under the leadership of Recai Kutan on 20 July 
2001. In the first ordinary congress of the SP, the clash between the hardliners and the 
reformist wings became apparent. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç and 
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Abdüllatif Şener were the prominent figures of the reformist wing. The reformist wing 
founded the Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, (AKP) on 14 
August 2001. They challenged the National Vision tradition which was followed by the 
pro-Islamist MNP, MSP, RP, FP and lastly SP. Instead of strict pro-Islamism, the AKP 
adopted a moderate conservative vision. In the party program market economy, democracy 
and the EU membership of Turkey were supported. The members of the party were 
criticized on the grounds that they criticized the founding principles of the Turkish 
Republic especially its secular regime drastically in the past. In response to these 
criticisms, they repeatedly emphasized that they had changed their political views which 
was symbolized in Erdoğan’s phrase ‘we took the National Vision shirt off’ (Şafak, 2006). 
In addition to the reformist former National Vision members, the party received support 
from individuals from diverse ideological backgrounds, i.e. nationalists, conservatives, 
social democrats and even liberals. On 22 October 2002,  the chief public prosecutor of the 
Court of Cassation, Sabih Kanadoğlu filed a lawsuit in the Constitutional Court as per 
article 104/2 of the constitution on the grounds that the party did not abide the 
Constitutional Court’s previous act of caution. Meanwhile, Erdoğan seceded from the party 
membership and the case dismissed (Hürriyet Haber, 2002).  
General elections were held on 3 November 2002. In the elections, the AKP received 34.28 
percent of the votes and gained 363 seats in the Parliament. Deniz Baykal’s CHP received 
19.39 percent of the votes and gained 178 seats (TBMM, elections). None of the other 
parties exceeded the national 10 percent threshold. With these results, the AKP came to 
power alone. Yet, there was a problem about the Chairman of the victorious AKP, 
Erdoğan’s prime ministry. According to the 109th article of the 1982 constitution, the PM 
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is assigned among the members of the Parliament by the President. Traditionally, the 
leader of the party with the most votes is given the mandate to form the government by the 
President. However, Erdoğan was banned from political involvement. Therefore Abdullah 
Gül founded the government on 16 November 2002 (TBMM, governments). A legislative 
proposal was submitted to the Parliament, which envisaged lifting Erdoğan’s political ban. 
The proposal was approved by the Parliament, but it was vetoed by the President Sezer on 
the grounds that it was subjective. Sezer sent the proposal back to the Parliament. 
However, the Parliament approved the proposal without amendment and sent to the 
President for the second time. This time the proposal was accepted by the President. A 
formula was found to make Erdoğan a member of the Parliament. The Supreme Committee 
of Elections had cancelled the elections in the Siirt Province owing to gerrymander claims. 
The statuses of the three elected Siirt Deputies were cancelled. A by-election was held in 
Siirt on 9 March 2003. The first raw candidate of the AKP, Mervan Gül withdrew from 
candidacy and Erdoğan replaced him. The AKP received 84.80 percent of the votes in the 
by-elections in Siirt and Erdoğan became a member of the Parliament. Abdullah Gül’s 
government resigned on 11 March 2003. Erdoğan was given the mandate by the President 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer to form the new government. On 14 March 2003 first Erdoğan’s 
government was formed (TBMM, governments).  
The AKP government had one of the most important crises within its first year of 
governance. Following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. launched a series of wars 
against terrorism. First Afghanistan was invaded. Following the Afghanistan war, the U.S. 
invaded Iraq to overthrow the Saddam Hussain’s government.  The Bush administration 
had a plan to use Turkish military bases and ports in the war against Iraq. The plan 
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included the deployment of 60.000 U.S. troops, 255 aircrafts and 65 helicopters in the 
Turkish military bases. The AKP government promised to make Turkish bases available 
for the U.S. troops. However, according to the Turkish constitution, such a decision had to 
be approved by the Parliament. The U.S. had offered economic aid of 6 billions of dollars 
for the decision to pass. However, on 1 March 2003, the Turkish Parliament denied the 
plan. A total number of 553 deputies joined the parliamentary session. In the session, 
against 264 Yes votes, only three votes less than required for the plan to be approved,  250 
No votes were cast and 19 members were abstained (CNN International, 2003). The 1 
March crisis, affected the Turkish-American bilateral relationship adversely. An event that 
is known as Hood Event further raised the tension between Turkey and the U.S. On 4 July 
2003, U.S. soldiers carried out a raid on a house in Süleymaniye Province of Northern Iraq. 
A team of Turkish Special Forces soldiers was based in the house. The Turkish soldiers 
were captured by the U.S. soldiers. The capture of the Turkish soldiers and hoods that were 
thrown over their heads sparked a reaction in the Turkish public. It was widely believed in 
Turkey that the Hood Event was the U.S.’s response to the Parliament’s decision on 1 
March (T24, 2011).  
On 15 and 20 November 2003, four terrorist attacks were staged with bomb-laden trucks in 
İstanbul. On 15 November, two trucks were exploded near Bet Israil and Neve Shalom 
synagogues in İstanbul. A total number of 27 were killed and about 300 were injured in the 
double attacks. On 20 November another double attack targeted the headquarters of HSBC 
Bank and the British Consulate in İstanbul. The attacks were organized during the U.S. 
President George Bush’s meeting with the UK PM Tony Blair. Thirty people were killed, 
including British Consul-general Roger Short and more than 400 people were injured in 
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the attacks. The responsible persons of the attacks were found to be associated with the 
terrorist organization Al-Qaeda (BBC, 2003).  
The AKP consolidated its political success in the 2004 local elections. Although it was its 
first elections, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP received 41.67, Deniz Baykal’s CHP 
received 11.08, Devlet Bahçeli’s MHP received 17.07 and Mehmet Ağar’s DYP received 
13.21 percent of the votes. With these results, the AKP won a total number of 1.750 
province and district municipalities while the CHP and the MHP won 467 and 242 of them 
respectively. The municipalities of two most populated provinces, İstanbul and Ankara 
were won by the AKP (YSK, local elections).  
The year 2007 was marked by the assassination of Hrant Dink, a Turkey-born Armenian 
Turkish citizen, journalist and the executive editor of the İstanbul-based weekly Agos 
newspaper. Dink had declared his ideas outspokenly about the alleged Armenian 
Genocide. He was under prosecution on the grounds that in his column in Agos he violated 
the Turkish Penal Code art. no: 301 which regulates the penalty for insulting the Turkish 
Nation. He was receiving threats from ultra-nationalist groups, but he never requested a 
special protection. On 19 January 2007, Dink was assassinated by Ogün Samast in front of 
the Agos office in İstanbul. The assassin was related to a Trabzon-based ultra-nationalist 
group which previously organized a bomb attack to a McDonald’s restaurant in 2004. 
Dink’s assassination caused a widespread reaction in Turkey. At Dink’s funeral, hundreds 
of thousands Turkish people protested his killing (Radikal[a], 2007).  
From the foundation of the AKP government, the secular segments of the society regarded 
President Sezer as the last guard of the secular regime in Turkey. Nevertheless, President 
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Sezer’s term of office was coming to an end on 16 May 2007. The secular opposition 
feared Tayyip Erdoğan’s candidature for the presidency. This fear was originated from 
Erdoğan’s previous controversial public statements targeting the secular regime, 
democracy, head scarf ban and the criminalization of adultery. The CHP and other 
opposition parties in the Parliament opposed the election of the President by then-
incumbent parliament, which was coming to the end of its term. However, the AKP did not 
decide to hold an election and supported the idea that the incumbent parliament was fully 
competent to elect the new President. The new President was going to be elected by the 
Parliament, which was dominated by the AKP deputies. Before the announcement of the 
AKP’s candidate, the Chief of the General Staff General Yaşar Büyükanıt stated that the 
army wanted to see a President who is ‘loyal to the principles of the Republic, not just in 
words but in essence’ (Radikal[b], 2007). Fearing a pro-Islamist President, secular public 
opposition organized a series of rallies called the Republic Protests. Atatürkist Thought 
Association, Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (ADD), an organization that was established to 
espouse Atatürk’s ideas and the preservation of the secular regime in Turkey, led the 
organization of the rallies which were supported by some 300 secularist non-governmental 
organizations. Although the political parties also took part in the protests, care was paid to 
avoid turning the protests into party rallies. The first rally was held in Ankara Tandoğan 
Square on 14 May 2007 (Armutçu, Yalazan & Akın, 2007). It was speculated that Tayyip 
Erdoğan changed his mind about running for the presidential office after this rally. On 24 
April 2007, Erdoğan announced Abdullah Gül as AKP’s candidate for the presidency 
(Hürriyet, 2007). However, the rallies carried on in İstanbul, İzmir, Manisa and Çanakkale 
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provinces. According to some sources, the number of the participants exceeded a million in 
some of these provinces (Reuters, 2007).  
According to the constitution a Presidential Candidate had to receive 367 votes in the first 
two rounds to be elected as the President. If none of the candidates are able to do so, the 
two candidates with most votes run for the third round and the candidate who receives the 
most votes in the third round becomes the President (1982 Turkish Constitution, art. 102). 
The first round of the presidential election was held on 27 April 2007. Abdullah Gül 
achieved 341 votes. On the same day, the Office of Commander in Chief released a 
statement on its website, which was described as an ‘e-memorandum’. In the statement, it 
was declared that the Armed Forces is a party in the debate over the election of the 
President and the defender of the secular system, when necessary they would not hesitate 
from taking actions (Ülsever, 2007). On 10 May 2007, the Parliament passed a series of 
amendments in the constitution. The amendments envisaged the presidential term will be 
five years and the President will be elected by direct vote, general elections will be held in 
every four years. In the second round on 24 August, Gül achieved 337 votes. In the third 
round on 28 August 2007, however, Gül achieved 339 votes and was elected as the 11th 
President of the Republic of Turkey (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Presidents). 
A month before the election of Abdullah Gül, general elections were held on 22 July 2007. 
In the elections the AKP received 46.47, the CHP received 20.84, and the MHP received 
14.26 percent of the votes. With these rates, the AKP gained 341, the CHP gained 112 and 
the MHP gained 71 seats in the Parliament (TBMM, elections). The government won a 
vote of confidence by receiving the support of 337 MPs in the 550-seat parliament. The 
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government, which is also known as the second Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government, was 
approved by the President Abduallah Gül on 29 August 2007 (TBMM, governments).  
The Ergenekon trail and its related trials left their marks on the political agenda in Turkey 
between 2006 and 2009. Originally, Ergenekon is a legend which tells about the escape of 
ancient Turks from Ergenekon valley in the Central Asia where their army was defeated 
and the foundation of Turkish Khanate. Allegedly, a secret armed organization called 
Ergenekon nested in the state body, carried out psychological warfare, acts of violence and 
terrorist attacks against the individuals, non-governmental organizations and the elected 
governments. It was argued that, such a secret or shadow government-like organization 
was inherited from the Ottoman Empire and Ergenekon is the present-day body of this 
organization. The demystification of the Ergenekon organization started after Tuncay 
Güney, a former journalist, was taken into custody in 2001. In his office, documents 
showing the organizational structure of Ergenekon were found. Years later, on 12 June 
2007, the Turkish police found 27 grenades, TNTs and fuses in a shanty house in 
Ümraniye, İstanbul related to the Ergenekon case. The grenades had numbers matching 
with others which were used in some previous attacks. Following the extension of the 
inquiry, more than 400 people, including active and retired police and army members from 
all kinds of ranks, former politicians, bureaucrats, lawmakers, academicians, unionists and 
the journalist were arrested. The accusations were several, i.e. coup plans against the AKP 
government, assassinations and assassination plots and armed attacks to the newspaper 
buildings. On 3 August 2009, the Ergenekon case was merged with another case 
investigating the Council of State shooting. On 17 May 2006, Alparslan Aslan staged a 
terrorist attack to the meeting of the second chamber of the Council of State killed the 
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member Mustafa Yücel Özbilgin and injured four other members of the council. It was 
claimed that the Ergenekon organization instigated Aslan to carry out this attack. On 29 
March 2007, Nokta, a weekly political magazine in Turkey, published diaries, which 
allegedly belonged to the Commander of the Naval Forces, Admiral Özden Örnek. 
According to the magazine’s claim it was written in Örnek’s diary that the Commander of 
the Land Forces General Aytaç Yalman, the Commander of the Naval Forces, admiral 
Özden Örnek, the Commander of the Commander of the Air Forces General İbrahim 
Fırtına, the Commander of the Gendarmerie General Şener Eruygur and the Commander of 
the First Army General Hurşit Tolon planned four military coups in 2004, but they were 
prevented by the Chief of the General Staff General Hilmi Özkök. Özden Örnek and 
İbrahim Fırtına were also accused of a coup plot called Sledgehammer involving plans 
such as bombing Fatih and Bayezid mosques in İstanbul and accusing Greece of causing a 
Turkish plane crash. Allegedly, the aim of the Sledgehammer coup plot was to create a 
chaotic atmosphere and justify a military coup against the AKP government. A Turkish 
daily newspaper, Taraf, revealed the plan. Çetin Doğan, the Commander of the First Army, 
who was accused of preparing the coup plan, stated that Sledgehammer was scenario-based 
military exercise plan but not a coup plan. The Turkish Armed Forces also made a 
statement to the press in the same direction. At the end of the Sledgehammer trials 236 
suspects were released. It was widely speculated that the Sledgehammer was a conspiracy 
against nationalist and secular members of the Turkish Armed Forces (Jenkings, 2011; 
Gürsoy, 2013).   
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK   
 
This chapter presents an overview of the extant literature on modernization theory, Karl 
Mannheim’s theory of generations and Seymour Martin Lipset’s working class 
authoritarianism thesis. The chapter is organized as follows. It starts with a brief 
introduction on democracy and political culture research. In the second section, 
modernization theory is introduced. The first sub-section gives a brief overview of the 
recent history of Western Modernization. The Industrial Revolution and French 
Revolutions are discussed in this part in order to help the reader to better understand the 
historical background of the modernization phenomenon. The second sub-section focuses 
on the question of what is modernization. In addition to this, some subsidiary questions, 
i.e.; what are the characteristics of the process of modernization, what changes the 
modernization process brings to individual attitudes, organizations and the overall society, 
what are the differences between traditional and modern societies are also addressed by 
referring to some prominent students of the modernization school.  
The third section starts with introducing four types of understandings of generation: 
generation as a genealogical and non-genealogical phenomenon, generation as a life stage, 
generation as a historical period and generation as a cohort are presented respectively. It 
provides brief information on the generation concept and some substantial topics relevant 
to it, i.e. the formation of generations; age, period and cohort effects; socialization and 
generational replacement. Rival hypotheses such as the impressionable years, later life 
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experiences and symbolic attitudes hypotheses are also discussed by referring to the 
leading authors’ views.  
In the fourth section, Karl Mannheim’s theory of generations is discussed in detail. This 
subsection aims to give a comprehensive analytical account of Mannheim’s theory as well 
his ‘actual generation’ and ‘generation unit’ arguments. In the final section, the working 
class authoritarianism thesis of Seymour Martin Lipset and the criticism levelled against 
Lipset’s thesis are presented.  
3.1. Democracy and Political Culture 
Today, democracy is widely seen as the ideal form of government in many countries of the 
world. It is suggested as important for tackling with many political, social and economic 
problems in domestic politics and for solving conflicts between nations. However, 
democracy is perhaps the most difficult political regime to develop fully. A large and 
growing body of literature, which has attempted to answer the popular question of ‘what 
makes democracy work, revealed that the establishment and continuation of a democratic 
system requires the satisfaction of a great deal of conditions. Perhaps one of the most 
striking answers to this question has come from the political culture research.  The very 
basic argument raised by this line of research is that people’s value orientations determine 
institutions. In fact, some of the most reputed works in the political science literature has 
investigated the relationship between individual-level value orientations and system-level 
institutions. All of these works are grounded on the basic idea that people’s values are 
conducive to the characteristics of macro systems. Max Weber, in his seminal work, The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, argues that a particular form of religious 
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belief paves the way for the establishment of a particular macro-economic system. 
According to him Protestantism, especially Calvinism and to a lesser extent Pietism, 
Methodism and Baptism, is the basic factor underlying under the creation of the modern 
capitalist economic system (Weber, 1958 [1904]). Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba’s 
1969 book, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, is the 
first systematic comparative research studying the relationship between people’s values 
and democracy. From a structural functionalist point of view, Almond and Verba argue 
that political culture serves as ‘the connecting link between micro and macro politics’ 
(Almond & Verba, 1969: p. 32). As a result of their analysis of the data derived from 
surveys held in the US, Germany, Mexico, Italy, and the UK, they distinguish between 
three types of political cultures; parochial, subject and participant. Parochial culture 
represents traditional and tribal societies. Individuals in parochial cultures do not have 
enough knowledge, about neither the political system nor their rights and powers to shape 
it. They also do not get involved in either its input or  output processes for the political 
system. This form of culture is likely to emerge in small traditional societies. On the other 
hand, individuals in subject cultures are aware of the system more generally and its 
outputs, but are unaware of the input objects and their own power to shape the system.  
Lastly, individuals in participatory culture are both aware of the system, its inputs and the 
outputs and their power to shape it. Their argument, suggesting that only in the US and in 
the UK a participatory civic culture is prevalent, was criticized on the grounds that it is 
Anglo/American-centric with respect to its findings. As a result, Almond and Verba 
conclude that a participant civic culture upholds democratic political systems (Almond & 
Verba, 1969).  
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Robert Putnam and his collaborators’ 1993 work on twenty Italian regional governments, 
Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, investigates the factors 
underpinning effective representative institutions. The analysis of  data collected over two 
decades by means of quantitative and qualitative techniques revealed  that, while in the 
northern Italy, individuals are more participatory and interested in community affairs, the 
regional governments work more efficiently, on the other hand, in southern Italy, 
individuals are not participatory and less interested in community affairs and regional 
governments are corrupt and their operations are inefficient. As a result, Putnam and his 
collaborators conclude that strong social capital fosters institutional performance (Putnam, 
1993).  
All the above-mentioned works which focus on the relationship between individual-level 
orientations and institutions can be considered within the political culture research. 
Looking from the democratization perspective, the political culture research links 
widespread individual orientations in the society and system-level democracy. According 
to the political culture approach, harmony between the people’s values and the democratic 
principles facilitates the establishment of a democratic political system and the maintaining 
of it. On the contrary, incompatibility between the two makes the establishment and 
continuation of democracy difficult (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 247-49). Inglehart and 
Welzel note in their book, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human 
Development Sequence, although there is no encompassing theory within political culture 
research, thus three rival approaches compete with each other within this line of research. 
They are the legitimacy (system-support), the communitarian (social capital) and the 
human development (emancipative) approaches. These three approaches attribute 
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importance on three different sets of values and orientations which are thought to be pro-
democratic. The legitimacy approach highlights two orientations with high face validity; 
the importance of citizens’ favourable assessment of democracy and their confidence in the 
institutions of a democratic political system. On the other hand, the communitarian and 
human development approaches place importance on the values deeply instilled in the 
culture of the society.  While the communitarian approach emphasizes the citizens’ 
participation in voluntary activities and their trust in fellow citizens, the human 
development approach prioritizes a diverse range of values, i.e. political participation, 
tolerance and self-expression. In addition to simply introducing each approach, Inglehart 
and Welzel test the orientations underscored by each of them with respect to their power to 
predict system level democracy. Their analysis of the combined data from the WVS and 
the democracy scores assigned by the Freedom House (FH), showed that countries’ 
aggregated scores of ‘democracy-autocracy preference’, ‘post-materialist liberty 
aspirations’, ‘tolerance of homosexuality’ (as proxy for ‘out-group tolerance’), ‘signing 
petitions’  (as proxy for ‘political participation’), ‘life satisfaction’ and ‘self-expression 
values syndrome’ strongly determine their formal and effective democracy scores 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 245-71). Based on this theoretical consideration and 
empirical finding, the present research operationalizes pro-democratic culture by means of 
three variables, namely ‘democracy preference’, ‘out-group tolerance’ and ‘political 
participation’. Thus, each variable stands as the dependent variable of the respective 
empirical chapters.   
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3.2. Modernization Theory 
Perhaps, the best way to approach the investigation of a far reaching phenomenon like 
modernization is to go back to the historical conditions which gave birth to its emergence. 
The following pages will serve for this purpose. Modernization, also called as the First 
Modernization, is widely viewed as a Europe-originating phenomenon. According to the 
generally accepted view, centuries-old societal order in Europe lasted without a significant 
change until the 18
th 
century. Yet, the Industrial Revolution in England between 1760-1840 
and the Political Revolution in France between 1789-1799- dual revolutions as named by 
Eric Hobsbawm- resulted in the birth of the modern socioeconomic and political order in 
the European continent and then spread to the other regions of the world. The new order 
comprised novelties in numerous fields, i.e.; economy, politics, social structure and culture 
(Eisenstadt, 1966: p. 1; Huntington, 1971: p.36; Harrison & Huntington, 2000: p. 257; 
Hobsbawm, 2000: p. ix). Thus, in order to better understand the historical origins of the 
modernization phenomenon, perhaps one should start by looking at the Industrial and the 
French Revolutions. 
3.2.1. The Industrial Revolution 
Between the 9
th
 and 15
th
 centuries there was not an appreciable alteration in the daily lives 
of the common man. Throughout the middle ages, the majority of the population was 
involved in agricultural activity, worshipping in institutionalized monotheistic religions 
and conducting their lives under the protection of absolute monarchies. This economic and 
political order produced a definite social system involved local hierarchies which were 
based on land ownership in exchange for military service and agricultural production. 
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There were four hierarchically ranked social groups. A very large proportion of the 
population was serfs. If we liken the distribution of the population amongst social groups 
in the medieval Europe to a pyramid, serfs were in the lowermost category with the largest 
share within the system of hierarchy. The primary duty of serfs was to provide agricultural 
products and services for the knights. They were bought and sold with the land and did not 
even have the fundamental rights and freedoms such as the right to liberty, the right of 
possession and the freedom of movement. Knights were located in the second from the 
below section of the pyramid. They were the belligerent power of the monarchy. They 
owned some lands which were given to them by the Lords in return for recruiting an army 
to protect the Lord and his family and being prepared for the battle to protect the Kingdom. 
Lords could fully exercise their authority on their land once they leased it from the King. 
The Lord’s position with respect to the King was understood according to the principle of 
primus inter pares, first among equals, although the King, as is known, was located at the 
top of the social and political hierarchy and owned the whole territory of the Kingdom 
(Tocqueville, 2001: p. 35-7; Brenner, 1976: p. 37-42; Bois, 1984: p. 135-261; Israel, 2001: 
p. 714).  
The first indicators of change appeared with the beginning of the Age of Enlightenment. 
Development of the global trade, rise in the usage of underground resources, rise in slavery 
and colonialism ended up with a great deal of capital stock in the hands of European 
merchants who thus found enough time and money to fund the arts and sciences. The 
invention of the printing press and distribution of the translations of the Oriental classics 
and Classical Era pieces boosted the accumulation of knowledge in the continent. Press, 
literacy, mass communication and education played important roles in the spread of this 
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knowledge to the wider masses. The pioneer members of the modern European 
intelligentsia, i.e.; René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and 
John Locke were the men of this era. They, in their works, questioned the authority of the 
established political, economic and spiritual institutions and guided the Enlightenment 
Movement (Israel, 2001: p. 3-14). 
The investment made in economic and intellectual domains brought quick results in the 
18
th
 century England. The technological leap was particularly remarkable. A great number 
of inventions were introduced and they were rapidly adopted into the production 
mechanisms. Novel industrial production methods were first used in textile production and 
then spread to other production areas. Innovation in the machinery and tools precipitated 
the overall transition of production methods. Among others, particularly the application of 
the steam engine in the manufacturing process as an equivalent of manpower changed the 
rules of the game. Throughout the 19
th
 and the 20th century, agricultural production and 
labour intensive manufacturing gradually yielded their place to mechanical systems. The 
replacement of the agrarian feudalism with mercantilism and of mercantilism with the 
overall mechanization of production was called the Industrial Revolution. In turn,  
industrialization gave birth to the capitalist mode of production. In the capitalist economic 
system all means of production, whether it is land or a factory are owned by private 
persons and the state authority is limited to a supervisory power. Privately owned 
companies do not receive subventions from the state and their primary objective is to 
survive and extend their market share. This alteration in the modes of production took 
effect on the daily lives of millions of people as well as organizational structures and the 
society as a whole. In order to administrate large-scale industrial production, factories went 
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through rationalization and reorganization which entailed the establishment of complex, 
rationalized and hierarchical administrative bodies. Centralized and bureaucratized 
production mechanisms required a further division of labour and specialization in skills. As 
a result of that, the capital and the labour are strictly segregated and the labour is sectioned 
according to the specialization of skills. Strict working hours, well-defined tasks and 
abstract schemes are introduced to the workers. Due to social isolation in the workplace, 
class consciousness arose among the workers. The working class with characteristic 
attitudes and behaviours appeared as a distinctive social group in Europe (Marx, 1976, 
Volume III; Thompson, 2002: p. 1-12; Foster, 2003: p. 8-38).  
3.2.2. The French Revolution 
Having discussed the historical conditions that paved the way for the emergence of the 
Industrial Revolution and the modern economic system in Europe, we can move on to 
examining the conditions that allowed for the flourishing of the modern political system on 
the continent. The French revolution, with respect to its consequences is recognized widely 
as the milestone political event in the formation of the modern state system. This is since 
the social and political events that took place between 1789 and 1799 in the wake of King 
Louis XVI’s rule were particularly dramatic with respect to their consequences for 18th 
century French and modern global politics.  
The French government under King Louis XVI’s rule gradually excluded the aristocracy 
and focussed all power in the monarchy as symbolized by Louis’s famous quote ‘L’´etat 
c’est moi’. In response to ever increasing authoritarianism in government practices, poor 
living standards, unjust taxation, decadence within the court and so forth, the members of 
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the French lower classes, also known as sans-culottes fought against the established order 
which consisted of the monarchy, the aristocracy and the church. They were led by 
intellectual and idealist revolutionary cadres. Their main ideal was to destroy privileges in 
the society and establish an egalitarian social order which protected every individual’s 
right. They won against monarchical powers and executed King Louis XVI and proclaimed 
the power of the people. The new rule abolished all federalist, aristocratic and religious 
privileges and declared the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and thus all the people 
considered as equal citizens with equal rights. However, the revolutionary cadres 
radicalized further in the course of the revolution and in the second phase of the revolution 
known as the Reign of Terror, executed thousands of opponents in guillotines. The reins of 
power moved between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries several times and at the 
end of a period of political uncertainty, Napoleon Bonaparte seized power in 1799 and 
fought a series of wars against other European monarchies. The Napoleonic wars ended the 
Holy Roman Empire’s order and stimulated nationalist sentiments throughout the Europe. 
Sovereign nations founded their own nation states. Different to multi-national 
emperorships, nation states based themselves on cultural, ethnic, political and economic 
commonalities (Tocqueville, 1856: p.i-xi; Bendix, 1967: p. 292; Israel, 2001: p. 714-20).  
The developments in the international politics about one and a half centuries after the 
French revolution led to a renewed interest in modernization. Immediately after the second 
world war, came a period in which colonized nations emancipated from their colonial ties 
and established independent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.  The need for a 
speedy economic and political reconstruction in these countries also revealed the need for 
an all-inclusive theory. This drew much academic attention in the literature. Some early 
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discussions developed in American academic circles. In 1950s and 1960s, a group of 
sociologists, behavioural scientists, historians and economists, i.e.; D. Lerner, S. M. Lipset, 
M. Weiner, R. E. Ward, M.J. Levy and C.E. Black published pieces which laid the 
foundations of a system of thought called modernization theory.  
D. Lerner, in his 1958 book The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle 
East, made very important contributions to the psychological aspect of modernization 
theory. His general argument was clear, Western development patterns should be followed 
by the underdeveloped nations if they wanted to successfully modernise. In his seminal 
piece, Lerner investigated radio listening habits of people from six countries in the Middle 
East region, namely Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iran.  The objective of the 
study was to find out the influence of exposure to mass media on the transformation of the 
public. Lerner argued that the American state funded radio channel Voice of America 
(VOA) played a positive role in the transformation of its audiences from traditional to 
modern individuals. Lerner's attempt was as significant, most importantly, as it laid the 
foundations of modernization theory and, to a lesser extent, as an early attempt of the 
application of empirical surveys and quantitative methods in the social sciences realm 
(Lerner, 1958).  
Another important modernization author is Lipset. His ground-breaking work, Some Social 
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, is acclaimed 
as one of the most cited and most influential social science articles of all times. The article 
reinforced our understandings pertaining to the relationship between the economy and the 
social and the quantitative model he employed, gained important insights into the realm of 
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comparative studies. In this piece, Lipset examined socioeconomic conditions of 
democracy and particularly drew attention to economic development in this regard. 
Basically, he credited the view which he also briefly summarized as: ‘the more well-to-do 
a nation, the greater the changes that it will sustain democracy’ (Lipset, 1959: p. 75). 
Lipset’s other book Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, on the other hand, 
elaborated his views pertaining to the relationship between socioeconomic development 
and political democracy. In this book, Lipset argued that socioeconomic development 
promotes  a series of social attributes, i.e., education, urbanization, communication and 
extended middle class. According to him, these social attributes concomitantly form a 
construct which is associated with democracy (Lipset, 1960: p. 41).   
Another major development of the theory was published by Ward and Rustow in their 
book Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, which compared the westernization 
process of two non-western Asian nations. They examined institutional structures of two 
countries, which had made some progress in the process of modernization, from a 
historical perspective and aimed to find similarities and differences in their modernization 
journeys. In this way, they aimed to show the decisiveness of the institutional factors for 
the advancement of modernization (Ward & Rustow, 1964).  Levy’s two volume study 
Modernization and the Structure of Societies: Aspects of Social Structure in Modernized 
and Nonmodernized Societies can also be considered as one of the influential works in the 
realm of comparative sociology. In this study, Levy strongly supported the duality of 
societies in the world and analysed the transition from ‘relatively modernized’ society to 
‘relatively nonmodernized’ one. His writings involve one of the most systematic analysis 
of the modernization process of its time. He compared Japan and China with respect to 
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their openness to the Western cultural influence. Finally, it is worth mentioning the book, 
The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History, of Black, a historian 
who compared 155 nations from throughout the world, and argued that modernization of 
societies incorporates a series of revolutions, i.e. political, economic, social, intellectual 
and psychological ones. These reformations are buttressed by technological advancement, 
communication and transportation and a centralized administrative bodies, savings and 
investment, change in family size, urbanization, social mobility, changing family roles. 
Black advanced four themes for analysis of modernization’s impact on a society. They are 
a) The challenge of modernity, b) The consolidation of modernizing leadership, c) 
Economic and social transformation, d) The integration of society (Black, 1966: p.13-55).  
The literature shifted the focus from the western-centric understanding of modernization, 
yet it did not undermine the value of the western experience. Instead, the western 
experience came into a particular prominence since it was set out as a model. The 
modernization thinkers’ objective was to find a comprehensive model, which subsumed the 
experience of the western world and on the basis of this experience guided the way for the 
new nations of the non-western world in their economic and socio-political 
transformations. With this purpose in mind, they indicated the current stage of the 
European and the North American social, economic and political systems as an ideal. This 
was hardly surprising since the western modernization was understood as a successful 
model in the eyes of modernization theorists. A growing body of literature from the 1950’s 
to the present, presented the view that modernization has enormous impacts on millions of 
people’s lives throughout the globe. A great deal of scholarly attention on the subject of 
modernization made it a fundamental focus of study in numerous academic disciplines i.e. 
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political science, sociology, psychology, history, economics, linguistics and law. Beyond 
the academic field, popular understandings in the media and other social commentary also 
started to refer to the term frequently to describe personal attitudes, architectural structures, 
and institutions and so on.  It is suggested that a broad range of individual attitudes, 
organizational decision-making mechanisms and societal values relate to modernization in 
some way or other. As a consequence, the term modernization has undergone a substantial 
semantic change to become located at the heart of our understanding of the individual and 
the societal transformation in the developing nations of the 20th century (Marx, 1859; 
Huntington 1971: p. 295; Inkeles, 1975; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 15-48).  
3.2.3. What is modernization? 
Having discussed the economic and political conditions that paved the way for the 
emergence of modernization in the European continent in the 18
th
 century and the 
underlying historical conditions of the theoretical emergence of modernization theory in 
the 20
th,
, the next subsection examines the question: ‘What is modernization?’ In the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, modernization is defined as ‘view of historical 
progression as a series of stages, reflecting intellectual, technological, economic and 
political development’ (McLean & McMillan, 2009: p. 349). The adherents of the theory 
failed to make a full definition of the concept of modernization, but similar definitions are 
adopted for the concept which aided the development of a common and useful conceptual 
groundwork. Samuel Huntington maintained that most modernization thinkers agreed that 
modernization is a revolutionary, complex, systemic, global, lengthy, phased, 
homogenizing, irreversible and progressive process (Huntington, 1971: p. 288-90). 
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Eisenstadt, a prominent thinker of the modernization theory, in his work, The Basic 
Characteristics of Modernization defines modernization as follows: 
Historically modernization is the process of change towards those types of social, economic 
and political systems that have developed in the Western Europe and North America from the 
seventieth century to the nineteenth and then have spread to other European countries and in 
the nineteenth and twentieth century to the South American, Asian and African continents 
(Eisenstadt, 1966: p. 1). 
Similarly, Karl Deutsch defined ‘social mobilization’ which he used to explain social 
aspects of modernization as ‘… a name given to an overall process of change, which 
happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from 
traditional to modern ways of life’. Deutsch continued and argued that this change involves 
a great number of more idiosyncratic changes; i.e. ‘changes of residence, of occupation, of 
social setting, of face-to-face associates, of institutions, roles and ways of acting, of 
experiences and expectations and finally of personal memories, habits and needs…’ 
(Deutsch, 1961: p. 493). In order to reveal the individual level differences that 
modernization brings, Inkeles developed one of the most comprehensive depictions of 
modern man. He developed eight to ten general dimensions by reducing many explanatory 
variables delineating various characteristics. These dimensions are; education, work 
experience, contact with mass media, consumer goods possessed, father’s education, 
urbanization, skill level, length of urban residence, the modernity of one’s factory and the 
modernity of one’s home and school backgrounds. According to this analysis, modern man 
embodies four basic traits in his character: (1) participation (2) self-efficacy (3) 
independence and autonomy (4) openness to change (Inkeles, 1974: p. 38-32).  
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Although theorizing such a far-reaching and multi-staged phenomenon like modernization 
is a thorny task, modernization theory has attempted to provide a comprehensive answer to 
the question ‘what is modernization?’ Despite over a half century having elapsed since it 
was first theorised; for many, it still remains as a well-developed system of thought 
explaining the social, economic and political change. However, this does not render 
modernization theory immune from harsh criticism. Starting from the very beginning of 
the second half of the century, more particularly from the 1960s down to the present, many 
methodological and substantive critiques have been raised against the theory. Alongside 
this, in recent years, with the current developments in data processing techniques and 
availability of  large-N data, the arguments of the theory have been subjected to a large 
number of quantitative tests. By the help of robust and novel empirical examination 
techniques political scientists achieve mixed results involving both those which justified 
and those which falsified the arguments raised by the proponents of the theory. The 
following section presents the fundamental aspects of the theory by referring to the views 
of the adherents together with the critics. However, before that, we examine modernization 
theorists’ ideological origins since this useful to better understand the logic behind their 
theorizing. There are many common characteristics shared by modernization thinkers so a 
particular typology representing most of them can be outlined. It should be primarily 
emphasized that the modernization theorists’ worldview is heavily influenced by certain 
specific sources. Positivism, evolutionary theory, structural functionalism and Marxism are 
central to the development of this approach.  
Positivism forms part of the background to modernization theorists’ methodology and 
ideology. Similarly to the natural sciences, modernization theorists aim to isolate variables 
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concepts, and quantify and rank them in categories. They propose testable hypotheses to 
guide observations and analysis. They hold the view that positivist methodology provides 
structured rules pertaining to operating mechanisms of the society by the help of which 
they can delineate global norms of societal change. Positivism, on the other hand, 
comprises an extensive area in modernization theorist’s ideology. They hold the view that 
modernization is an objective process which, independent of cultural factors that allow 
them to underscore the historical and cultural differences between societies. The 
modernization theorists assume that all societies are bound to be traditional at one time in 
their history and either they have already transformed into a modern society or they are 
currently on course for achieving this objective. The departure and destination points and 
the direction of the change are clear in their approach. The approach assumes that if 
economic and societal experiences of the West were repeated, similar political 
consequences could be achieved in other socio-political contexts. The influence can be 
observed in many classical works of the modernization theorists. Marx, in the preface of 
the first volume of the Capital, argued that ‘the country that is more developed industrially 
only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future’ (Marx, 1867: preface).  
Daniel Lerner, in his book where he explores the change in the Middle East, The Passing 
of the Traditional Society, expressed his views strikingly ‘What America is… the 
modernizing Middle East seeks to become’ (Lerner, 1958: p. 79). In a similar vein, the 
words of Levy; a pioneering modernization thinker, predicted that in the beginning of the 
second half of the 20th century, American and Japanese publics will resemble each other 
more than in the 1990s. Levy states that: ‘Underdeveloped nations would inevitably 
develop institutions that paralleled those of the more economically advanced nations, 
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which ultimately would lead to a global convergence of societies.’ (Levy, 1965: p. 30). We 
can also see this perspective in Walt W. Rustow’s growth theory. In his book, The Stages 
of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Rustow draws a growth model which 
is formed by the past experiences of the economically developed nations and  can be 
applied as a development model to less developed ones. There are five stages identified in 
the process of development, they are; (1) the traditional society, (2) the preconditions for 
take-off, (3) the take-off, (4) the drive to maturity and (5) the age of high mass 
consumption. According to Rustow, less developed economies can make a quicker 
progress  by looking at the past experiences of the developed ones which ultimately may 
result in an increasing commonality between the two (Rustow, 1960).  
Marxism, on the other hand, has had immense influence on positivist thinkers’ 
understanding of the functioning of society. Heavily informed by the Marxist tradition, the 
modernization theorist’s way of evaluating the relationship between the economy and the 
social spheres carries the ideological traces of Karl Marx, who stated in the preface of his 
well-known piece, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, ‘The mode of 
production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in 
general’ (Marx, 1859: p. 45). Especially the more reductionist, orthodox readings of  the 
theory (later, New Left Marxists rather saw this relationship as dialectical and fluid and 
mutually constitutive), frequently saw the social sphere as dependent on the economic 
mode of production as the independent variable and saw a causal relationship between the 
two.  Among various indicators of socioeconomic development, classical modernization 
theory puts a particular emphasis on the diversified and complex industrial mode of 
production as the basis of the modern social system. Besides positivism and Marxism, 
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Structural Functionalism also constitutes an important source feeding into the 
modernization theorists’ approach. Informed by the work of social theorists such as 
Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim, modernization theorists view society as a working 
organism which progresses from a simple to a complex level. In the process of social 
evolution, social groups act as organs which take on supplementary roles in the proper 
functioning of the ‘body’ of society.  
The contrast between the traditional and the modern is central to the modernization 
theorists’ understanding. To conceptualize a large-scale, multi-dimensional and complex 
process like modernization, modernization theorists frequently refer to dichotomies. The 
great dichotomy, which incorporates ‘the traditional’ on one side and ‘the modern’ on the 
other, has been central to the modernization theorists’ understanding of social change. 
Analogous to the two poles of an axis, these two concepts correspond to two end states of 
the modernization process. Within this dichotomous evaluation, they are designed as 
mutually exclusive and contrasting poles. This usage implies that traditional is equal to 
everything that is not modern and modern is equal to everything that is not traditional. This 
methodological selection is reflected in the views that tradition is an obstacle to be 
overcome to achieve economic and social development; therefore one can only be modern 
as long as one emancipates oneself from traditional commitments and ties restricting his 
social self. With reference to the great dichotomy, the modernization theorist also employs 
a vast number of descriptive binary axes, i.e.; economy, politics, society, personal life and 
culture. Rural against urban settlement, illiterate against literate person, religious against 
the secular lifestyle, self-sufficient against complex society are some examples of this 
dichotomous understanding of change. Levy who drew a bold line between ‘the relatively 
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non-modernized’ and ‘relatively modernized’ nations and argued that the greater the ratio 
of inanimate sources to animate sources the less traditional a given society is (Levy, 1972: 
p. 3). The limitation of the traditional man surrounding his existence has many 
consequences relating from his belief system to his role in the society. He is insufficiently 
technically equipped against the compelling forces of nature and this has implications for a 
broad range of areas. His abilities are largely limited by structural forces. The production 
mechanism is heavily based on his muscle force and apart from tamed animals that are 
used in physically demanding jobs, such as ploughing, haulage and transportation he only 
had that to rely on. He needs to wait for the rain to pour and the sun to shine in order to 
produce. What is more, geographical isolation makes him heavily rely on goods and 
services produced in his close vicinity. In response to being exposed to economically and 
physically insecure situation, the traditional man develops a fatalistic world view. Since he 
has a limited power to exercise control over his own life, he becomes more inclined to 
believe in a higher authority contemplating his life from birth to death and even after. 
Believing in  such a supernatural power, reinforces his existential security and helps him 
reduce in his mind the unpredictability of the journey of life. His belief system provides 
him with the answers to the questions that have been asked throughout history, such as 
‘where do we come from?’ ‘what are we?’. Contrary to traditional man, his modern 
counterpart leads a completely different life. By making use of innovative technology he 
enjoys a greater level of control over the nature. He is intellectually and technically 
equipped to change his surroundings according to his needs. He makes the use of 
machinery in the process of production. He is employed in complex, hierarchic and 
rationalized institutions which require developing an inherent discipline to comply with 
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strict work hours and rational and objective attitudes to comply with the machinery 
(Huntington, 1971: p. 286; Bell, 1973: p. 147; Inglehart & Baker, 2000: p. 25-7; Inglehart 
& Oysterman, 2004: p. 24-5). 
Although the dichotomous approach provides a ‘cognitive map’ of the modernization 
process, it  has attracted a considerable amount of criticism and has become one of the 
most debated points of modernization theory. Criticism gathered particularly around the 
mutually exclusive design of the traditional and the modern concepts (Huntington, 1971: p. 
295-6; Bendix, 1967: p. 326; Gusfield, 1967: p. 356; Eisenstadt, 1974: p. 236), their 
homogeneity (Tipps, 1973: p. 231, 218-9; Gusfield, 1967: p. 352; Huntington, 1971: p. 
293-5), and the static depiction of the traditional society (Gusfield, 1967, p. 356; Bendix, 
1967: p. 293; Tipps, 1973: p. 213). Tipps, in this regard, claimed that the dichotomous 
approach is biased against traditional societies because it rules out the option of equality of 
opportunity and transmissivity between the two attributes (Tipps, 1973: p. 213-4, 207). 
Tipps also argued that an absolute rejection of tradition does not necessarily lead to a 
perfect state of modernization, but to disorder (Tipps, 1973: p. 206). Huntington (1971), in 
a similar vein, suggested that the zero-sum character of the contrast between the traditional 
and the modern does not necessarily reflect the reality. Instead, in some cases, traditional 
and modern may strengthen one another. The positive role of the family based 
entrepreneurialism on the development of modern capitalist economic mechanisms and the 
role of modern mass communication technologies in broadcasting traditional cultures are 
given as examples of such a positive relationship between the two. Regarding to the 
homogeneity of the concepts, Huntington argued that the unbalanced characterization of 
the traditional and modern categories defined the traditional concept as a residual category 
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implying that it simply covers everything which falls out of the modern category. Instead, 
traditional societies are diverse in many aspects, although to a lesser extent, this holds for 
the modern ones as well (Tipps, 1973: p. 231, 218-9; Huntington, 1971: p. 293-6; see also 
Gusfield, 1967: p. 352).  
Another criticized point is the theory’s linear, deterministic, inexorable, irreversible 
depiction of the change. Opposing this picture, Huntington advances the view that 
modernization is an uneven process and political reversals can take place (Huntington, 
1971: p. 298). Barrington Moore’s argument is more elaborate. He suggests that there are 
three different destinations of the modernization process. The modernization process may 
lead to a democracy or a fascist or communist government. What determines that is a 
couple of factors, i.e.; power distribution amongst the elites, the economic basis of the 
agrarian upper-class, the class constellation, the distribution of power between classes and 
the state’s economy against the dominant class (Moore, 1966). Inglehart and Baker in this 
regard suggest that modernization is not deterministic, but a probabilistic phenomenon in 
which many other factors apart from socioeconomic development can also play significant 
roles. Giving the former Soviet Union countries as an example, they maintain that although 
economic development is accounted for by a predictable cultural change, economical 
backing can reverse the process of modernization (Inglehart & Baker, 2000: p. 49). 
A broad range of criticism has been levelled against the convergence thesis that is 
supported by the modernization thinkers. One of the aspects of the criticism was related to 
the repeatability of the modernization process. Eisenstadt, a prominent revisionist thinker 
of modernization theory, admitted that the process of modernization is linked to several 
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factors, i.e.; the availability of essential resources in a society, the type of change societies 
were influenced, its international relations, pre-modern socioeconomic and cultural 
backgrounds and maybe the most crucially perceptions and decisions of ruling elites in 
pre-modern regimes (Eisenstadt, 1966: p. 1; 1974: p. 252). Relative to this point, it is also 
argued that modernization is a unique experience of Western European societies that has 
emerged as a consequence of unique historical events. Following the Weberian tradition, 
exponents of the culturalist approach argued that since it is impossible to reproduce the 
same historical conditions, European modernization cannot be repeated in other politico-
historical contexts. Emphasizing the importance of the cultural legacy and its lasting 
influence conditioning the modernization effect, theorists in this school claimed that all 
societies bear their own internal dynamics which would lead them to a different expression 
of the process of modernization (Huntington, 1971: p. 298; Inglehart & Baker, 2000: p. 29; 
Bendix, 1967: p. 327-35). Samuel Huntington, one of the leading scholars in this camp, 
maintained that, let alone converging, instead, countries do diverge based on their cultural 
heritage in the process of modernization (Huntington, 1971: p. 298). Huntington’s claim 
marshalled empirical evidence in the following years. It has been shown that lasting 
cultural gaps prevail between both modern and non-modern camps contrary to what is 
suggested by modernization theory (Inglehart & Baker, 2000: p. 36). 
The convergence thesis was also opposed within the context of modernization-
Americanization debate. Tipps argues that the classical modernization theory idealizes the 
western and particularly American cultures. It ranks western especially American values 
upon non-western ones to legitimize unbalanced power relationships between western and 
non-western societies, in particular the European colonialism (Tipps, 1973: p. 210-16). 
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Another criticism is raised by Edward Said, who in his long debated book Orientalism: 
Western Representations of the Orient criticized Western perspective of the non-western 
world, particularly the Middle East. He argued that the Orientalist perspective laid by the 
modernization theorists serves for the justification of European and American cultural, 
military domination of the countries in the Middle East. Most of the Western investigation 
of the Middle Eastern culture aims to confirm the European and American superior 
position against the Middle East (Said, 1978). Mazrui linking modernization theory with 
Darwinism is another critic who harshly criticized this perspective on the grounds that it 
incorporates racist and ethnocentric implications (Mazrui, 1968: p. 82). Inglehart and 
Baker, relying on their findings, argued that modernization does not transform countries 
into the United States. Even if there was such a cultural convergence, not the United States, 
but Scandinavian countries would be the point where all countries will eventually 
resemble. Finding the convergence thesis unlikely, at least in the near future, they note 
that; ‘economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than 
converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritages’ 
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000: p. 49).  
3.3. The Generation Phenomenon and Mannheim’s Theory of Generations 
3.3.1. The concept of generation 
In daily life, we often come across older generations lamenting that younger generations 
have become for selfish, disrespectful or unconcerned and young berating older citizens for 
being reactionary or inconsiderate of their lifestyles. Traditionally, we are accustomed to 
attribute this clash solely to age disparities. We tend to think that young or old people 
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behave in a particular way due to the very nature of being young or old. However, 
attributing age as the only cause of social disparities is to assume that every individual is 
born into and lives through the same life conditions. However, this assumption does not 
seem to be a reasonable one, especially in today’s world of rapid change and inequality. 
What other factors may come into play in the occurrence of age-related disparities? 
Generation is one of the answers given to this question. 
Generation is not a new concept to our understanding. The appearance of the concept dates 
back a long time in both religious and non-religious scriptures. In religious books the term 
generation connotes age-stratified human groups. In non-religious context it is used in a 
similar meaning. Homer, in his ancient epic poem the Iliad, which narrates the battle 
between the King Agamemnon and Achilles, likens the succession of generations to the 
leaves of the trees which are ‘born and perish’. Herodotus mentions the term generation in 
his writings about the chronological sequence of Egyptian monarchs and priests. For him, 
one hundred years is equal to three generations. Beyond its general recognition in the 
religious and classical literary texts, the concept generation has first been studied 
scientifically in the modern times by August Comte, the father of positivist ideology. 
Comte, who basically attempted to find globally applicable laws of social change, argued 
in his book Cours de Philosophie Positive, that ‘the true filiation of every kind of progress 
should be traced from generation to generation’ (Comte, 1853: p. 542). John Stuart Mill, 
largely influenced by his contemporary Comte, argued that generation is one of the key 
concepts to understand history. According to him, each generation is the product of the 
preceding generations and as their time comes by they take the possession of the society 
(Mill, [1983] 1961: p. 598).  
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Despite these early attempts, the generation phenomenon has not been analysed 
comprehensively until the beginning of the 20th century. As is known, the 20th century 
witnessed the most devastating wars in human history. Several millions died or were 
injured in the battlefields and trenches of WWI. Families fell apart and the social order was 
undermined in the belligerent countries. In addition to this, people from all over the world 
suffered from the devastating consequences of migration, famine and epidemic diseases. 
At the end of the war, empires collapsed and national borders were changed which 
underpinned long term and continued conflicts among nations. On the other hand, 
economic difficulties implied poor conditions for large human populations. Originating 
from a stock market crisis in the US, the Great Depression spread to the rest of the globe. 
Global GDP dropped, international trade shrank and unemployment rose. These conditions 
left dramatic imprints on the lives of millions of people throughout the world and paved 
the way for the exacerbation of conflict that fed into the outbreak of WWII, which brought 
even more dramatic consequences. Intellectuals could not be indifferent to these major 
developments. Francois Mentré, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Wilhelm Pinder, Karl Mannheim, 
Alfred Lorenz are some of the writers who observed these events closely and pondered on 
their social consequences. Perhaps for that reason, generational responses given to these 
events constitute an important aspect of their works.  
Karl Mannheim deserves particular attention among these writers. Mannheim, in his 
seminal 1923 essay ‘The Problem of Generations’ analysed the generation phenomenon 
within a fully developed theory and laid down the foundations of the theory of generations. 
Mannheim states that: ‘[Generation]… is one of the indispensable guides to an 
understanding of the structure of social and intellectual movements’ (Mannheim, 1952 
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[1923]: p. 286-87). Mannheim’s theory is outlined in the following pages, but now we turn 
to his brief explanation of the state of knowledge in his time, which will provide us with a 
sound theoretical ground to further develop our discussion of the generation phenomenon. 
In the first part of his essay, Mannheim highlighted the outstanding aspects of a rivalry 
between two ‘positivist’ and ‘romantic-historical’ approaches in the realm of generations. 
Because of French and German dominations in the respective approaches, Mannheim 
preferred calling them French positivism and German romanticism. Mannheim suggested 
that, these two rival approaches diverge mainly on their depictions of the formation of 
generations. Mannheim argued that, reflecting the general perspective of the positivist 
mind, the positivist understanding of the formation of generations seeks to find general 
rules explaining the historical development. The positivist approach, according to 
Mannheim, developed a quantitative understanding of the formation of generations by 
emphasizing mere biological forces, i.e. birth, limited life span and death. It is also 
assumed by the positivists that characteristic differences and time intervals between each 
pair of successive generations are identical, which implies a linear and predictable pattern 
of social progress. Contrary to the positivist approach, as Mannheim noted, the romantic-
historical approach, which is dominated by German historicists, challenged the mere 
biological explanation of the succession of generations. The adherents of this approach 
favoured the separation of generations by time intervals based on subjective experiences of 
time. According to them despite the biological base the direction and the tempo of change 
are heavily influenced by the social forces which allow successive generations take on 
their unique place in the process of social change. In their qualitative periodization of the 
time, history is not depicted as a smooth chronological flow, but as a fluctuating process 
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(Mannheim 1952 [1923]: p. 276-86). One might draw such a conclusion from Mannheim’s 
comparison. The positivist approach views generations as equally sliced age groups 
replacing each other in the flow of history. Not surprisingly, this relates to a particular 
depiction of history, which is linear in terms of its course of action and predictable in terms 
of its pace. Conversely, the romantic-historical approach views generation as a social 
location and supports the view that generational formation is based on qualitative 
periodization of time. History is pictured as a fluctuating process by this approach. 
Reflecting his German historicist origins, Mannheim takes a critical stance on the first 
group and took sides with the second one. He opposes the sole positivist explanation 
which, he argues, causes losing the social perspective. He claims that, the biological forces 
are important because they set the rules of the game; however, the sociological explanation 
of generations starts beyond this point (Mannheim 1952 [1923]: p. 290-91).  
Mannheim’s theory which he elaborated in the second part of his essay is elaborated in the 
following pages, but now we turn to the question asked above: What is a generation? In its 
most basic meaning, the generation phenomenon establishes a unique link between man 
and the time. It locates individuals within particular time intervals in history and helps us 
to answer the question why a particular individual who lived in a particular time point in 
history acted in a particular way. The importance of the generation concept is recognized 
by leading philosophers of the 20th century. Ortega y Gasset, a pioneer Spanish liberal 
intellectual, defined the concept generation as ‘… a dynamic compromise between mass 
and individual and is the most important conception in history’ (Y Gasset, (1961 [1933]: p. 
15).  Jane Pilcher, an influential sociologist, described the generation phenomenon as ‘a 
way of understanding differences between age groups and as a means of locating 
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individuals and groups within historical time’ (Pilcher, 1994: p. 481). As can be seen, there 
exists a general consensus on the importance of the concept of generation. However, these 
definitions only address the most general meaning of the concept of generation. In order to 
come to a better understanding of the concept, we need to distinguish between the different 
meanings that exist in the literature.  
David I. Kertzer, reviewed the diversified sociological usage of the generation concept in 
his essay. He argued that we can make a progress in the problematic field of generation 
only if a common definition is adopted. Therefore, the following pages aim to distinguish 
between different meanings of the concept in the guidance of Kertzer’s categorization. 
Based his categorization on Troll’s five different concepts of generation, Kertzer suggests 
that there are four different usages of the concept of generation in the sociological 
literature. They are; (a) generation as a principle of kinship descent, (b) generation as a 
cohort, (c) generation as life stage and (d) generation as a historical period (Kertzer, 1983: 
p. 126).  
2.3.1.1. Generation as a principle of kinship descent 
In Kertzer’s categorization, the first usage of the term generation implies a genealogical 
meaning. This type of usage corresponds to presence in a family linkage and is indigenous 
to the parent-offspring type of investigations. These investigations are particularly useful in 
studying intrafimilial value transmission from family to the children. In these 
investigations, the conditions of value transfer are mostly explored by comparing parent 
and offspring generations. Specific to the realm of politics; some common themes are party 
preferences, political participation and political attitudes. Hyman (1959); Levin (1961), 
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Jennings and Niemi (1968; 1974; 1981), Katz and Rotter’s (1969); Jennings and Niemi 
(1974; 1981), Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz (1976), Niemi and Sobieszek (1977), Beck 
and Jennings (1975; 1979; 1991); Jennings, Stoker and Bowers (2001) produced works in 
which the term generation is used in genealogical meaning.  
The family has long been suggested as the primary source of children’s political 
development. The main assumption in ‘the transmission model’ is that family’s political 
orientations and values are reflected in children attitudes and behaviours (Hyman, 1959; 
Levin, 1961; Beck & Jennings, 1991: p. 744). Herbert Hyman, in his 1959 review article 
on political socialization, suggested family as the primary transmitter of the political values 
in children (Hyman, 1959: p. 72). Although this view acclaimed widely in the literature 
and became the traditional view, it did not remain free from criticism. Hess and Torney 
(1965) opposed this view and brought the family’s preeminent role in children’s political 
socialization up to discussion. They argued that family is one of the agents of socialization, 
but it is no way comparable to the public school in terms of its power to socialize young 
individuals (Hess & Torney, 1965: p. 93-116). On the other hand, the idea that family is 
the primary source of political socialization is endorsed by numerous studies, yet it is 
supported by scant empirical evidence that many additional factors could be at work. An 
early parent–offspring type of empirical evidence is presented by Martin L. Levin. Levin 
analysed data yielded from Illinois high school students and their parents in 1957 and 
1959. Levin reported 95 percent family-offspring party preference congruency in 
Republican, and 75 percent in Democrat families (Levin, 1961: p. 597). Levin also found 
that parent’s social status influence adolescent’s party preference, but this relationship is 
mediated by family’s party preference. Another finding is that girls are slightly more likely 
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to agree with their parents on party preferences than boys. On the other hand, boys are 
more likely to be influenced by the political environment in their high school than girls and 
girls are more likely to be influenced from the national political climate than boys (Levin, 
1961: p. 603). Deriving from Hyman’s finding that boys are more interested in politics 
than girls, Levin speculates that boys are less likely to adhere their parent’s party 
preference and remain exposed to the national political climate, but on the other hand, 
more likely to be influenced by the political environment at school (Levin, 1961: p. 603). 
However, it should be noted that he did not support this with empirical findings.  
In another parent-offspring study, Jennings and Niemi achieved variegated evidence 
regarding to parent-offspring correspondence in the American context (Jennings & Niemi, 
1968). They employed data derived from surveys made with American secondary school 
seniors (12
th
 graders) and their parents. They relied on intra-pair tau-beta correlation scores 
as indicators of parent-offspring congruence. Their analysis revealed a compatibility 
between children and their parents on party preference with a tau-beta correlation of .47 
(Jennings and Niemi, 1968: p. 7). On the other hand, when specific issues such as federal 
role in integrating the schools, allowance of prayers in the schools, communists’ taking 
office positions and speaking against religion are explored, they found less compatibility 
between the two groups. While the parent-offspring congruence is relatively higher in the 
first two items, with correlations of .34 and .29 respectively, a clear incompatibility is 
revealed in the last two with correlations of .13 and .05 (Jennings & Niemi, 1968: p.9). 
They also found that the level of parent-offspring congruence is lower on their feelings 
toward dissident groups. While the feelings toward Catholics topped the list with 
correlations of .36, feelings towards big business ranked the lowest with .12 (Jennings & 
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Niemi, 1968: p. 12). To look at cynicism against the government, they employed Guttman 
scaling and found that students are less cynical than their parents, which made the 
correspondence between the two groups appear low with tau-beta correlations of .12 
(Jennings & Niemi, 1968: p. 12-15). The last point they make is related to the salience of 
political matters. They found that neither the children’s nor the parent’s politicization 
influence parent-children congruence remarkably (Jennings & Niemi, 1968: p. 22). From 
these results they concluded that party preference is the most agreed political orientation 
between children and their parents in the American context while other political values 
display a lower level of congruency. For comparative purposes, they tested parent-
offspring agreement on religious beliefs and found that 74 percent of pairs agreed on a 
denominational preference which is a much higher rate than the rate of agreement on party 
preference (Jennings & Niemi, 1968: p. 16-17). Their analysis also revealed some 
interesting findings. They found that parent-offspring congruence is largely independent of 
sex roles and close relations between children and the parents promotes the congruency 
(Jennings & Niemi, 1968: p. 19-20). 
In their analysis of data derived from the Socialization Panel Study conducted in 1965, 
1973 and 1982 with a sample of American high school seniors and their parents, Niemi and 
Jennings explored the patterns of the influence of parent’s partisanship on offspring 
partisanship over time. Their preliminary analysis supports the traditional conviction that 
parental influence is higher in the beginning of adulthood, but then levels off as one ages. 
While in 1965, parent partisanship data are correlated with 1965, 1973 and 1982 filial 
partisanship data by . 61, . 38 and . 38 respectively (Niemi & Jennings, 1991: p. 972; Beck 
& Jennings, 1991: p. 749). To explore the underlying reasons of this decline in parental 
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influence they employed a series of variables corresponding to specific issues, i.e. ‘racial 
integration of the schools’, ‘use of prayers in school’, ְ‘correctness of entering the Vietnam 
war’ and ‘the government’s role in ensuring jobs and a good standard living’ (Niemi & 
Jennings, 1991: p. 173). When separate regressions are run, in which filial partisanship in 
1965, 1973 and 1982 are the dependent variables; it is revealed that in 1965, parental 
partisanship is the strongest determinant of offspring partisanship and followed by school 
integration issue. However, in 1973, the family influence decreases, but still remains a 
more powerful determinant of filial partisanship than any of the specific issues mentioned 
above, despite their increased determinative power. In 1982, the family influence does not 
decrease remarkably but the influence of opinions on all other issues increases (Niemi & 
Jennings, 1991: p. 978). Replicating the same analysis for presidential elections revealed 
that parental influence follows the same trend. However, at each year the family influence 
is lower and issue influences are higher compared to the partisanship results (Niemi & 
Jennings, 1991: p. 985). As a result of this analysis, Niemi and Jennings come to the 
conclusion that family partisanship is a strong determinant of children’s partisanship 
especially at the time when children embark on their adulthood. Although, it’s power 
declines over the years, it remains being as one of the most powerful predictors of the 
matured children’s partisanship. Their findings confirmed Hyman’s previous findings. In 
addition to this, opinions on specific issues become more salient in terms of their power to 
determine filial generation’s partisanship over the years.   
Similar results were achieved by Beck and Jennings (1991). Having the data derived from 
the three-wave panel study of American high school seniors and their parents; they 
investigated parent influences on interest in politics and partisanship. They found that the 
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congruence between parental and filial partisanship was at its highest in 1965 and then 
gradually eroded with the passage of time. On the other hand, a curvilinear effect occurred 
between the parental and filial politicization between 1965 and 1982 which reached its 
peak in 1973. Their analysis illustrates that partisanship and politicization differ in strength 
in terms of their influence on the children. While family-child correspondence is modest in 
partisanship, it follows a low pattern in politicization (Beck & Jennings, 1991: p.747-49). 
The similar trends are observed when partisanship is categorized into republican, neutral 
and democrat groups and politicization is divided into low, medium and high categories 
(Beck & Jennings, 1991: p.752). They found that while children from partisan families are 
more likely to adopt a partisan outlook, what is more, these children are those who are less 
likely to stand against anti-partisan movements between 1965 and 1973 (Beck & Jennings, 
1991: p.755).  Given these results, they conclude that ‘times’ influence people coming 
from different family backgrounds and different age groups (Beck & Jennings, 1991: 
p.756).  
2.3.1.2. Generation as a non-genealogical phenomenon 
In Kertzer’s categorization, the last three usages of the term generation bear non-
genealogical meanings. They are: generation as life stage, generation as a historical period 
and generation as a cohort. Quite different than in the first usage, when generation holds a 
non-genealogical meaning the members of each successive generation are not necessarily 
linked with familial ties. Nevertheless, generation in a non-genealogical meaning plays an 
important role in addressing the issue of social change. Strong theoretical arguments and 
empirical findings in the sociology literature suggest that social change appears by three 
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means; namely biological maturation, historical evolution and replacement of generations 
(Riley, 1973; Converse, 1976; Glenn, 1981). More frankly, either the ageing of the 
individuals, or the influences contemporary events impinge on people or the replacement 
of older individuals with younger ones change the prevailing values in a society. In the 
sociology literature, these three means of change are also known as ‘age, period and cohort 
(APC) effects’. These three effects are discerned in numerous studies thus far and linked 
with a broad array of human attitudes and behaviour. However, it should be kept in mind 
that there exists a fundamental problem with these effects. Despite clear theoretical 
differences between them (Abramson, 1983; Riley, 1987), their overlapping influences 
make treating them statistically a thorny task (Glenn, 1976; Alwin & Krosnick, 1991: p. 
171). On the other hand, not disentangling cohort age and period effects may lead to 
dramatic results. There are some scholarly works in the literature which did not distinguish 
between these effects and failed to show the real reasons of change (Kertzer, 1983: p. 131). 
On the other hand, there are several works in the literature which made successful attempts 
at disentangling their overlapping influences. In their 1976 work, Searing, Wright and 
Rabinowitz attempted to disentangle age and period effects from cohort effect in party 
identification, political efficacy and political trust. Their findings indicate that regardless of 
which one is controlled first, period effects prevail age effects in terms of their influence 
on cohorts. Similar results are achieved when political efficacy and political trust are 
considered (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976: p. 105-11). Norval D. Glenn in his 1976 
work visited this problem and argued that it is a ‘futile quest’ to try to disentangle age, 
period and cohort effects. He noted that ‘Regardless of how cohort data are examined, two 
kinds of effects are confounded with one another; age and cohort effects are confounded in 
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cross-sectional data by age, age and period effects in intra-cohort trend data, and period 
and cohort effects in trend data for each age level’ (Glenn, 1976: p. 900). Leaving aside the 
empirical difficulties of ‘un-confounding’ these effects for now, these three effects are 
discussed below with regards to their conceptual meanings.  
2.3.1.2.1. Generation as a life stage (Age effect) 
Kertzer’s first non-genealogical usage of the term generation is ‘generation as a life stage’ 
which is also known as ‘age effect’ or ‘life cycle effect’ in the sociology literature. It is an 
irrefutable fact that aging brings about a broad range of changes to individuals. We all 
undergo a change as we accumulate knowledge, gain new skills or encounter other 
individuals and ideas while passing through different stages of life. Further to that, aging 
which is actually one’s biological progression in life, when considered from an aggregate 
perspective, becomes a fundamental property of social change. In other words, the 
prevailing values in that society are bound to change as the members of a given society 
age. This holds true for political values as well. Age-related changes in political attitudes 
and behaviour is a frequently observed phenomenon in daily life. Aging may exert its 
influence on political attitudes through a great many mechanisms. Some usual 
consequences of aging i.e. decline in mental inabilities, biases or mobility problems may 
be associated with a change in attitudes. Alwin and McCammon investigated the 
relationship between aging and cognitive abilities. Having all potential intervening factors, 
i.e. race, gender, parental education, father’s occupational prestige, maternal employment 
and rural upbringing controlled for, they found that aging causes a decline in vocabulary 
knowledge (Alwin & McCammon, 2001: p. 156; Merelman, 1972: p. 154). A considerable 
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amount of evidence shows that political participation follows a curvilinear pattern as 
individuals travel through different stages of life. It increases incrementally after the age of 
eighteen, peaks around the age of thirty as one seizes maximum power to participate and 
then slows its increasing pattern and finally it descends (Milbrath, 1965; Inglehart, 1971: p. 
312; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980: p. 48; Alwin, Hofer & McCammon, 2006: p. 31).  
Lastly the spirit of the time should also be considered when the relationship between age 
and political attitudes is investigated. Empirical evidence introduced by Beck and 
Jennings, matched the panel data involving American high school students’, their parents’ 
and teachers’ political activity patterns between 1965 and 1973 with Michigan presidential 
election series between 1956-1976. Although a considerable part of their data come from 
high school children and their parents, their use of the data does not bear a genealogical 
meaning because they did not match children with their parents but used each group as the 
representative of their generation. Their findings are important because the situation in a 
very volatile period in American politics is reflected in their findings. Their main finding is 
that period effects should be taken seriously while the diversion of the youth political 
values from that of their parents is investigated. They show that during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, the younger generation took a more active position in six out of nine political 
activities than their parent’s generation, which appeared contrary to the traditional view 
about the age and participation. What is more, they are more politically active than their 
counterparts from other periods as well. In return for that, the parent generation also 
exhibits an uncommon political participation during this period (Beck & Jennings, 1979: p. 
739-43). By looking at these results, they detected the period between the late 1960s and 
early 1970s as an exceptional one. They argued that political activity patterns during this 
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period does not comply with the general theories of participation in the US. As a solution 
to this problem, they suggested that the conventional relationship between age/ideology 
and political participation must be revised by adding a factor ‘the opportunities of 
involvement’ into this relationship (Beck & Jennings, 1979: p. 748-49).  
2.3.1.2.2. Generation as a historical period (Period effect) 
 
Kertzer’s third usage of the term generation, namely generation as a historical period 
which is also known as ‘the period effect’ in the literature, tells us a completely different 
story. The period effect basically corresponds to short term attitudinal and behavioural 
reactions developed against far-reaching macro-scale events. These events may exert 
shifting influence on large numbers of people within the society and cut across several age 
groups (Alwin, Hofer & McCammon, 2006: p. 21). Beck and Jennings argue that period 
effect represents ‘… far-reaching socio-political forces and events that touch the lives of 
most contemporary individuals’ (Beck & Jennings, 1991: p. 743). Take for example, a 
repeated question asking whether the government should take more responsibility to 
provide people things they need, was directed to the same respondent just before and after 
a destructive and sudden economic depression. The assumption regarding to period effect 
is that, in the second interview the respondent will be more prone to the option that 
government should take more responsibility. Regardless of whether these ideas will change 
or persist in the future, the economic crisis is, with a high degree of probability, 
responsible for the respondent’s sudden alteration of his idea of government’s role in the 
economy. It is not surprising that some particular social and economic groups may remain 
more vulnerable to period effects. For instance, in above-mentioned case an unemployed 
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young individual’s answer is more likely to change between the two waves than that of an 
employed adult who feels more secure economically. Whether similar over-time disparities 
can be observed across age groups is an important question to ask at this point. Searing, 
Wright and Rabinowitz, in their 1976 work, searched for an answer to the question whether 
ageing or contemporary events play a more important role in determining individual 
political orientations. They tested the ‘the primacy principle’ on nine orientations relating 
to party identification, political efficacy and political trust. As a result, they found that in 
some particular cases all age groups react in a similar way and in similar magnitudes to the 
same political events. In seven out of nine political orientations, period effect dominated 
the age effect. However, it should be kept in mind that according to their findings period 
effects do not erode age effects. The spread between age groups remain the same, but all 
age groups contribute to the same overall shifting trend (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 
1976: p. 101-11). In another investigation, Jennings and Markus reported on their 
longitudinal analysis that the period effect is conditional on the age effect when partisan 
orientations are taken into account. According to their findings, responses to fourteen 
political events are less likely to be influenced from partisan orientations as the members 
of both offspring and parent groups (with two exceptions) age (Jennings & Markus, 1984: 
p. 1007). Although these are very particular forms of interaction between the two effects, 
we need to keep in mind as a general rule that period effect should be considered carefully 
and must be separated from age effect due to their overlapping influences. 
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2.3.1.2.3. Generation as a cohort (Cohort effect) 
Kertzer’s fourth category is ‘generation as a cohort’. Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz 
argue that ‘generations are age cohorts whose orientations are unusually durable, having 
developed in response to major events and crises which have reshaped a population’s 
outlooks.’ (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976: p. 98-99). According to Glenn a cohort 
consists of ‘… those people within a geographical or otherwise delineated population who 
experienced the same significant event within a given period of time’ (Glenn, 1977: p. 8). 
In a similar vein, Ryder identified the concept cohort as ‘… the aggregate of individuals 
(within some population definition) who experienced the same event within the same time 
interval’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 845). Ryder opposes the synonymous usage of the term cohort 
instead of generation and suggests that the term generation should only be used to connote 
‘the temporal unit of kinship structure’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 853). It is seen from the above 
definitions that both concepts bear parallel meanings, yet it should be noted that there exist 
at least two important differences between them. The first one relates to their conceptual 
frameworks. The concept cohort is a broader concept than the concept generation. As an 
umbrella term, it involves several sub-terms, i.e. birth cohort, marriage cohort, workforce 
cohort and graduation cohort. Each form of cohort refers to a different type of stratification 
of human groups. A marriage cohort, for instance, consists of those who got married in 
approximate years. Members of a marriage cohort do not necessarily share a birth year 
because obviously not everyone gets married at the same age. Similarly, a workforce 
cohort includes those who entered the workforce at about the same year. Again the 
members of a workforce cohort are not necessarily coevals because workforce entering age 
is determined by a series of factors, i.e. age of compulsory schooling, qualification 
 118 
 
requirements of the industry, female schooling (Erikson et al.,1979). Birth cohort, on the 
other hand, bears the closest meaning to generation. Nevertheless, even if the cohort is 
used in the birth cohort sense, still a subtle nuance, which relates to the second difference, 
distinguishes cohort from generation.  It is argued that the difference between birth cohort 
and generation originates from data organizing preferences (Ryder, 1965: p. 846-48; 
Alwin, Hofer & McCammon, 2006: p. 23). Marshall made perhaps the most convenient 
analogies to explain the differences between birth cohort and generation. He resembles the 
difference between a generation and a cohort to the difference between the expressions of 
the same actual temperature either by using Fahrenheit/Celcius or qualitative break points 
such as freezing and boiling. In both ways the same fact is addressed, yet the latter does it 
by referring to some predetermined critical thresholds. Similarly, while a birth cohort 
divides time into objective intervals by employing a quantitative categorization, a 
generation divides it into subjective time periods by referring to qualitative break-points 
(Marshall, 1983: p. 53-4). Two important questions arise at this point. The first one deals 
with the source of the socialization and the second one with its subject. Let us ask the first 
question immediately. What are these break-points that are referred while specifying 
generations? In the sociology and political science literatures, major tumultuous politico-
historical events such as war and economic crises are referred as factors that play role in 
the formation of generations (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976: p. 104). Take for 
example, the ‘hard timers generation’ which involves those who come of age during the 
First World War conditions and faced all difficulties of the most cruel war until that time. 
Similarly, ‘the Good Warriors’ generation is characterized by devastating conditions of the 
Second World War and ‘the Baby Boomers’ generation is a product of affluent conditions 
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of post-war period. All these generations, one way or the other, refer to the important 
events of the time their members come of age. There exists empirical evidence searching 
the underlying reasons of this fact. Shuman and Scott’s 1989 research provides that people 
mostly recall and deem important the events which took place in their adolescence or early 
adulthood. They asked a sample of Americans to identify national or global significant 
events in the last fifty years, and why they deem these events significant. Their research 
revealed that the majority of the respondents viewed the Second World War and the 
Vietnam war as the two most important politico-historical events in the late fifty years of 
American history. They reported that wars are viewed as the only reminiscent events in the 
formation of their respondents’ memories, such an extent that, no generational lines are 
discovered in the recalling of events other than wars. Wars, on the other hand, appeared to 
be equally dramatic for respondents from the entire age ranges; however, for those who 
have a direct experience with wars, they become even more salient. (Shuman & Scott, 
1989: p. 363, 370-372; see also Ryder, 1965: p. 848-9; Jennings, 1996: p. 240-41). 
A very important mechanism, political socialization, is suggested as central to the 
relationship between macro-scale contemporary politico-historical events and formation of 
generations. Political socialization is important for generations because the notion of 
‘generation as a cohort’ is based on the idea that idiosyncratic conditions happen to take 
place and impinge upon the members of a generation coming of age and limit them with 
similar experiences which ends up with their adoption of similar characteristics and values. 
As the father of the term, Hyman defines political socialization as ‘learning of social 
patterns corresponding to ... social positions as mediated through various agencies of 
society’ (Hyman, 1959: p. 25). Ryder, from a constructivist point of view, argues that 
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socialization is ‘… a process of committing an individual to a term of service in a group, 
by progressively confining his behavioural potentialities within an acceptable range and by 
preparing him for the types of role he will be expected to play’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 852). 
Similarly Langton defines it as ‘the way society transmits its political culture from 
generation to generation’ (Langton, 1969: p. 9).  
Discussions on political socialization can be dated back to Plato’s stimulating arguments 
on citizens’ education. However, in modern times political socialization first entered into 
the political science literature as a particular field of study in 1950s. Herbert H. Hyman’s 
1959 review of the previous works is viewed as the beginning of political socialization as a 
distinct field of study. In this essay, Hyman primarily dealt with stratification of age-
groups, political learning, the origins of political behaviour and political socialization 
agencies. Marriam (1931), Newcomb (1943) Hollingshead (1949) and Stevenson and 
Stuart’s (1958), Greenstein (1960), Hess and Torney (1967), Easton and Dennis (1969), 
Inkeles and Levingson (1969) are some other prominent works in the field (Sears, 1975: p. 
94). Political socialization studies then faded into the background in 1970s. Niemi and 
Hepburn argued that this is due to over-deterministic approach it brings to pre-adulthood. 
According to them, although it is difficult to reject that generations are formed due to 
important contemporary events and things that are learned in early phases of life have 
influence on future attitudes in one way or another; assuming that things happened in pre-
adulthood are fully responsible of how one behaves in the future is ‘a gross 
oversimplification’. This is one of the important underlying causes of abandoning the 
theory. Nevertheless, a new wave of revitalization is observed concerning especially the 
Eastern European countries, which is linked with the concerns in these countries about 
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whether the upcoming generation will be supportive of the new political systems (Niemi & 
Hepburn, 1995, p. 9-12).  
For the purpose of comparison, it should be noted that, in the realm of ‘generation as a 
cohort’ contemporary events are not associated with the short-winded reactions they give 
rise to but with the results they yield in the long run by means of generations they 
socialize. Thus, unlike the far-reaching period effect, cohort effect corresponds to the 
influence that historical events exert on a particular age segment (Alwin, Hofer & 
McCammon, 2006: p. 22). To set an example, an economic crisis was faced by an 
individual who was at a particular stage of his life in which he was most receptive. He has 
experienced all the difficulties of being impressionable to such a crisis during this period. 
In response to the formative power of this event, he might have developed an economically 
unsecure character. The assumption pertaining to the cohort effect is that the influence is 
likely to persist and reflect on future attitudes and behaviour.  
2.3.3. The impressionable years hypothesis versus later life experiences hypothesis 
 
Having clarified its source, we may now continue with the second question which relates 
to the subject of socialization. In the literature, two rival hypotheses are tailored to answer 
this question: ‘who is socialized?’. They are; the impressionable years hypothesis and later 
life experiences hypothesis. 
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2.3.3.1. The impressionable years hypothesis 
The impressionable years hypothesis, also known as the primacy principle basically 
suggests that not all the members of the society who experienced the same event are 
influenced equally. Instead, those who are in their adolescence and early adulthood at the 
time of the event are at their most receptive period which makes them more impressionable 
to the influence. What is more, it is also suggested by the impressionable years hypothesis 
that this early influence strongly roots into one’s value system and serves to shape future 
political attitudes and behaviours. As can be seen, the impressionable years hypothesis 
relies on two basic assumptions. The first one relates to the establishment of political 
values and is heavily reliant on the theories of the development of the human mind 
(Hyman, 1959: chapter 6). On the other hand, the second assumption is associated with 
stability of values acquired early in life and their potential to take effect in the future. 
According to the first assumption, most political orientations are adopted early in life. The 
idea behind this assumption is that adolescents who are on the verge of adulthood are not 
matured and experienced to hold stable values, which makes them more impressionable to 
the influence. A large volume of published studies draws attention to adolescence and early 
adulthood as the period in which most political values and orientations are learnt. 
Mannheim highlighted the approximate age of 17 as the most impressionable period. 
Mannheim viewed this period important because individuals make their ‘fresh contact’ 
with the cultural heritage in this period and all later experiences receive their meaning from 
this early encounter (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 293, 298; see also Grasso, 2013; Ghitza & 
Gelman, 2014). His argument parallels to that of Ryder, who argued that ‘all those alive at 
the same time are contemporaries, but they respond and contribute to social history in 
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different ways unless they are also coevals’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 848). For him, those who are 
‘old enough to participate directly in the movements impelled by change, but not old 
enough to have become committed to an occupation, a residence, a family of procreation or 
a way of life’ are the most vulnerable to the influence of formative events and bears the 
highest potential to change social history. It is also claimed that high instability in 
adolescence is underlined by ‘role transitions’; such as, graduating from the high school 
and entering to the university or starting to work bring about huge changes in individual 
perspectives. Contrarily, memberships in the established organizations such as marriage 
and occupation in the following years reduce the chances of individual transformation 
because the roles given by these institutions require avoiding unstructured and unattached 
behaviours (Ryder, 1965: p. 857). Niemi and Hepburn pointed out between the ages 14 and 
25 as the most impressionable period on the grounds that the most rapid change is 
observed between these ages (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995: p. 4). Krosnick and Alwin 
employed zero-order correlations and SES models to test the impressionable years and the 
increasing persistence hypotheses. They investigated a range of social and political 
attitudes and found that the youngest (18-25) and the oldest (66-83) age groups’ average 
correlations are smaller than that of the middle-age (26-65) group (Krosnick & Alwin, 
1989: p. 420-21). Their findings are informative in that the reliability of the measurement 
decreases in the very young and very old groups and the most consistent age group appears 
to be the one consist of respondents with the middle ages (See also Sears, 1981). With 
these results in hand, they conclude that individuals are the most unstable and so 
impressionable to attitudinal change during early adulthood. They regard the 
impressionable years hypothesis more powerful than persistence hypothesis, since stability 
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increases until the age of 33, but after this point it stops increasing (Krosnick & Alwin, 
1989). Similarly, Beck and Jennings investigated the impact of socialization in pre-adult 
years on adult political activity in a longitudinal setting. Data are derived from the first two 
successive rounds (1965 and 1973) the Socialization Panel Study. Having a series of SES 
models employed, they ascertained four linkages operating between early adulthood and 
adult political participation. They are; status of the parent, youth involvement in high 
school activities environment in the school, parent’s organizational involvement and 
parent’s participation in politics. However, the most powerful direct impact comes from 
youth involvement in high school activities with correlations of .18 (Beck & Jennings, 
1982: p. 14-29). Empirical evidence comes from Jennings and Markus, who investigated 
partisanship and voting behaviour of high school seniors and their parents using the four-
wave Socialization Panel Study. They found that offspring generation’s social-political 
responses are disproportionately more erratic than that of their parents. Political 
orientations increasingly persist with age, however, with a diminishing magnitude 
(Jennings & Markus, 1982; see also Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Markus, 1979).  
The second assumption, that the impressionable years hypothesis relies on, which is called 
the stability hypothesis, is associated with the persistence of political attitudes. It implies 
that political values and orientations that are acquired in early life hold such a strong 
position in human character that they endure and function in shaping the attitudes and 
behaviour throughout one’s life. A great deal of research has claimed that a systematic 
relationship occurs between crystallization of party identification and age (Newcomb et al., 
1967; Converse, 1964; Markus, 1979; Glenn, 1980; Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Jennings & 
Markus, 1984; Alwin et al., 1991; Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Jennings & Stocker, 1999). 
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Partisanship is indicated as one of the most stable attitudes. It is found that as one gets 
older partisanship becomes more impermeable to political events (Jennings & Markus, 
1984: p. 1016; Jennings & Stocker, 1999). What is more, each voting experience (Jennings 
& Markus, 1981: p. 1004-5) as well as early participation and interest in politics (Jennings 
& Stocker, 1999: p. 3) lead to a higher level of stability in partisan attitudes. The 
impressionable years hypothesis regards attitudinal instability as an indicator of high 
receptivity which put early adulthood, in which attitudes appear to be relatively less stable, 
under the spotlight. However, it should be noted that there is no one way of measuring 
stability that is agreed upon in the literature. Bivariate correlations (Sears, 1981), simple 
correlations, mean fluctuations (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976), zero-order 
correlations (Beck & Jennings, 1982), structural-equation models (Alwin & Krosnick, 
1991) are some frequently employed statistical methods to explore stability over time. 
2.3.3.2. Later life experiences hypothesis 
The later life experiences hypothesis was raised as a contrary argument to the 
impressionable years hypothesis. The adherents basically argued that socialization is not 
limited with the adolescence and early adulthood but continues after the adolescence. 
Opposing the impressionable years hypothesis, Ryder argued that ‘Clearly, childhood 
socialization cannot prepare a person for all the roles of his later years. Indeed, parents 
effectively inhibit many types of learning by selectively sheltering their children from and 
exposing them to the world outside the home. Many types of economic, political and social 
participation are effectively limited to later life…’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 859). Inkeles, in his 
attempt where he compared the early and late learning influences, found that late 
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socialization experiences, i.e. type of occupation, living standards, urbanization and media 
exposure supersedes early socialization experiences such as education, ethnic background 
and family education in determining individual modernity (Inkeles, 1974: p. 331).  
Searing Wright and Rabinowitz, in their examination of party identification, party efficacy 
and political trust, achieved important evidence for the later life experiences hypothesis. 
They analysed five-wave follow-up data from the University of Michigan Survey Research 
Centre’s election studies conducted between 1952 and 1968. Relying on mean fluctuations 
they found confirmatory evidence for the later life experiences hypothesis, however, when 
compared to the learning at the adolescence, adult learning occurs at a low level. 
Regarding party identification, their findings identified that the highest fluctuation was 18 
percent for Democratic and 16 percent for Republican cohorts while the average rate of 
change appeared to be as 7 percent in Democratic and 4 percent in Republican 
identifications. On the other hand, their analysis lends support to the idea that efficacy 
orientations are less stable than party identifications. Mean fluctuations for responsiveness, 
benevolence and complexity do not exceed 9 percent, while the highest fluctuation for a 
single cohort over four years is 29 percent. Their third examination concerned stability in 
political trust. It is demonstrated that political trust is as stable as political efficacy, 
although different items of political trust differ greatly. Overall, when compared with 
religious affiliations and issue beliefs, political party identification, political efficacy and 
political trust appear to be less stable than religious affiliations and more stable than issue 
beliefs. As a result, they reach the conclusion that learning continues throughout the adult 
life which, nevertheless, does not refute the validity of the impressionable years 
hypothesis. What is more, their comparison of age and period effects further demonstrated 
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that adult change does not appear due to major social events, but as a result of gradual age-
related changes (Searing Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976: p. 84-101).  
Another important discussion revolving around the issue of socialization is the difference 
between symbolic versus non-symbolic attitudes. Sears’ (1981, 1983) symbolic attitudes 
theory suggests that symbolic attitudes such as  party identification and ideological 
orientations crystallizes at early adulthood and is not based on deep knowledge while non-
symbolic attitudes originate from information gained during later stages of life and remain 
erratic during the lifespan. What is more, the former group of attitudes is more likely to 
persist with the passage of time; the latter group is impressionable to change due to new 
information. Similarly, Glenn (1980) argues that one needs to be selective while discussing 
the stability of attitudes. Attitudes that hold a more central position are more stable over 
the years. Jon A. Krosnick is another scholar who supported the argument that attitudes 
which hold central positions in human character are more resistant to change. Krosnick 
(1988) in his investigation where he employed data from American presidential election 
campaigns shows that attributes to important attitudes make them more resistant. However, 
he does not rule out the possibility that the relationship may also work the other way 
around and suggests that it is not unlikely that people decide whether an attitude is 
important by looking at its stability. According to Krosnick there are some reasons why 
important attitudes to people must remain stable. Important attitudes may tend to persist 
because they are possibly related to belief systems and values. Another reason is could be 
that, important attitudes are linked with larger amounts of experience and knowledge 
which makes it difficult for them to fade away. In addition to these, it is also likely that 
people spend time with like-minded ones which help these attitudes to settle down. Last 
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reason could be that, people may associate themselves with attitudes they think are 
important (Krosnick, 1988: p. 240-52; see also Glenn, 1980). Lastly Duane F. Alwin and 
Krosnick’s work is worth mentioning. Alwin and Krosnick tested impressionable years, 
ageing stability’ and symbolic attitudes hypotheses on over fifty different attitudes. They 
employed a nationally representative sample derived from the American National Election 
Study’s (ANES) three-wave panel surveys. They found that youngest group’s attitude are 
the least stable, however the difference is not statistically significant. What is more 
symbolic attitudes are not significantly more stable than non-symbolic attitudes. However, 
their analysis revealed that the stability of the intensity component of partisan attitudes 
declines over the years, on the other hand, the stability of the direction component of 
partisanship does not decrease but increases or persists. They also made a distinction in 
terms of the direction and intensity of attitudes. With a parsimonious interpretation, their 
findings reveal that attitude stability is the lowest in young ages, it increases in middle age, 
but no profound decline is found in older ages (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991: p. 179). 
As a final word, it should be noted that much of what has been discussed thus far suggests 
that period effect holds a strong theoretical and empirical position in the realm of attitude 
change which makes it worth considering. Yet, we should be conscious about its 
implication before considering period and age effects. Especially for democracy 
preference, tolerance to out-groups and political participation, which may not be 
categorized as strong loyalties and attachments, cohort effects might be more vulnerable to 
the effects of period and age.  
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3.4. Mannheim’s Theory of Generations 
Karl Mannheim`s views on the concept of generation has been discussed previously in this 
thesis. This section involves Mannheim`s ideas regarding the concept in much greater 
detail. Mannheim, the founding father of the theory of generations, introduces the main 
aspects of his theory in his 1927 essay, The Problem of Generations. Enjoying a great deal 
of theoretical and empirical support from the works of Hyman (1959), Greenstein (1965); 
Hess and Torney (1965), Easton and Dennis (1967), Kohlberg (1969), Merelman (1973), 
Liebschutz and Niemi (1974), Niemi and Sobieszek (1977), Shuman and Scott (1987), 
Krosnick and Alwin (1989), Niemi and Hepburn (1995), Jennings (1996), the theory of 
generations holds a strong position in the literature. Mannheim’s theory reflects his 
broader relationist perspective and can be viewed as a part of his sociology of knowledge 
studies. The departing point of relationism, which is also known as the philosophy of space 
and time, is the idea that the knowledge about existence can only be achieved by 
considering spatial and temporal factors (Kaipayil, 2009). Sociology of knowledge, on the 
other hand, as a school of thought within this research line, investigates the bases of human 
knowledge. It basically tackles with the question, ‘how knowledge is constructed’. 
According to the adherents of this school of thought, i.e.; Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, 
Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim, human knowledge is largely shaped by social and 
historical influences.  
Mannheim applies the basic principle of relationism in the particular area of generations. 
Mannheim defines the concept of generation as ‘one of the basic factors contributing to the 
genesis of the dynamic of social development’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 320). Crediting 
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the argument raised by the prominent art historian Wilhelm Pinder, Mannheim suggests 
that the combined effects of constant and transient factors produces the historical 
progression  of which generation is an important carrier (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 284). 
One of the first points Mannheim clarifies in his essay about generation is its difference 
from concrete groups. A concrete group, as Mannheim suggests, is ‘… the union of a 
number of individuals through naturally developed or consciously willed ties’ (Mannheim, 
1952 [1928]: p. 289). Mannheim alleges that, while family and tribe, which are based on 
ascribed statuses are examples of the former, modern companies which are established by 
its participants own will are examples of the latter. Generation, however, is neither 
comparable to family and tribe nor to modern companies according to Mannheim. In this 
regard, Mannheim draws a parallelism between generation and social class, in that both 
limits human experiences in particular ways. Mannheim states that: 
The fact of belonging to the same class, and that of belonging to the same generation or age 
group, have this in common, that both endow the individuals sharing in them with a common 
location in the social and historical process, and thereby limit them to a specific range of 
potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and 
experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action. (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 
291). 
According to Mannheim biological factors play the most fundamental role in the formation 
of generations. Mannheim argues that:  
Generation location is based on the existence of biological rhythm in human existence    the 
factors of life and death, a limited life span of life, and ageing. Individuals who belong to the 
same year of birth, are endowed, to that extent, with a common location in the historical 
dimensions of the social process (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]:p. 290).  
However, as Mannheim maintains, while the biological factors provide the elementary 
conditions for their formation, the overall process should not be reduced to the biological 
base. This is the point where Mannheim’s ideas diverge from those of the French 
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positivists. Unlike them, Mannheim claims that generations emerge as a result of the joint 
contribution of biological and non-biological factors. Mannheim argues that: 
The fact that people are born at the same time, or their youth, adulthood, and old age coincide, 
does not in itself involve similarity of location; what does create a similar location is that they 
are in a position to experience the same events and data, etc., especially that these experiences 
impinge upon a similarity ‘stratified’ consciousness (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 297). 
As can be seen, according to Mannheim, a generation does not come into existence for the 
mere sake of contemporaneity. Instead, in the process of the formation of generations, 
contemporaneity is completed with being imposed to the same social and historical events. 
Moreover, as Mannheim claims, the socio-historical events socialize individuals only if 
they are experienced by those individuals in the early phases of their lives. This is because, 
Mannheim argues basing on the theories of development of the human mind that, 
individuals only start to get to know life, make their first contact with it and its problems 
during adolescence and early adulthood. The period about the age of 17 is particularly 
championed by Mannheim in this regard. He suggests that this is the age in which 
individuals are the most receptive. As Mannheim maintains, the impressions acquired 
during this period set the basic values what later experiences receive their meaning from 
(Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 299-300; see also Grasso, 2013; Ghitza & Gelman, 2014).  
In a modern society which harbours many complexities, accounting contemporaneity and 
imposition to the same socio-historical context as sole responsible factors for the formation 
of a homogenous value set is at all not realistic. For that reason, it would not be surprising 
to observe education, income or social class-based heterogeneities within generational 
categories. The importance of Mannheim`s theory is located right at this point. Realizing 
that generation as location is still a too heterogeneous group and needs a further internal 
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stratification, Mannheim, as the next step of his theorizing, carries on with his 
decomposition of the generation as location. Mannheim notes that: 
In order to share the same generation location, i.e. in order to be able passively to undergo or 
actively to use the handicaps and privileges inherent in a generation location, one must be born 
within the same historical and cultural region. Generation as an actuality, however, involves 
even more than mere co-presence in such a historical and social region. A further concrete 
nexus is needed to constitute generation as an actuality. This additional nexus may be 
described as participation in the common destiny of this historical and social unit (Mannheim, 
1952 [1928]: p. 303). 
To support his more fine-tuned argument, Mannheim raises the question whether peasants 
living in isolated areas should be put in the same actual generation category with urban 
youth and answers his own question as ‘Certainly not!’(Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 303). 
The justification of this certain answer lurks in his strong belief that the members of the 
former group maintain an isolated life which is by little chance influenced by important 
events. On the other hand, while the members of the latter group mostly find themselves in 
the hub of social and historical events which makes them more vulnerable to their 
formative influences. As a result, regardless of the common generational locations, the 
differences in the socialization histories of the two groups generate two different velocities 
of change. In this connection, Mannheim propounds ‘generation as actuality’ which 
corresponds to participating ‘… in the common destiny of this historical and social unit’ 
(Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 303). Mannheim notes that:  
We shall therefore speak of a generation as an actuality only where a concrete bond is created 
between the members of a generation by their being exposed to the social and intellectual 
symptoms of a process of dynamic de-stabilization. Thus the young peasants we mentioned 
above only share the same generational location, without, however, being members of the same 
generation as actuality, with the youth of the town. They are similarly located, in so far as they 
are potentially capable of being sucked into the vortex of social change, and, in fact, this is 
what happened in the wars against Napoleon, which stirred up all German classes. For these 
peasants` sons, a mere generation location was transformed into membership of a generation as 
an actuality (Mannheim, (1952 [1928]: p. 303-4). 
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Here, we understand that Mannheim regards social class as a form of generation as 
actuality. The difference between ‘generation as location’ and ‘generation as actuality’ 
likens, as Mannheim maintains, to the difference between ‘class’ and ‘consciously 
constituted class’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 303). 
In the following pages of his essay, Mannheim completes this argument by arguing that, 
actual generations can also be internally stratified into generation units which constitute 
even more heterogeneous groups. What may play a role in the formation of generation 
units is, according to Mannheim, being imposed to the same formative event but 
interpreting it differently. Moreover, as Mannheim maintains, in some cases generation 
units may represent rival or even antagonistic forces. Mannheim gives conservative and 
rationalistic/liberal youth groups in the 19
th
 century Germany as examples of generation 
units (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 304-307).  
As can be seen, in Mannheim`s mind the generation phenomenon consists of three 
imaginary concentric circles, namely; generation as location (generationslagerung), 
generation as actuality (generationszusammenhang) and generation unit 
(generationseinheiten). In this representation, generation as location which is symbolized 
by the large outmost circle that corresponds to the widest criterion of a generation. The 
next inner-circle, on the other hand, symbolizes generation as actuality and the second 
inner-circle, which is surrounded by generation as location and generation as actuality 
respectively, symbolizes generation unit. According to Mannheim, as one moves from the 
outmost circle to the innermost one, attitudinal heterogeneousness of the categories 
gradually decreases. This means that, even if they were imposed to the same formative 
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forces as a result of sharing the same environment; individuals who share a generation 
location do not necessarily fall into the same category with respect to our focus of 
investigation. Lastly, it should be noted since it relates to one of the main points of the 
present thesis that, according to Mannheim some important macro scale events, like wars, 
can transform generation as locations into generation as actuality. Mannheim states that: 
Thus the young peasants we mentioned above only share the same generational location, 
without, however, being members of the same generation as actuality, with the youth of the 
town. They are similarly located, in so far as they are potentially capable of being sucked into 
the vortex of social change, and, in fact, this is what happened in the wars against Napoleon, 
which stirred up all the German classes. For these peasant’s sons, a mere generation location 
was transformed into membership of a generation as an actuality (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 
303-4).  
As can be seen from the above paragraph, Mannheim implies that some important macro 
events like wars can socialize the members of generations in a way that the class-originated 
differences among them are homogenized.  
3.5. Lipset’s Working Class Authoritarianism Thesis  
Having introduced the historical and ideological foundations of modernization theory, the 
key arguments raised by its adherents and critics, the generation phenomenon and the 
theory of generations of Karl Mannheim, in this final part a final argument is addressed. 
Seymour Martin Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis is reviewed systematically 
as a reference guide in the analysis of social class gaps in Turkish pro-democratic culture. 
Before moving on with Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, we need to take a 
quick look at the development of authoritarianism studies in the 20
th
 century. The second 
World War provoked serious interest in Fascist regimes. Researchers wanted to understand 
individual psychology underlying support for fascist parties. It was thought that one of the 
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most distinguishing feature of fascists were their authoritarian characteristics. Adorno, et 
al.’s 1950 book The Authoritarian Personality was one of the first academic works on the 
authoritarian personality. Adorno and his colleagues developed a scale what they called F-
scale to gauge anti-democratic values and authoritarianism on the individual level. The 
scale was constructed by nine basic components. They are: (1) conventionalism (rigid 
adherence to conventional, middle class values), (2) authoritarian submission (submissive, 
uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the group), (3) authoritarian 
aggression (tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject and punish people 
who violate conventional values), (4) anti-intraception (opposition to the subjective, the 
imaginative, the tender minded), (5) superstition and stereotypy (the belief in mystical 
determinants of the individual’s fate, the disposition to think in rigid categories), (6) power 
and toughness (preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-
follower dimensions; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the 
conventional attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of the strength and toughness), (7) 
destructiveness and cynicism (generalized hostility, vilification of the human), (8) 
projectivity (the disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; 
the projection outward of unconscious emotional impulses) and (9) sex (exaggerated 
concerns with sexual ‘goings-on’).  
Some alternative scales were developed to overcome F-scale‘s shortcomings. Bob 
Altemeyer’s Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale is one of the most influential ones. 
Altemeyer modified the F-scale by adding new questions to develop its ability to capture 
authoritarian characteristic. RWA consists of 22 questions while half of the questions have 
authoritarian and the other half have non-authoritarian predispositions. The inter-item 
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agreement of the scale was over .90 in the US and Canada. The questions aimed to test 
respondents’ predispositions on radicals, the role of the woman in the family, dissident 
groups such as homosexuals, atheists and feminists, institutionalized authorities like the 
government and religion as well as political leaders, traditional and moral values. 
According to Altemeyer right wing authoritarian character has three major characteristics; 
authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and conventionalism. In his theorising 
authoritarian submission corresponds to submissiveness to all sorts of authorities, 
authoritarian aggression corresponds an aggressive reaction towards deviant groups of the 
society and conventionalism involves adherence to traditional norms and rules as well as 
willing others to adhere to the same rules (Altemeyer, 1981; 1988).  
Recently, Karen Stenner, in her 2005 book, has suggested social conditions as important 
determinants of authoritarian characteristic which was not detected by neither Adorno and 
his friends’ F-scale nor Altemeyer’s RWA scale (Stenner, 2005). It was also reported that 
higher education is a stronger determinant of high F-scale score than authoritarian 
characteristic (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954). Perceived threat is another factor recognized in 
the literature as an important determinant of authoritarianism. Recently, Feldman and 
Stenner (1997) did not find a direct relationship between perceived threat and 
authoritarianism, but found an interaction between the two. According to them perceived 
threat plays different roles for authoritarians and non-authoritarians. Lastly, it should also 
be noted that recent studies praise child rearing values as one of the measures of 
authoritarianism (Feldman and Stenner, 1997: p. 747). This view was also shared by 
Adorno and his colleagues who suggested that those individuals who were raised by using 
strict, critical and harsh methods and thought to respect for parents are not able to display 
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their anger to their parents but to other weaker individuals and groups in the society 
(Adorno et al., 1950).  
Having discussed the development of the concept of authoritarianism shortly now we turn 
to introduce Lipset’s workıng class authoritarianism thesis As discussed in the above 
sections, modernization theory is an important system of thought linking the economy with 
the social sphere. The very essence of modernization theory is the idea that attitudinal 
variations can be largely explained by referring to infrastructural indicators. Therefore, the 
modernization theorist is accustomed to explaining human attitudes through attributes such 
as class position, education, income, etc. Seymour Martin Lipset; a leading theorist of the 
modernization school, in his seminal 1959 work Democracy and Working Class 
Authoritarianism, raised perhaps one of the clearest arguments concerning to the 
relationship between social class structure and authoritarian propensity. His thesis is strong 
in its argument. Lipset notes that: 
Before 1914, the classic division between the working-class left parties and the right was not 
based solely upon stratification issues, such as redistribution of income, status, and educational 
opportunities, but also rested upon civil liberties and international policy issues. The workers, 
judged by the policies of their parties, were often the backbone of the fight for greater political 
democracy, religious freedom and minority rights, and international peace. The parties backed 
by the conservative middle and upper class in much of Europe, on the other hand, tended to 
favour more extremist political forms, resist the extension of the suffrage, back the established 
church, and support jingoistic foreign policies. 
Events since 1914 have gradually eroded these patterns. In some countries working class 
groups have proven to be the most nationalistic and jingoistic sector of the population. In a 
number of nations, they have clearly been in the forefront of the struggle against equal rights 
for minority groups, and have sought to limit immigration or to impose racial standards in 
countries with open immigration (Lipset, 1959: p. 483).  
 
As can be seen from the above quotation, Lipset claims that authoritarianism is 
disproportionately spread among the social classes. More specifically, according to Lipset 
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working class members of the society since the start of the century have become more 
reactionary and more likely to adopt an authoritarian outlook than their middle class 
counterparts. According to Lipset, political inclination towards autocratic regimes, 
intolerance against civil liberties and rights of unpopular groups constitute some of the 
dimensions of the working class`s authoritarian predisposition. Lipset links working class 
authoritarianism, with a series of factors, i.e. low educational attainment, economic 
insecurity and isolation at the workplace. Lipset suggests that low educational attainment 
among the working class members prevents them from comprehending complicated 
relationships and gradual mechanisms of politics. They search for quick solutions to 
economic and political problems and are attracted by radical movements that pledge 
revolutionary changes. Another point Lipset stresses is the economically insecure feeling 
of the working class members. Lipset claims that relatively easy replacement of unskilled 
workers at the workplace causes tension and aggression, which are directed either to the 
family members or to the ‘dissident’ groups in the society. Isolation of the workplace is 
another working class feature that Lipset points out in his analysis. Lipset argues that being 
surrounded by those who share the similar backgrounds make the occupants of the jobs, 
i.e. miners, fishers, farmers and small businessmen living in the provinces, politically less 
tolerant of people from different ethnic, religious and national groups (Lipset, 1959: p. 
483, 491-92).  
Lipset’s argument concerning the relationship between the middle class share of income 
and democracy was tested in both nation and individual levels. Robert J. Barro (1999) in 
his study analysed data from over 100 countries and found a positive relationship between 
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the middle class share of income and democracy. With these results, he credited the role of 
the middle class as the primary promoter of societal segment of democracy. However, 
from a historical perspective Göran Therborn raises a counter argument regarding the 
relationship. Therborn suggests that no bourgeois democracies did neither born out of a 
bourgeois revolution nor wealth, literacy and urbanization. Instead, in countries, such as 
Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan and Sweden bourgeois democracies grew out of a 
defeat against a non-democratic country (Therborn, 1997: p. 17-21).   
On the other hand, many criticisms levelled against Lipset’s particular thesis. S. M. Miller 
and Frank Riessman in their 1961 essay criticized Lipset on several grounds. Their first 
criticism is on the usage of the question inquiring respondents' preference of the number of 
parties in a political system. They argue that this question may well be interpreted either as 
a question asking the respondents’ general views of the political system or their day-to-day 
views about the ongoing political debates in the country. Their second criticism is on the 
mutually exclusiveness of democratic and authoritarian concepts. Not necessarily 
authoritarianism is associated with undemocratic practices while democracy is associated 
with non-authoritarianism. They also criticize the use of the data from Stouffer’s study. 
They suggest that intolerant attitudes may not necessarily imply an ignorance of dissident 
groups’ civil liberties, but may reflect an incompatibility with their world-view. Another 
point Miller and Riessman make is that lower class persons’ uncertainty in their opinions 
does not necessarily show that they view the world in black-and-white terms. They suggest 
that their authoritarian-equalitarian (A-E) scale which is a modified version of the F-scale 
is not able to discriminate different levels of authoritarianism among working class 
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members as it does among middle class members. Therefore, a high percent of middle-
class members appeared to be authoritarian in their analysis. Their last criticism is that 
preference of a strong leader, anti-intellectualism, punitive attitudes towards the children 
and a definite world-view do not necessarily reflect authoritarianism but may originate 
from traditionalism and pragmatism in American cultural contexts. They suggest that if 
democracy is measured by egalitarian, anti-elitist, cooperative measures, which are 
compatible with working class characteristics, the working class would not appear to be 
too non-democratic (Miller & Riessman, 1961).  
Another criticism of Lipset’s thesis came from Edward G. Grabb. Grabb, in his attempt to 
test Lipset’s argument, approved that the working class individuals are less likely to show 
tolerance to out-groups than the middle class members. However, in his analysis, Grabb 
revealed that, the difference is neither dramatic nor does it arise directly from the type of 
occupation per se. He demonstrated that no statistical difference between blue and white 
collar employees is found when education, income and cynicism are controlled. Based on 
these results, he supported the view that the low tolerance of blue collar workers is 
attributable to their relatively lower education, income levels and high distrust (Grabb, 
1979). More recently, Dick Houtman, in his review of the Lipset’s working class 
authoritarianism thesis, has noted that education incorporates class and cultural capital. 
Moreover, income is also as an indicator of class, but to a lesser extent. By employing low 
income, wage dependence and job insecurity as ‘unambiguous’ class indicators and 
cultural participation as the second ‘less ambiguous’ indicator of cultural capital after 
education, Houtman attempts to distinguish education effects from the social class effects. 
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He argues that if there is a particular class effect, the first group of indicators should play 
role in authoritarianism but cultural participation should not. His analysis shows that the 
class effect on authoritarianism is largely explained by education and cultural participation. 
In this regard, Houtman distinguishes economic liberalism from conservatism and 
authoritarianism from libertarianism (See for a contrary argument Napier & Jost, 2008). He 
argues that while the economic market position is associated with the former ones, cultural 
capital is associated with the latter ones. Houtman’s more recent findings signal similar 
results. In his 2003 study Houtman finds that when education and cultural participation are 
controlled, the class effect largely fades away (Houtman, 2003). 
Remember, the purpose of the current chapter is to introduce main aspects of the 
modernization theory, Mannheim’s theory of generations and Lipset’s working class 
authoritarianism to the reader. In the beginning of the first section, which tackles with the 
modernization theory, the industrial and French revolutions were briefly discussed with 
respect to their role in the First Modernization. Following this part, the question ‘what is 
modernization’ was answered by referring to prominent thinkers of the modernization 
theory. Positivist, Marxist and structural functionalist origins of the modernist thinker 
were also briefly discussed. At the end of this section some discussions pertaining to the 
concept of modernization and the modernization theory, including the great dichotomy and 
the convergence thesis were discussed. The second sub-section started with raising the 
question ‘what is generation?’ In order to find an answer to this question first a rivalry 
between French positivist and German romanticist approaches regarding to the formation 
of generations were introduced by referring to the first part of Mannheim’s classic work. 
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Following this, four forms of generation, (a) generation as a kinship descent, (b) 
generation as a life stage, (c) generation as a historical period and (d) generation as a 
cohort were discussed based on Kertzer’s categorization. Next, the impressionable years 
hypothesis and the later life experiences hypothesis were introduced with the same 
purpose. In the third subsection, Mannheim’s theory of generations and Lipset’s working 
class authoritarianism were introduced to guide our search of attitudinal differences across 
generational and class categories in the upcoming empirical chapters.   
Based on this theoretical ground, the following two groups of hypotheses lead the thesis. 
The first set of hypotheses aims to test Mannheim’s general insight in the Turkish context. 
Relying on Mannheim’s argument on the formation of generations, it is expected that the 
members of generations socialized by authoritarian and non-authoritarian governments 
exhibit different levels of pro-democratic attitudes. More particularly, it is hypothesized 
that, owing to the politico-juridical order during their socialization, the members of the 
post-1980 generation are less likely to assess democracy as the best form of government, 
tolerate the dissident members of the society and participate in politics than the members 
of the previous generation. The second set of hypotheses employs a more particular 
argument of Mannheim as a theoretical guideline. In Mannheim’s theorizing the generation 
phenomenon emerges as three imaginary concentric circles, namely; generation as location 
(generationslagerung), generation as actuality (generationszusammenhang) and generation 
unit (generationseinheiten). In this representation, generation as location which is 
symbolized by the large outmost circle corresponds to the widest criterion of a generation. 
The first inner-circle, on the other hand, symbolizes generation as actuality and the second 
inner-circle, which is surrounded by generation as location and generation as actuality 
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respectively, symbolizes generation unit. As one moves from the outmost circle to the 
innermost one, attitudinal heterogeneity of the categories represented by the circles is 
expected to decrease. Social class occupies an important part in Mannheim’s theorizing in 
this model. According to Mannheim, social classes constitute more coherent units of a 
generation and therefore should be regarded as ‘actual generation’. Mannheim suggests 
that peasants living in isolated areas should not be considered within the same actual 
generation category with urban youth even if they share a generational location 
(Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 303). Although Mannheim attaches importance to social class 
in further decompositions of generations, his theory lacks an explanation of how social 
classes differ from each other in the same generational location. Nevertheless, Mannheim 
provides the example of a situation which could abolish the differences between social 
classes. Mannheim argues that social classes may blend in with one another as a result of 
being socialized by an extraordinary event. According to Mannheim, this is what happened 
to German classes during the wars against Napoleon (Mannheim, 1952 [1928], p. 303-4). 
Based on this insight, the second set of analysis initially aims to understand the 
relationship between social class structure and pro-democratic orientations in Turkey. With 
this objective in mind, Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis is used as a 
theoretical guide. As a pioneer thinker of modernization theory, strongly informed by 
positivist and Marxist ideologies, Lipset, in his landmark Democracy and Working Class 
Authoritarianism essay, argues that the members of the lower classes, particularly the 
manual workers, miners, fishers and farmers are more likely to develop an authoritarian 
characteristic than their middle class counterparts. According to Lipset, the working class’s 
authoritarian predisposition is reflected in a wide range of attitudes, i.e. their scepticism 
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about democracy and intolerance of minorities. Basing his thesis on a series of measures, 
i.e. surveys inquiring preference of the number of political parties in the Parliament, 
support for extremist parties, the F scale and his own observations, Lipset acknowledges 
that a series of factors, i.e. low education, economic insecurity, low income, low 
participation in politics, isolation in the workplace and authoritarian family background, 
underlie the working class’ authoritarianism (Lipset, 1959). Thus, here it is hypothesized in 
the light of Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis that the manual class individuals 
in Turkey are disproportionately less likely to adopt pro-democratic attitudes than their 
non-manual class counterparts. More specifically, the manual class members are expected 
to be less likely to prefer democracy over its autocratic alternatives, show tolerance to the 
members of the minority groups and participate in politics than the non-manual class 
members. In the third group of analysis, having assessed Lipset’s theory in the particular 
case of Turkey, it is moved on to test it across generations. Combining Mannheim’s 
general idea on the formation of generations and particular claim on the homogenization of 
the social classes with Lipset’s thesis, it is investigated whether social classes are 
homogenized with respect to their pro-democratic culture as a result of being exposed to 
major scale events. It is expected that the social class effect on pro-democratic attitudes is 
largely determined by system level authoritarianism experienced during socialization 
period. More specifically, social classes are expected to be homogenized with respect to 
their likelihood of displaying pro-democratic attitudes if the generation they belong to was 
socialized under authoritarian governments and legal order. On the other hand, if the given 
generation was not socialized under an authoritarian politico-juridical order, it is expected 
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in line with Lipset’s argument, that the non-manual class members of those generations are 
more likely to develop pro-democratic orientations than their manual class counterparts.  
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CHAPTER 4. DATA AND METHODS 
 
This chapter is designed to introduce the data that were used for the analysis of the present 
thesis, the survey items that were used in the construction of the dependent and 
independent variables and the method that was employed to investigate the relationships 
between the variables.  
4.1. Data   
The five waves (1990, 1996, 2001, 2007 and 2011) of repeated cross-sectional World 
Values Survey (WVS) data for Turkey were employed in the analyses of the present thesis. 
While in the first and third empirical chapters, the data from all the five waves; in the 
second empirical chapter the data from the last four waves were employed due to the 
absence of the battery that was used in the construction of the dependent variable of the 
second empirical chapter in the 1990 survey. The WVS is selected because it is the only 
available data for Turkey containing the measures of interest to this study. The WVS 
monitors people’s values, beliefs and ideas regarding to politics, government, society, 
religion, economy, culture, family, the other individuals and etc. It consists of data from 
almost 100 countries, representing almost 90% of the world population. The surveys are 
administered by the World Values Survey Association (WVSA), which is a global 
network of social scientists (World Values Survey, 2016).  
The Turkish surveys began in 1990 and extended through 1995, 2001, 2007 and 2014. Five 
waves of the Turkish survey were conducted by face-to-face interviews with Turkish 
respondents at the age of 18 and over. In general, Turkish surveys followed a three-staged 
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sampling procedure. In the first stage, statistical blocs, including a certain number of 
households are selected. In the second stage, households are selected randomly within 
blocs. In the final stage, individuals are selected randomly within households.  
As reported in the methodological questionnaire of the 2001 survey, the first stage involves 
a series of steps. First, provinces were selected as self-representative as Primary Sampling 
Units (PSU). Next, they are stratified according to income. Then, districts are selected 
within provinces. Finally, within districts, urban/rural locations, i.e. villages (in rural 
locations), neighbourhoods and streets (in urban locations) are selected following 
Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) method. The second stage involved random 
selection of households within locations and the final stage involved the random selection 
of individuals within households (WVS Methodological Questionnaire for Turkey, 2001). 
As reported in the subsidiary documents of the 2011 survey, the blocs are selected as 
Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) following the Turkish Statistical Institute’s ‘blocking’ 
system which divides the population into blocs involving a certain number of households. 
The blocs were distributed ‘at the highest possible level’ across NUTS1 regions, which 
divides Turkey into 12 regions. For instance, in the 2011 survey, 134 blocs each involving 
300 households (150 in the 2007 survey) were randomly selected. The second stage 
involved the selection of 12 out of 300 households within each bloc. Following the 
selection of households, in the third stage, individuals are randomly selected within 
households by using a Kish grid method, which uses a pre-assigned table of random 
numbers to decide the person to be interviewed. The Turkish sample is generally well-
distributed across sex and age categories and across the regions of the country. Yet, it was 
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noted that response rates were lower in urban than it is in rural settlements (WVS 
Sampling Frame for Turkey, 2011; WVS Methodological Questionnaire for Turkey, 
2007).
4
  
4.2. Variables 
The variables of the analysis employed in this thesis were derived from the Turkish 
respondents’ valid answers. While constructing the sample, ‘no answer’ and ‘don’t know’ 
answers were set to missing and those cases holding missing values on any of the variables 
of our interest were deleted. It should be noted that, the deletion of ‘no answer’ and ‘don’t 
knows’ is not expected to change the representativeness of our sample. This is because, 
before and after these were deleted, the distribution of the categories within our key 
variables did not change considerably. The final samples of the three subsequent empirical 
chapters are representative of the Turkish population. Since the independent variables were 
largely protected across the empirical chapters, the number of respondents who answered 
the question that the dependent variable was derived from largely determined the sample 
size in each chapter. While the first empirical chapter holds 5701, the second and the third 
empirical chapters contain 4970 and 6488 cases respectively.
5
  
4.2.1. Dependent Variables 
Pro-democratic culture was quantified by means of the three groups of variables, each for 
one empirical chapter. They are: political participation, democracy preference and out-
                                                 
4
 Turkish surveys are conducted by Boğaziçi University under the Chairmanship of Professor Dr Yılmaz 
Esmer. 
5
 A detailed overview of survey items used in the analysis is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendices 
section. 
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group tolerance. These three groups of variables’ relation to system level democracy is 
discussed widely in the theory chapter. These variables were designed to measure the 
respondents’ participation in politics, their preference of democracy as a way of governing 
the country over its autocratic alternatives and tolerance towards unpopular groups in the 
society. These three groups of variables resided at the dependent end of the analysis and 
were investigated as a function of two key independent variables: generation and social 
class.  
The dependent variable of the first empirical chapter is derived from a battery type 
question inquiring respondents’ participation in politics. Political participation was 
assessed in the question by means of three repertoires: signing a petition, joining a boycott 
and attending a lawful demonstration. All the three items were routinely replicated in five 
successive rounds of the survey. Each repertoire of action was employed as a separate 
dependent variable owing to huge discrepancies in the rates of respondents’ participation to 
each. The answer categories were designed to involve information regarding whether the 
respondents have done, might do or would never do these political actions. While recoding 
the answers, have done answers were distinguished from hypothetical might do and would 
never do answers. This way, only actual participation was specified as the success 
category.  
In the second empirical chapter democracy preference was employed as the dependent 
variable. The variable was based on a battery-type question asking the respondents’ ideas 
regarding four forms of political regimes. Relying on previous theoretical advice, and our 
own factor analysis results, while constructing the variable, the respondents` legitimization 
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of democracy is subtracted from their delegitimization of army rule which was found to be 
the strongest alternative of democracy.  
The dependent variable of the third empirical chapter inspects the respondents’ ideas 
concerning having a neighbour from several groups that are known to be unpopular in the 
Turkish society. A total number of the six groups were repeated in the last five waves. 
They are; heavy drinkers, people who have AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals, people of a 
different race and immigrants/foreign workers. Our factor analysis findings revealed that 
the first four and the last two groups tap in two separate factors. This means that the idea of 
having neighbours from the first four groups occurs differently than the idea of having 
neighbours from the last two groups in the minds of Turkish respondents. Moreover, the 
rejection rates pertaining to the two sets of groups also differ hugely. Based on this 
empirical ground, two composite type variables were designed. They were called 
nationalistic out-group tolerance and social out-group tolerance.
6
 
4.2.2. Independent Variables 
The construction of the two key independent variables, namely generation and social class 
are elaborated in the following lines. In addition to generation and social class, the model 
also encompasses a series of controls to isolate the proper effects of these two independent 
variables on the dependent ones.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 Further information on the construction of the dependent variables are presented in the data and methods 
section of each empirical chapter.  
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4.2.2.1. Generation 
In order to analyse a potential generational divide in the three measures of pro-democratic 
attitude, generation was employed as the first key independent variable.  The generation 
variable was obtained from the WVS question asking the respondents’ year of birth. It 
should first be noted early that generations sketched in this study should be perceived as 
‘generation as cohort’ since they basically represent age-groups stratified by major 
politico-historical events. They neither represent ‘a principle of kinship descent’, nor ‘a life 
stage’ or ‘a historical period’ (Kertzer, 1983). Moreover, our successor generations are also 
by no means future time representatives of the predecessor ones since the data does not 
hold a longitudinal characteristic. It is widely recognized in the literature that age, period 
and cohort (APC) effects can intertwine (Glenn, 1976; Pilcher, 1994; Grasso, 2014). In 
cross-sectional designs like ours disentangling of the age, period and cohort effects is a big 
problem (Pilcher, 1994). However, to tackle this problem cohort analysis serves as a 
‘quasi-panel technique’ (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976: p. 86). 
While constructing the generation variable, the below two-staged analytical  strategy 
was followed to locate each respondent in the right generational location. As is known, 
generations are replaced in a gradual manner in the flow of history, which makes pulling 
them apart a difficult task. As a result of this, it is always difficult to find quantitative 
responses to generational differences. To prevent artificial demarcation of generations and 
increase the changes to capture inter-generational differences, major scale important events 
are frequently used as splicing points (Spitzer, 1973: p. 1358; Roscow, 1978: p. 69). This 
research refers the 1960 and 1980 military coups, two landmark events in the recent 
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Turkish political history, in this regard. It should be noted that, unlike Searing, Wright and 
Rabinowitz (1976: p. 89), this work did not treat major formative events as points in 
history, but as intervals because although our events came all of a sudden, they are 
important not in terms of their sudden appearance, but in terms of their consequences 
spread across a long time period. Having the two military coups pinpointed, as the next 
step, with reference to these two noticeable events, the Turkish 20th century political 
history was divided into three periods, what we labelled as ‘the foundation’, ‘the interim’ 
and ‘the post-1980’. After splitting apart the three periods, following Beck and Jennings 
(1979: p. 749) advice, ‘an explicit political factor’ was considered while distinguishing the 
interim period from the foundation and post-1980 periods. Our explicit political factor is 
system level authoritarianism. As discussed extensively in the background chapter, the 
foundation and the post-1980 periods are more authoritarian than the interim period with 
respect to its politico-juridical atmosphere. Therefore, while the foundation and the post-
1980 periods are labelled as authoritarian, the interim period was labelled as non-
authoritarian.  
Given that, each period remains shorter than an average human life and a respondent may 
well live through two, even three periods, we needed to decide how to associate each 
respondent with one political period. At this point, we followed the guidance of 
Mannheim’s theory of generations. Mannheim argues that individuals first encounter 
with the life problems ‘round about the age of seventeen, sometimes a little earlier and 
sometimes a little later’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 300). According to Mannheim, this is 
a period in which individuals are the most receptive since they face a bombardment of 
information while not having little prior knowledge about things. Mannheim’s point is 
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supported by other students of socialization. Nie et al (1996) defined the formative period 
as an interval between mid to late adolescence. According to Erikson (1950), the period 
from fourteen to fifteen is important for the formation of political views and attitudes. 
Niemi and Hepburn (1995) proposed the age range between fourteen and twenty-five as 
being crucial for the formation of participatory behaviour. Following this tradition, 
especially Mannheim’s and Erikson’s advises on the formation of political attitudes, fifteen 
was specified as the peak age of socialization (see also Grasso, 2013; Ghitza & Gelman, 
2014). The reason underlying the selection of one particular age was to avoid overlapping 
generational locations. Logically, fifteen is the age at which young individuals are old 
enough to acquire from life experiences, but still too young to emancipate themselves 
from authoritarian pressures coming from the family and the school. Thus, each 
respondent was located in the period, which he/she spent his/her fifteenth year in and by 
this means the whole sample was divided into three generational categories. Generations 
were named after their related periods. As a result, while those respondents who were born 
before 1944 constituted the foundation generation, those who were born between 1945 and 
1964 constituted the interim and those who were born after 1965 constituted the post-1980 
generations. The unbalanced number of the generations doesn’t show an under-
representation, but which was something naturally expected because the foundation 
generation involves the oldest respondents. Yet, the two younger generations, namely 
interim and the post-1980, are comparable due to the numbers of cases they include. 
Therefore, the comparison of these two comparable-in-size generations is particularly 
focused in the analyses.  
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4.2.2.2. Social Class 
The second key independent variable is social class. Social class measurement employed in 
the analyses is an objective class measurement since it relies on the answers given to the 
WVS question asking respondents’ current or last occupation. The question asks: In which 
profession/occupation do you work? If more than one job, the main job? What is/was your 
job there? Following the question, fifteen occupations were given to the respondents to 
express their own statuses. As the battery, in its original version, largely overlaps with 
John Goldthorpe’s 11-digit version of the class schemata (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992), 
while obtaining the class variable Goldthorpe’s guidance was followed. The Goldthorpe 
schema is a widely recognized categorization of social classes in the Western context and 
preferable, especially due to its ability in capturing the associations in attitudes and 
behaviour, to some of its alternatives, including the Registrar General’s classification of 
occupations or theory-oriented Marxian categorizations (Evans, 1992). Within the scope of 
this analytical strategy, first, the original 15-point scale version was downgraded to three 
main clusters, namely manual, non-manual and service/self-employed. However, in 
addition to these, the large number of respondents, who assessed their occupational status 
as unemployed, agricultural worker and has own farm, compelled the inclusion of 
unemployed and farmer categories. In most cases, agricultural worker and has own farm 
categories exhibit close levels of pro-democratic attitudes so they were included in the 
same category. 
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4.2.3. Controls 
The configuration of the controls was guided by the theory and the empirical findings of 
the previous works.  In order to reveal the pure cohort effect, three variables, age, age 
squared and survey years were included in the analysis. Age was employed in its original 
linear format, age squared was included as a quadratic term to capture the curvilinear age 
effect which tends to follow parabolic shape and survey year dummies were included to 
account for the period effect. As it is widely discussed in the literature, social class 
measurement can obscure other socioeconomic factors foremost education and income 
(Dekker & Ester, 1987; Mishler & Rose, 2001: p. 54; Evans & Rose, 2012 p. 510-11; 
Grasso, 2013). Therefore, to isolate the proper social class effect, education and income 
variables were employed as controls.  The education variable was coded into three 
categories by looking at the three basic stages in the Turkish national education system; 
elementary, secondary and university (See, Evans & Rose, 1996:502-503; Weil, 1987; 
Bratton, 2005). The income variable was left in its 10-digit original model. In addition to 
these, in the second empirical chapter, which predicts the respondents’ level of 
participation in politics, four variables, namely political interest, politics important, self-
political positioning and post materialism were included to control for the respondents’ 
personal interest in politics. Similarly, in the third empirical chapter distrust variable was 
employed to isolate a group-specific intolerance from the general feeling of distrust 
(Graab, 1979). As right-wing authoritarianism and religion are known to be important 
determinants of some pro-democratic attitudes, in all the models a 7-item authoritarian 
child-rearing (Kohn, 1977; Feldman & Stenner, 1997) and also 7-item perform prayer 
variables were recruited to isolate system level authoritarianism effect from individual-
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level right-wing authoritarianism and control religiosity. Lastly, Gender (female) was 
employed as a classical control variable in all the models.
7
 
4.3. Method 
Multivariate logistic regression, ordinary least squares and ordered logistic regression are 
applied to measure relationships between the dependent and the independent variables in 
three respective empirical chapters. The reason underlying the selection of the type of the 
analysis is, as expected, directly related to the character of the dependent variables. 
Multivariate logistic regression is used in the analyses of the first empirical chapter. 
Multivariate logistic regression is a probabilistic model used to predict binary-type 
dependent variables. A binary variable is a special categorical variable with two possible 
outcomes. The variable takes on the value ‘1’ if event happens ‘success’, and ‘0’ if the 
event does not happen ‘failure’ (coding depends on what one would like to measure as 
success and failure). The logistic regression estimates the probability of a binary outcome’s 
taking on value 1 as a function of a one or more than one explanatory variable. The 
ordinary least squares (OLS) is used in the analyses of the second empirical chapter. The 
OLS, on the other hand, is used to model relationships between a scalar dependent variable 
and one or more independent variables. Basically it aims to minimize the sum of squares of 
the differences between the observations. Finally, since we don’t know whether the 
distances between the various categories of the dependent variable are identical or not, 
ordered logistic regression is recruited to predict the relationships between the dependent 
                                                 
7
 Further information on questionnaire wording, original and re-coded versions of the variables see Table 3.1 
in the Appendices. 
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and the independent variables in the third empirical chapter (Long & Freese, 2006). All the 
analysis were executed with the help of the STATA 11.2 software programme. 
In each empirical chapter four groups of model were run. While the first models test 
Mannheim’s hypothesis, the next two test that of Lipset. In the fourth models, Mannhaim’s 
and Lipset’s models are combined. In the fourth models the data is split into three 
generational categories and the same model was run repeatedly with three samples coming 
from three generations. This procedure was preferred to interactions due to its several 
advantages. First, splitting the overall sample into three generational categories and 
running separate regressions for each disentangles the cohort effect from the age and 
period effects effectively. Second, this procedure reduces the likelihood of the emergence 
of a sampling error since each generation involves respondents from several survey waves. 
Third, this procedure allows pitting the manual class category against each occupational 
category separately, which allows understanding of the relative influence of being a 
manual class member to being a non-manual class member. In our models, the three 
dependent variables reside at the dependent end of the causal relationship as a function of 
two key independent variables: social class and generation. The generation and class 
measures were treated in the analysis concomitantly following Hans Jeager’s advice.  
Jeager likens studying history from the generational and class perspectives to studying ‘the 
path of longitudinal and diagonal threads of a rather messily produced fabric’. Jeager 
continues and suggests that ‘we therefore have to deal with a coordinating system with two 
axes, in which the social historical location of each individual can be determined through 
information both about his age and his class membership.’ (Jeager, 1985: p. 285). 
According to Jeager two basic difficulties are likely to occur while following this 
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methodology. First, this method may give way to many groups which make the sampling 
impossible. In the counter scenario, having larger generational and class categories may 
not give clear results about the groupings. So, neither an excessive elaboration nor a 
synthetic fusion of the generational and class categories is advised.  Jeager suggests that 
the second difficulty regarding to this methodology may stem from the fact that there are 
no universal rules to investigate the relationship between generation and social class. 
Expectedly, he argues, three types of relationship are likely to occur between generation 
and class. Class and generational memberships either bolster or impede each other’s role, 
or no relationship occurs between the two (Jeager, 1985: p. 285).   
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 CHAPTER 5. A PARTICIPATORY GENERATION? THE 
GENERATIONAL AND CLASS BASES OF POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION IN TURKEY 
 
Today, political participation is on the rise all over the world. Individuals want to make 
their voices heard by the central governments in America, Europe, the Middle East and 
Asia. Thousands of protesters take part in demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins against 
socioeconomic inequality, austerity measures, and governments` authoritarian practices. 
Occupy Movements, Colour Revolutions, the Arab Spring are but some examples of 
attempts made in this direction. Turkey is no exception to this global trend. The Gezi 
Protests (GP), which took place in the 2013 summer, sparked as a resistance against the 
Turkish government`s decision to reconstruct of historical military barracks in the Taksim 
Gezi Park, İstanbul. A small number of environmentalists engaged in the protests in the 
beginning, but the police`s severe suppression of the first wave of protests through the use 
of tear gas and water cannons transformed them into a nationwide movement.  
The GP put Turkey in the limelight of the political participation research. Many local as 
well as foreign researchers took an interest in the protests. To better understand the 
underlying circumstances of the protests, parallels were drawn between the GP and other 
youth-led movements in the recent history. Nilüfer Göle, a leading Turkish sociologist 
contends that ‘The Gezi Movement is both all of these movements, and none of them. It 
borrows from them all, and has similarities with each. However, it is also distinct and 
unique’ (Göle, 2013: p. 8). Göle draws a parallelism between the anti-De Gaullist 
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characteristics of the May ‘68 movement in France and the anti-Erdoğanist motives of the 
GP, and to a lesser extent, likens the GP to the new anti-system movements in the Western 
countries. However, rejecting the comparisons between the GP and Arab Spring, Göle 
suggests that Turkey diverges from the countries in the Middle East through its democratic 
tradition (Göle, 2013).  
An analogy can also be drawn between the macroeconomic circumstances preceding the 
1960s youth-led movements in Western Europe and the GP in Turkey. According to the 
post-materialist theory, which is perhaps as the most popular theorizing of the impact of 
secular changes in post-war Europe, the individuals who were born into the physical and 
economic security environment of the post-WWII Europe did not need to struggle for their 
material needs. Instead, enjoying material security from birth, what those individuals seek 
for is a higher set of needs, i.e. direct political participation, self- esteem, self-actualization, 
aesthetics, well-being and life satisfaction. Eventually, by means of the generational 
replacement mechanism, these individuals became the majority in the 1970s, which paved 
the way for a sociological transformation in the Western European advanced industrial 
societies labelled as ‘the silent revolution’ (Inglehart, 1971; Inglehart & Deutsch, 2004; 
Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 43-44). Arguably, macroeconomic stabilization in Turkey in 
the post-1980 period, which, to a large extent, overlaps with the period in which the 
majority of the Gezi protesters came of age, can be likened to the economic development 
in post-war Western Europe. Making such an analogy is important because a participatory 
Turkish generation which was socialized during this period, if any, may breathe fresh life 
into Turkish democracy, as did the 1960s youth movement in Western Europe.  
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Beginning with the liberalization of the market in the early 1980s, the Turkish economy 
has grown by about five percent in average and the GDP per capita at purchasing power 
parity (PPP) has quadrupled till 2010s. The share of the middle class increased from 18 to 
41 percent between 1993 and 2010. Turkey signed the Customs Union agreement with the 
EU in 1995 which increased Turkish exports to the European region by about twenty times 
(World Bank, 2016).
 
By drawing parallels between this period in the Turkish history and 
the post-war period in the Western European history in the light of Inglehart’s post-
materialist theory (Inglehart, 1977; 1990; Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002), one can argue that 
the members of the generation which have enjoyed relatively affluent economic conditions 
of the post-1980 Turkey during their formative years are more likely to participate in 
politics than the members of the preceding generations. 
5.1. Theory 
In the literature, the effects of both macroeconomic and macro political socialization of 
generations on political actions have been recognized. Starting from early 1970s, a group 
of scholars has focused on the declining levels of electoral turnout and party membership 
in the advanced industrialized nations of the West, which, according to them, if not 
prohibited, may lead to governability problems which may constitute appreciable risks for 
democracy (Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki, 1973; Putnam, 1995; 2000; Pharr & Putnam, 
2000; Putnam & Gross, 2002; Huntington, 1981). Opposing to this startling picture, 
another stream of scholars has argued that this ‘political cynicism’ was a mis-detection.  
They have claimed that it is not true that political participation is shrinking. On the 
contrary, it is undergoing a reformation and change in traditional repertoires, structure and 
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objectives of political action lead to an even higher level of participation. Ronald Inglehart, 
from this stream, explains the shift in the forms of political participation as a result of an 
overall shift from materialist to post-materialist values in the advanced industrialized 
societies of the West. According to Inglehart, the members of the post-WWII generation, 
who had born into an economic and physical security environment of the post-war era, 
took economic and physical security granted. As a result of being born into a relatively 
more affluent life, the members of this generation prioritize a higher set of values, i.e. well-
being, self-actualization, self-development and self-expression. Thus, it is suggested that 
the rise of the ratio of the members of this generation paved the way for a transformation 
from materialism to post-materialism. In the particular realm of political activism, 
Inglehart maintains that, rising levels of physical and human capital undermine the 
conventional forms of political action and introduce new avenues to participate in politics. 
More elite-challenging, flexible and direct forms of political action substituted 
conventional forms since the latter have substantially lost their ability to respond needs of a 
new post-materialist generation (Inglehart, 1971; Welzel, Inglehart & Deutsch, 2004; 
Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 43).  
The shift from institutionalized to novel forms of political action is also recognized by 
some other prominent students of participation. In line with Inglehart, Pippa Norris 
suggests a change in the ‘agencies’, ‘repertoires’ and ‘targets’ of political action in the 
Western democracies and argues that novel forms of political action, right alongside the 
conventional ones provide substitute channels for individuals to contact the state. 
According to Norris ‘the reinvention of civic activism, allows political energies to flow 
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through diverse alternative avenues as well as conventional channels’ (Norris, 2002: p. 11-
2). In the same vein, Russell J. Dalton recognizes the same shift in the US and other 
advanced industrial democracies. According to Dalton, this does not put democracy at risk, 
instead enhances democratic participation. Dalton shows that while older Americans are 
more likely to adopt duty-based citizenship norms, namely voting and other 
institutionalized forms of political action, younger Americans are more likely to adopt new 
and emerging norms, i.e. joining in boycotts, buying products with political reasons. In his 
attempt to use generational patterns to understand changing norms of political action, 
Dalton finds that a shift in citizenship norms changes citizens` attitudes and behavior in 
general and political actions in particular (Dalton, 2008).  
Alternative to the macroeconomic socialization which was outlined above, another group 
of researchers has focussed on macro political socialization. A period ranging from the late 
1960s to the early 1970s in the US worths a particular attention in this regard. Beck and 
Jennings in their study where they investigated data from the 1965-1973 Socialization 
Panel Study and the 1956-1976 Michigan Presidential Election Surveys show that the 
American youth of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which they recognize as ‘a deviant 
period’, constitute a particular generation with respect to their high level of political 
participation. According to them the general theories of participation are not able to 
explain the generation-participation relationship for this generation. The youth of this 
period, which was socialized by some remarkable events, i.e. anti-Vietnam war protests, 
Civil Rights Movement and McCarthyism, developed a more activity-prone characteristic 
than the youth of the preceding periods and also the adults of their time. To capture this 
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deviance period, Beck and Jennings suggest adopting ‘an approach which can handle 
‘deviance’ as well as ‘normality’ by adding an explicit political factor, the opportunities for 
involvement, into the participation equation’ (Beck & Jennings, 1979: p. 749; see also 
Beck & Jennings, 1982). 
Departing from this theoretical ground we set our research hypotheses accordingly. First, 
it should be noted that the situation in the post-1980 Turkey is quite different than in the 
post-war West. When macroeconomic development is considered as the sole factor, the 
post-1980 Turkey and the post-war Western Europe can be likened, nevertheless, an 
important feature of the former, which may also have influenced the socialization of the 
Turkish youth, distinguishes it from the latter. It is system-level authoritarianism. As 
discussed in the background chapter in details that along with macroeconomic 
stabilization, the post-1980 period in Turkey has also witnessed authoritarian 
governmental practices introduced on the plea of re-establishing the state authority and 
the security environment in the country. Unlike the situation in the post-war Western 
Europe in which socioeconomic development was accompanied with the empowerment of 
the individual against the state; in post-1980 Turkey, macroeconomic development was 
accompanied by the adoption of an authoritarian political system which did not pay enough 
attention to the protection of many fundamental rights and freedoms. Taking this fact into 
consideration, our first hypothesis is based on the main argument of Karl Mannheim`s 
theory of generations. Recall that the theory of generations recognizes adolescence and 
early adulthood as the period in which one is the most receptive and the values that were 
acquired during this period occupy an important place in one`s value system (Mannheim 
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1952 [1928],  p. 298). From Mannheim’s perspective, we predict that the members of the 
post-1980 generation who were exposed to the system-level authoritarianism during an 
early stage of their lives are less likely to adopt an activity-prone characteristic than the 
members of the previous generation (Hypothesis I).  
So far, we have discussed the direct generation-participation relationship. However, our 
data show that the gaps between the likelihoods of participation pertaining to each social 
class differ across generations. This implies a potential indirect generational effect on 
participation, which presumably operates via the social class structure. Examining this 
indirect generational effect requires first clarifying the class-participation relationship in 
Turkey and then testing it across generations. With this objective in mind, a reputed 
theoretical guideline explaining the class-participation relationship, Seymour Martin 
Lipset`s working class authoritarianism thesis, is exploited. As it was discussed in the 
theory chapter, Lipset’s thesis postulates that one of the elements of working class 
authoritarianism is low participation in politics, which implies that the working class 
members are less likely to participate in politics than their middle class counterparts 
(Lipset, 1959:  p. 498).  
Having the main arguments of Mannheim’s theory of generation and Lipset’s thesis 
reminded, now we turn to design our second hypothesis. In order to design a hypothesis 
testing Lipset’s thesis across generations, we combine Lipset’s thesis with Mannheim’s 
theory and his argument on the transformation of generation as location into actual 
generations.  As can be remembered from the theory chapter, Mannheim defines the 
generation concept as a combination of three interwoven clusters: generation as location, 
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generation as actuality and generation unit. Mannheim argues that individuals who share a 
generation location are not necessarily the members of the same generation as actuality, 
while the members of the same generation as actuality are not necessarily the members of 
the same generation unit. However, in some particular circumstances, Mannheim 
maintains, generation as location can transform into generation as actuality.  
In his modelling of generation as actuality, Mannheim implies that important macro-scale 
events can homogenize social classes. From this perspective, combining Mannheim’s 
general idea regarding the formation of generations, his argument on the transformation 
of generation as location into actual generation with Lipset’s understanding of the class-
participation relationship, we predict that Lipset’s thesis is valid for the generations 
which have come of age during an ordinary time; in our case in a period in which an 
authoritarian politico-juridical order did not prevail. On the contrary, we suggest that 
Lipset’s thesis does not hold for those generations that have socialized by an 
extraordinary event; in our case the prevalence of an authoritarian politico-juridical order 
because social classes are homogenized in this scenario (Hypothesis II).  
5.2. Data and Method 
This section introduces the data, the construction of the key variables and the methods 
employed in the analysis of the present chapter. 
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5.2.1. Data 
The analysis of the present chapter employed five waves of WVS data for Turkey. After 
deleting cases, holding ‘no answer’ and ‘don`t know’ answers for any of the variables of 
our interest, a final sample which consists of 5071 cases is obtained. Construction of the 
dependent and the independent variables are presented below.
8
 
5.2.2. Variables 
5.2.2.1. Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable was based on a question inquiring into the respondents’ 
participation in politics. The question asks: Now here are some forms of political action 
that people can take. Please indicate, for each one, whether you have done any of these 
things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Following 
the question, three repertoires of political action, which were repeated in all the five 
subsequent waves of the Turkish survey, are given as options to the respondents. They are: 
signing a petition, joining in boycotts, and attending lawful demonstrations. These three 
repertoires of action constitute the three dependent variables of the current investigation. 
The dependent variables are recoded so ‘1’ is assigned for participation and ‘0’ for non-
participation (see Grasso, 2011; 2014). 
                                                 
8
 A detailed overview of survey items used in the analysis is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendices 
section.. 
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5.2.2.2. Independent Variables 
Two key independent variables are employed in the analysis: generation and social class. 
The two variables were largely discussed in the data and methods section. In this chapter 
three additional controls, namely political interest, importance of politics and self-political 
positioning were employed to control for the respondents` general interest in politics. 
5.2.3. Method 
Since each of our three dependent variables has two possible outcomes, logistic regression 
models were sketched to empirically test the hypotheses set previously. Three groups of 
multivariate logistic regressions were run to predict the likelihood of three repertoires of 
political action. Each group of regressions consists of four models. The first model tests the 
Mannheim’s theory versus that of Inglehart’s. The next two models test Lipset’s thesis. 
The last model runs separate logistic regression analysis for three separate samples coming 
from three distinct generations. This way, it aims to test Lipset’s thesis across generations.  
5.3. Findings 
Before moving on with inferential findings descriptive findings are presented below. Table 
5.1 demonstrates the percentage shares of the answers given to the petition, boycott and 
demonstration questions.  
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As it can be seen from Table 5.1 actual political participation, as is represented by the 
three repertoires of action, is generally low in Turkey. Even petition signing, which is 
known to be a ‘low cost’ political action, does not seem to be very appealing for Turkish 
citizens. Although the Turkish citizens` right of petition has been recognized by all the 
Turkish constitutions since the First Constitutionalist Period, Birinci Meşrutiyet, in 1876, 
and today, the internet further facilitates exercising this right, the percentage of Turkish 
respondents who have signed a petition still remains quite low. At this point, one could 
argue that the Turkish population is considerably young and a ‘have you ever’ type of a 
question makes the inquiry biased against the young population. This might be true to a 
certain extent since in our sample the 25
th
 percentile age is 26, the 50
th
 percentile age is 34 
and the 75th percentile age is 44. Nevertheless, the mean ages for each category are quite 
revealing. While for those who answered the question as ‘have done’ it is 35.50, for those 
who stated that they ‘might do’, it is 35.53. On the other hand, the mean age of the ‘would 
Table 5.1  
Percentage rates of answers pertaining to three repertoires of political action (%) 
(%)  
 
 
Battery Item 
 
Have done Might do 
 
Would never do 
 
Signing a petition 15.45 41.76 42.78 
Joining in boycotts 7.19 29.56 36.25 
Attending lawful/peaceful 
demonstrations 
7.86 35.68 56.46 
 
N=5,701 
Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990-1996-2001-2007-2011 
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never do’ group, which constitutes the largest category, is 37.55. In short, the public`s 
timid approach towards signing a petition is well distributed across age categories in 
Turkey. The picture is quite the same for the boycott and demonstration variables. Actual 
participation is considerably low, decreasing to the single digit-level in both cases. For 
both boycott and demonstration, the percentage of ‘would never do’ answers surpasses the 
sum of the percentages of ‘have done’ and ‘might do’ answers. Exceeding the 50 percent, 
the percentage rate of the ‘would never do’ answers is particularly high for demonstration.  
Next, Table 5.2 presents the ‘have done’ answers across the generational and social class 
categories.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2  
Percentage rates of ‘have done’ answers for three repertoires of political action by 
generation and class categories (%) 
 
 Generation Social Class 
 Foundation   Interim Post-1980 Unemployed Farmer Manual  Non-manual  Serv.self-
employed 
Signing a petition 12.60 17.27 14.84 10.74 11.60 13.40 25.83 20.17 
Joining in a boycott 3.80 9.37 6.45 4.12 1.88 6.45 14.81 9.01 
Att. a demonstration 
demonstrations 
3.80 10.16 7.15 5.03 1.88 8.02 14.54 8.87 
N=5,701         
  Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990-1996-2001-2007-2011 
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As can be seen from the first panel of Table 5.2 the percentage of the respondents who 
signed a petition varies considerably across the generational categories. While it is the 
lowest for the foundation generation, it reaches to a peak in the interim generation and 
drops in the post-1980 generation. In the second panel of the table the participation rates 
are broken down by the categories of social class. The non-manual category appears to be 
the most participatory one and it is followed by the service category. These two classes are 
followed respectively by manual, farmer and unemployed classes, for which, the 
participation rate slightly exceeds ten percent.  When we look at patterns pertaining to the 
boycott and demonstration items, we see that although both items share a similar trend 
with the petition, their participation level is lower than that of petition. For the generational 
categorization, the ranking remains exactly the same with the order that is for the petition 
variable. The interim generation appears to be the most participatory generation which is 
followed by the post-1980 and foundation generations respectively. For the class 
categorization, the order of the first three classes remains the same. The non-manual class 
ranks the highest and is followed by service and manual classes respectively. The only 
difference in the ranking is that while in petition, the farmer category surpasses the 
unemployed category marginally, in boycott and demonstration they switch their orders 
and farmers rank the lowest under the unemployed category.  
The findings reveal that with respect to our three repertoires of political action the 
members of the interim generation are more participatory than the members of the 
foundation and the post-1980 generations. Figure 5.1 supports this idea visually by 
presenting lowess (locally weighted scatterplot) analysis of the predicted values of 
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three repertoires of political action against birth year after all the necessary controls 
are applied.
9
 
 
Figure 5.1 
Predicted likelihoods of petition boycott and demonstration against birth year 
 
As Figure 5.1 shows, the predicted likelihoods of each repertoires of political action, when 
contrasted on a two dimensional plane against birth year, start off from a low level, reach 
to a nadir in the middle and level off in the end. Reverse parabolic shapes indicate that, 
the younger generation in Turkey is less participatory than the interim generation. This 
                                                 
9
 Variables that were controlled are: age, age squared, female, survey year dummies, education, income, 
politics important, political interest, post-materialism, self-political positioning. 
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finding lends support to the macro political socialization argument which is based on 
Mannheim’s theory of generations against the macroeconomic socialization argument 
which is based on Inglehart’s post-materialism theory.  
To investigate whether the class-participation relationship differs across generations, 
Figure 5.2 plots the likelihoods of participation into three forms of political action against 
birth year for each social class.  
 
Figure 5.2 
Predicted Likelihoods of petition boycott and demonstration against birth year by social 
class 
 
Figure 5.2 reveals that for all the three forms of participation the total absolute 
participation gap between the non-manual and manual classes is greater between the 
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years the members of the interim generation were born than it is between the years the 
members of the foundation and the post-1980 generations were born.  
 
The above descriptive findings foreshadow, to some degree, the upcoming results. 
However, for a more robust investigation, three groups of logistic regression, each for one 
repertoire of political action, were run. Owing to important differences in generation and 
class categories’ participation in petition and the other two repertoires of political action, 
each repertoire is treated as separate dependent variable. 
 
Table 5.3 presents a series of multivariate logistic regressions predicting respondents` 
likelihood of signing a petition.
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Table 5.3 Multivariate logistic regression models predicting signing petition 
 Mannheim’s Model Lipset’s models Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Foundation Interim Post-1980 
 Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR 
Age .02 (.01) 1.02 .01 (.01) 1.01 .02 (.01) 1.02 -.26 (.23) .76 .04 (.09) 1.04 -.03 (.06) .96 
Age
2
 -.00 (.00)* .99 -.00 (.00) .99 -.00 (.00) .99 .00 (00) 1.00 -.00 (.00) .99 .00 (.00) 1.00 
Gender (female) -.31 (.09)** .73 -.20 (.10)* .81 -.17 (.10) .84 -.80 (.45) .44 -.10 (.18) .90 -.09 (.13) .91 
Survey Years (1990 omitted) 
   1996 .65 (.15)*** 1.92 .52 (.15)** 1.69 .47 (.15)** 1.61 .25 (.43) 1.29 .25 (.24) 1.29 1.12 (.29)*** 3.06 
   2001 .39 (.15)* 1.48  .37 (.14)* 1.45 .27 (.14) 1.32 -.33 (.56) .71 .43 (.25) 1.54 .64 (.28)* 1.91 
   2007 .32 (.17) 1.38  .27 (.16) 1.32 .15 (.16) 1.19 .18 (.67) 1.20 .05 (.33) 1.05 .66 (.29)* 1.94 
   2011 -.02 (.18)  .97  -.09 (.15) .91 -.32 (.16)* .72 -1.24 (1.14) .28 -.68 (.40) .50 .21 (.30) 1.23 
Interest in politics .42 (.05)*** 1.52 .40 (.05)*** 1.50 .36 (.05)*** 1.44 .30 (.19) 1.35 .36 (.09)*** 1.43
3 
.39 (.07)*** 1.47 
Importance of politics .20 (.04)*** 1.22 .20 (.04)*** 1.22 .20 (.04)*** 1.22 .14 (.15) 1.15 .17 (.07)* 1.19 .21 (.06)** 1.23 
Self-positioning -.09 (.01)*** .90 -.09 (.01)*** .90 -.09 (.01)*** .91 -.06 (.05) .94 -09 (.02)** .91 -09 (.02)*** .91 
Post-materialist .19 (.03)*** 1.21 .19 (.03)*** 1.21 .18 (.03)*** 1.19 .14 (.12) 1.15 .22 (.05)*** 1.25 .15 .(04)** 1.16 
Authoritarian child-rearing -.18 (.03)*** 1.19 -.16 (.03)*** 1.17 -.11 (.03)*** 1.11 -.16 (.11) 1.17 -.11 (.05)* 1.11 -.10 (.04)* 1.10 
Perform prayer -.04 (.02)* .95 -.03 (.02) .96 -.02 (.02) .97 -.04 (.07) .95 -.04 (.03) .95 -.00 (.02) .99 
Education (Ref: Elementary) 
   Secondary     .42 (.10)*** 1.52 .73 (.35)* 2.08 .36 (.16)* 1.44 .43 (.15)** 1.54 
   University     1.03 (.13)*** 2.82 .34 (.58) 2.41 .68 (.23)** 1.98 1.26 (.18)*** 3.55 
Household Income      .02 (.02) 1.02 -.02 (.08) .97 .06 (.03) 1.06 .01 (.02) 1.01 
Social Class (Ref: Manual) 
  Unemployed   -.08 (.12) .91 -.08 (.12) .91 .85 (.60) 2.34 -.61 (.21)* .53 .01 (.15) 1.01 
  Farmer   .08 (.20) 1.09 .14 (.20) 1.15 -.30 (.65) .73 .25 (.30) 1.29 .07 (.31) 1.08 
  Non-manual   .46 (.11)*** 1.58 .03 (.12) 1.03 -.05 (.54) .94 -.13 (.21) .86 .12 (.17) 1.13 
  Serv./self-employed   .30 (.13)* 1.35 .10 (.13) 1.11 .01 (.52) 1.01 -.11 (.22) .89 .23 (.18) 1.26 
Generation (Ref: Interim) 
  Foundation .22 (.24) 1.25           
  Post-1980 -16 (.14) .84           
Intercept -3.44 (.47)*** -3.47 (.38)*** -3.97 (.41)*** 6.12 (7.20) -4.13 (1.97)* -3.72 (.97)*** 
Log likelihood -2161.44 -2148.23 -2112.85 -167.19 -730.49 -1192.08 
N (obs.) 5701 5701 5701 500 1899 3302 
Pseudo R
2
                 
 
.1193 .1247 .1391 .1170 .1641 .1403 
Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Note:  Entries are multivariate logistic regression logit estimates with standard error values in parentheses and odds ratios 
(exponentiated B).  Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990-1996-2001-2007-2011. 
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After introducing all the controls, the coefficient scores and odds ratios pertaining to the 
categories of the generation variable show that there is no significant difference between 
the interim and foundation as well as between the interim and the post-1980 generations 
with respect to their members` likelihood of signing a petition (p= .358 and .257 
respectively). When the reference category is set to foundation, it is also seen that the 
foundation and the post-1980 generations are not significantly different too (p= .216). 
Thus, our first hypothesis concerning the relationship between generation and political 
participation is rejected for petition signing.  
The second and the third models test Lipset`s working class authoritarianism thesis. It is 
seen from the second model that the members of the non-manual category are 1.58 times 
more likely to sign a petition than the members of the manual class (p<. 000). However, 
when education is controlled, the significant difference between the manual and the non-
manual categories disappears (p=. 727). Nonetheless, when income is controlled alone, the 
difference remain to be significant (p<. 001). Thus, in this scenario the ratio attenuates to 
1.47. Therefore, it could be argued that income too mediates the class-petition relationship, 
but not as strongly as education does.   
The fourth model, on the other hand, tests Lipset`s thesis across three subsequent 
generations. Before interpreting the findings, it should be noted that since under this model 
each generation is investigated individually, especially the number of individuals that fall 
into the oldest foundation generation is low as it might be expected. However, since the 
two younger generations that we focus on are comparable in size, this does not cause a 
problem.  
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No significant differences were found between the non-manual and manual classes in the 
foundation generation (p=. 913). In fact, no other significant difference is observed 
between any two classes in this generation. The difference between the two classes is still 
insignificant when the education and income are removed out of the analysis (p=. 769). In 
the post-1980 generation the non-manual and manual classes are not significantly different 
than each other with respect to their likelihoods of singing petition (p=. 451). However, 
when education and income are removed, the non-manual class seems to have higher odds 
of signing petition than the manual class (p<. 000). Finally, when the interim generation is 
observed, there seems to be no significant difference between the two classes of interest 
(p=. 451). No significant difference is observed between the manual and non-manual 
categories even after the education and income factors are removed out of the analysis (p=. 
310). Unemployed becomes the least likely group to sign a petition in this case. Apart from 
the significant differences between the unemployed and all the other classes, no significant 
difference was observed between any class pairs.  
Table 5.4 presents the models predicting boycotting.
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Table 5.4 Multivariate logistic regression models predicting joining in boycott 
 Mannheim’s Model Lipset’s models Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Foundation Interim Post-1980 
 Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR 
Age .05 (.03) 1.05 .06 (.02)** 1.07 .08 (.02)** 1.08 -.13 (.41) .87 -.08 (.13) .92 .04 (.09) 1.04 
Age
2
 -.00 (.00) .99 -.00 (.00)** .99 -.00 (.00)** .99 .00 (00) 1.00 .00 (.00) 1.00 -.00 (.00) .99 
Gender (female) -.59 (.13)*** .55 -.58 (.14)*** .55 -.54 (.14)*** .58 -1.13 (.73) .32 -.39 (.24) .67 -.51 (.19)** .59 
Survey Years (1990 omitted) 
   1996 .69 (.22)** 1.99 .58 (.21)** 1.79 .54 (.22)* 1.72 .55 (.82) 1.74 .30 (.32) 1.35 1.08 (.46)* 2.95 
   2001 .35 (.22) 1.42  .35 (.21) 1.43 .20 (.21) 1.22 -.06 (1.08) .94 .33 (.35) 1.40 .48 (.45) 1.61 
   2007 .45 (.26) 1.57  .47 (.23)* 1.61 .33 (.24) 1.39 .27 (1.36) 1.32 -.43 (.49) .64 .98 (.46)* 2.68 
   2011 .19 (.27) 1.21  .17 (.22) 1.19  -07 (.23) .92  -1.37 (.61)* .25 .65 (.46) 1.91 
Interest in politics .54 (.08)*** 1.72 .52 (.08)*** 1.68 .47 (.08)*** 1.61 .23 (.39) 1.26 .26 (.13)* 1.30 .67 (.11)*** 1.96 
Importance of politics .35 (.06)*** 1.43 .36 (.06)*** 1.43 .36 (.06)*** 1.44 .33 (.32) 1.39 .38 (.11)** 1.47 .35 (.09)*** 1.42 
Self-positioning -.18 (.02)*** .83 -.18 (.02)*** .83 -.18 (.02)*** .83 -16 (.11) .84 -.19 (.04)*** .82 -.18 (.03)*** .82 
Post-materialist .34 (.04)*** 1.40 .33 (.04)*** 1.39 .31 (.04)*** 1.37 .46 (.23)* 1.58 .36 (.08)*** 1.44 .27 (.06)*** 1.31 
Authoritarian child-rearing -.19 (.04)*** 1.21 -.17 (.04)*** 1.18 -.09 (.04) 1.09 -.05 (.21) 1.06 -.12 (.07) 1.13 -.06 (.06) 1.06 
Perform prayer -.05 (.03) .94 -.05 (.03) .95 -.03 (.03) .96 -.08 (.13) .91 -.00 (.05) .99 -.02 (.04) .97 
Education (Ref: Elementary) 
   Secondary     .60 (.17)*** 1.83 .58 (.73) 1.79 .47 (.26) 1.60 .54 (.25)* 1.72 
   University     1.64 (.20)*** 5.17 1.28 (.92) 3.60 1.69 (.31)*** 5.43 1.44 (.28)*** 4.25 
Household Income      -.02 (.03) .98 .07 (.14) 1.08 .04 (.05) 1.04 -.07 (.04) .93 
Social Class (Ref: Manual) 
  Unemployed   -.03 (.18) .96 -.09 (.18) .90 1.68 (1.41) 5.38 -1.08 (.35)** .33 .15 (.23) 1.16 
  Farmer   -.92 (.44)* .39 -.92 (.44)* .39  -1.65 (.76)* .19 -.33 (.55) .71 
  Non-manual   .51 (.15)** 1.66
6 
-.13 (.17) .87 1.02 (1.22) 2.78 -.50 (.27) .60 .06 (.24) 1.06 
  Serv./self-employed   .07 (.18) 1.07 .-.21 (.19) .80 .41 (1.30) 1.52 -.50 (.30) .60 -.09 (.28) .91 
Generation (Ref: Interim) 
  Foundation -.44 (.39)  .63           
  Post-1980 -16 (.20) .84           
Intercept -5.78 (.73)*** -6.27 (.60)*** -6.76 (.66)*** 1.82 (13.02) -2.90 (2.77) -6.89 (1.50)*** 
Log likelihood -1150.68 -1139.54 -1098.19 -56.74 -409.19 -607.45 
N (obs.) 5701 5701 5701 406 1899 3302 
Pseudo R
2
                 
 
.2194 .2270 .2550 .2604 .3074 .2309 
Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Note:  Entries are multivariate logistic regression logit estimates with standard error values in parentheses and odds ratios 
(exponentiated B).  Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990-1996-2001-2007-2011. 
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The first model, as in the previous analysis, tests Mannheim`s theory of generations. It is 
seen from the table that, the interim generation does not differ with respect to their 
members` likelihood of joining a boycott from the foundation and post-1980 generations 
(p=. 252 and . 416 respectively). Switching the reference category to foundation also 
reveals no significant difference between the foundation and post-1980 generations (p=. 
559). This finding refutes the first hypothesis which predicts generational differences for 
boycotting. The second and the third models test Lipset`s thesis. The finding reveals that 
the members of the non-manual class are 1.66 times more likely to join in a boycott than 
the members of the manual class (p=. 001). However, the first significant difference 
between the non-manual and manual classes disappears when the education is controlled 
for in model 3 (p=. 409). On the other hand, when the income is controlled, the difference 
between the non-manual and manual classes still remain significant (p=. 006).  
In order to test Lipset`s thesis across generations, the fourth, fifth and sixth models run the 
same analysis for split samples coming from each of the three subsequent generations. It 
can be seen from the table that no significant difference between the two classes of primary 
interest can be observed neither in the foundation generation (p=. 405). In fact, when the 
reference categories is switched to other classes it is found that no significant difference 
can be observed between any two classes in the foundation generation. When the education 
and income variables are removed out of the analysis, the difference between the non-
manual and manual classes of the foundation generation is still insignificant (p=. 181). In 
this case, still no significant differences can be observed between any two classes. When 
the last two columns of the third panel of the table are looked, it is seen that in the post-
1980 generation, the non-manual and manual classes are no different than each other with 
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respect to their likelihoods of joining in a boycott (p=. 795). In this scenario, there exist no 
significant differences between any pairs of class. Only after removing the education and 
income factors, the non-manual class becomes 1.73 times more likely to join in a boycott 
than the manual class (p=. 013). Lastly, it is seen from the table that the non-manual class 
of the interim generation is not significantly different than the manual class (p=. 068). The 
situation does not change when the education and income variables are removed out of the 
analysis (p=. 263). In this case, the manual class is more likely to join in boycott than the 
unemployed and farmer classes as well (p=. 002 and . 035 respectively).  
Table 5.5 presents the results of the analysis done for attending a lawful demonstration. 
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Table 5.5 Multivariate logistic regression models predicting attending a lawful demonstration 
 Mannheim’s Model Lipset’s models Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Foundation Interim Post-1980 
 Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR Logit OR 
Age .02 (.02) 1.02 .05 (.02)* 1.06 .07 (.02)** 1.07 -.11 (.42) .88 -.05 (.12) .94 -.08 (.08) .91 
Age
2
 -.00 (.00) .99 -.00 (.00)** .99 -.00 (.00)** .99 .00 (00) 1.01 .00 (.00) 1.00 .00 (.00) 1.00 
Gender (female) -.61 (.12)*** .53 -.61 (.13)*** .53 -.56 (.13)*** .56 -1.65 (.88) .19 -.62 (.22)** .53 -.40 (.18)* .66 
Survey Years (1990 omitted) 
   1996 .50 (.21)* 1.65 .37 (.20) 1.46 .33 (.20) 1.39 -.00 (.80) .99 .22 (.30) 1.25 1.03 (.43)* 2.82 
   2001 .44 (.21)* 1.56 .33 (.19) 1.39 .19 (.19) 1.22 -.80 (1.14) .44 .38 (.33) 1.47 .75 (.42) 2.12 
   2007 .47 (.25) 1.61 .32 (.22) 1.37 .19 (.22) 1.21 .10 (.35) 1.10 .03 (.44) 1.03 .97 (.43)* 2.64 
   2011 .20 (.25) 1.22 -.02 (.21) .97 -.21 (.22) .80  -1.26 (.60)* .28 .66 (.43) 1.94 
Interest in politics .45 (.07)*** 1.56 .43 (.07)*** 1.55 .39 (.07)*** 1.49 .32 (.44) 1.38 .22 (.12) 1.24 .55 (.10)*** 1.73 
Importance of politics .35 (.06)*** 1.41 .35 (.06)*** 1.42 .35 (.06)*** 1.42 .21 (.34) 1.23 .27 (.10)** 1.31 .43 (.08)*** 1.53 
Self-positioning -.17 (.02)*** .83 -.17 (.02)*** .83 -.17 (.02)*** .84 -.12 (.11) .87 -13 (.04)** .87 -.20 (.02)*** .81 
Post-materialist .30 (.04)*** 1.36 .30 (.04)*** 1.35 .28 (.04)*** 1.33 .57 (.24)* 1.77 .31 (.07)*** 1.37 .25 (.06)*** 1.28 
Authoritarian child-rearing -.24 (.04)*** 1.27 -.23 (.04)*** 1.26 -.17 (.04)*** 1.19 -.06 (.22) 1.06 -.16 (.07)* 1.17 -.18 (.06)** 1.20 
Perform prayer -.07 (.02)* .92 -.06 (.02)* 
 
.93 -.05 (.02) .94 -.07 (.13) .92 -.07 (.04) .92 -.01 (.04) .98 
Education (Ref: Elementary) 
   Secondary     .58 (.15)*** 1.79 1.10 (.79) 3.02 .50 (.23)* 1.65 .46 (.22)* 1.59 
   University     1.26 (.19)*** 3.54 2.16 (.97)* 8.68 1.22 (.29)*** 3.39 1.10(.26)*** 3.01 
Household Income      -.02 (.03) .97 .11 (.15) 1.11 .00 (.05) 1.00 .-.05 (.03) .94 
Social Class (Ref: Manual) 
  Unemployed   -.13 (.16) .87 -.16 (.16) .84 1.30 (1.34) 3.67 -.53 (.31) .58 -.18 (.21) .82 
  Farmer   -1.43 (.43)** .30  -1.17 (.44)** .30  -1.26 (.63)*  .28 -.93 (.61) .39 
  Non-manual   .20 (.15) 1.22 -.25 (.16) .77 -.19 (1.08) .82 -.19 (.25) .82 -.32 (.23) .72 
  Serv./self-employed   -.20 (.18) .81 .-.39 (.19)* .67 .-.07 (1.08) 1.08 -.52 (.29) .58 -.34 (.26) .70 
Generation (Ref: Interim) 
  Foundation -.33 (.38) .71           
  Post-1980 -.45 (.19)* .63           
Intercept -.4.25 (.68)*** -5.22 (.57)*** -5.64 (.61) 1.87 (13.16) -2.19 (2.57) -4.25 (1.37)** 
Log likelihood -1242.45 -1237.14 -1213.27 -52.55 -475.54 -658.32 
N (obs.) 5701 5701 5701 406 1899 .3302 
Pseudo R
2
                 
 
.2084 .2117 .2269 .3151 .2381 .2255 
Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Note:  Entries are multivariate logistic regression logit estimates with standard error values in parentheses and odds ratios 
(exponentiated B).  Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990-1996-2001-2007-2011.  
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The first model shows that the members of the interim generation are no different than the 
members of the foundation generation with respect to their likelihood of attending a lawful 
demonstration (p=. 380) However, they are 1.57 times more likely to attend a 
demonstration than the members of the post-1980 generation (p=. 021). This finding lends 
support to the first hypothesis which predicted a generational difference between the 
interim and post-1980 generations. It is seen from the second model that the levels of odds 
of attending a lawful demonstration pertaining to the manual and non-manual classes are 
not significantly different than each other (p=. 130). The situation does not change when 
the education and income variables are removed out of the analysis (p=. 175).  
The fourth model tests the class-demonstration attendance relationship for each generation 
respectively. The analysis revealed no significant difference between the non-manual and 
the manual members of the founding generation (p=. 859). The difference is still 
insignificant when the education and income factors are removed out of the analysis (p=. 
462). The last two columns of the third panel of the table show that in the post-1980 
generation, the manual and non-manual classes are no statistically significant than each 
other (p=. 170). As it was the case in the foundation generation, none of the classes are 
different from each other with respect to their demonstration behaviour in the post-1980 
generation. When the education and income factors are removed, the manual and non-
manual classes are still not different regarding to their likelihoods of attending a lawful 
demonstration (p=. 866). In this case the same is true for any two classes of the post-1980 
generation. Lastly, when the results pertaining to the interim generation are observed, it is 
seen that, the odds of attending a lawful demonstration for the non-manual and manual 
classes are not statistically different (p=. 451). However, the manual class seems to be 
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more demonstration-prone than the farmer class (p=. 046). When the education and income 
are removed from the analysis, the difference between the manual and non-manual classes 
remain insignificant (p=. 205).  
5.4. Conclusion and Discussion 
The present chapter primarily aimed to investigate generational and class bases of political 
participation, which is suggested as one of the indicators of a pro-democratic culture. The 
first hypothesis which was based on Mannheim’s theory of generations, argued that due to 
their socialization under an authoritarian politico-juridical order, the members of the 
interim generation are different from the preceding and succeeding generations with 
respect to their likelihood of participating in the three repertoires of political action. Our 
analysis found only limited empirical evidence supporting this argument. It was found that 
the post-1980 generation is less likely to attend a lawful demonstration than the interim 
generation. Apart from this, no significant difference was found between interim and post-
1980 generations which clearly runs counter to Mannheim’s theory of generations. This 
finding also has a bearing on the current ‘rising participatory Gezi generation’ discussions 
in Turkey. By looking at this finding, we can argue that a new rising participatory Turkish 
generation thesis does not hold true for all the three repertoires of action analysed here. 
There might be several reasons underlying this. Arguably, the lack of significant 
differences between the generational categories for petition and boycott might be related to 
the fact that these two are ‘low cost’ political actions in comparison to attending a 
demonstration. Unlike demonstration, signing a petition and joining in boycott does not 
necessarily require a generation to develop a participatory character. Alternatively, positive 
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macroeconomic circumstances that the post-1980 generation faced in Turkey might have 
counterbalanced macropolitical effect for the youngest generation. Another potential 
reason could be that traditional culture in Turkey has dampened the generational effects 
on political participation. The last alternative potential reason underlying this 
generational indifference could be the fact that the Gezi generation, is too young to appear 
in our analysis. Each explanation requires further scrutiny and presents avenues for further 
research. On the other hand, the finding regarding that post-materialist values has 
significant positive impact on all the three forms of political action supports Inglehart’s 
thesis against that of Mannheim’s. 
The second and third groups of models, on the other hand, were designed to test Lipset`s 
working class authoritarianism thesis. The analysis run with the pooled data from all the 
generations supported Lipset`s thesis to a large extent. It was found that, for two out of 
three repertoires of political action, namely for petition and boycott, the members of the 
non-manual class are more likely to exhibit a participatory behaviour than the members of 
the manual class and the differences between the two classes disappear or become reversed 
when the education factor is controlled for. By looking at this finding, one can argue that 
Lipset’s thesis is applicable to our particular case. Nevertheless, the whole picture changes 
when Lipset`s thesis is tested across subsequent generations.  
Table 5.6 shows significant differences between social classes in all the three generations 
for three forms of political actions.    
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Recall that, the original argument of the present research, which was designed in the 
second hypothesis, suggested that for the members of the generations which reached to 
maturity under an authoritarian politico-juridical order, the social classes are homogenized 
with respect to their level of participation in politics. As it can be seen from Table 5.6, all 
the significant differences between social classes appear in the interim generation. This 
finding lent support for the second hypothesis. It supports our idea that socialization of the 
foundation and the post-1980 generations under authoritarian political and juridical orders 
homogenized social classes in terms of their level of political participation. By looking at 
this finding, we can argue that the present finding challenges Lipset`s working class 
authoritarianism from a generational perspective.  
What is more interesting is that, the results pertaining to the analysis of the interim 
generation, for which we expected Lipset thesis holds true, are different than how Lipset 
Table 5.6 
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for three 
repertoires of political action  
 Unemployed Farmer Manual Non-
manual 
Service./self-
employed 
Unemployed  1 1 2  1 1 
Farmer    2 3   
Manual     3 
Non-manual      
Serv./self-
employed 
     
Signing a petition=1, joining a boycott=2, attending lawful demonstrations=3 
1 Foundation generation, 2 interim generation _ post-1980 generation 
Note: The differences are those produced by multivariate logistic regression analysis after age, age squared, 
gender (female), survey year, education, income, authoritarian child-rearing, perform prayer, interest in 
politics, importance of politics, self-positioning and post-materialist variables held controlled. 
(Significance levels: *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001) 
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would predict. As can be seen from the table, in the interim generation, the number of the 
significant differences between the manual class and the first two classes (which is 4) is 
higher than the number of significant differences between the manual and the last two 
classes (which is 1). This shows that the manual class resembles to the last two social 
classes to a greater extent than it resembles to the first two classes. Remember that, in 
Lipset’s categorization of social classes manual class is regarded as low class with i.e. 
farmers and minors. Differently, modernization theory while locating the manual class in 
the modern end of the traditional/modern dichotomy, envisages a positive relationship 
between replacement of traditional modes of production with modern ones and higher level 
of participation in politics in a society. Thus, this finding favours the modernization 
theory’s categorization of the social classes which was based on the traditional/modern 
dichotomy over Lipset’s categorization of the classes. It seems that the notable cleavage in 
the class-based participatory behaviour in Turkey is between those classes which take part 
in the modern production mechanisms and which remain out of it. 
Table 5.7 shows the significant differences between the social classes when education and 
income factors removed out of the analysis. 
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Table 5.7 
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for three 
repertoires of political action (education and income removed) 
 Unemployed Farmer  Manual Non-
manual 
Service./self-
employed 
Unemployed  1 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 2  
Farmer    2 3 2 3 2 
Manual    1 2  
Non-manual     1 2 3 
Serv./self-
employed 
     
Signing a petition=1, joining a boycott=2, attending lawful demonstrations=3 
1 Foundation generation, 2 interim generation _ post-1980 generation 
Note: The differences are those produced by multivariate logistic regression analysis after age, age squared, 
gender (female), survey year, education, income, authoritarian child-rearing, perform prayer, interest in 
politics, importance of politics, self-positioning and post-materialist variables held controlled. 
(Significance levels: *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001) 
 
As can be seen from the Table 5.7, the previous picture has slightly changed when the 
education and to a much lesser extent income factors were removed out of the analysis. 
While the total number of significant differences between classes was 8 in the previous 
case, now it increases to 20. By looking at this, one can argue that most of the class-based 
participatory behaviour in Turkey can be explained by the education factor.  
On the other hand, even after removing the education and income factors out of the 
analysis, still the number of differences between the manual class and the first two classes 
of the interim generation (which is 4) is higher than the number of differences between 
the manual class and the last two classes of the interim generation (which is 2). This 
finding supports our initial hypothesis which argued that the manual class resembles to 
the non-manual/service/self-employed classes in greater degree than it resembles to the 
unemployed/farmer classes even after the education and income factors are ignored.  
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CHAPTER 6. A DEMOCRACY-PRONE GENERATION? THE 
GENERATIONAL AND CLASS BASES OF DEMOCRACY 
PREFERENCE IN TURKEY 
 
In today’s world, an extensive body of literature presents democracy as the most publicly 
desired form of government. Democracy outnumbers, by far, its alternatives with respect to 
the number of its supporters in many countries of the world. However, democracy’s 
popularity is a very recent phenomenon. For a considerable portion of the recorded human 
history, from classical ages down to modern times, the ideal of democratic government 
was pursued by only a handful of idealistic men, whose ideas serve as a basis for the 
democratic government model as we understand it today. In parallel to that, in no small 
part of the history, mankind was governed by authoritarian governments which were 
equipped with extensive powers. This relatively recent democratization trend is 
conceptualized by Samuel Huntington, a leading student of democratization, within his 
‘three waves of democratization’ argument as the third wave of democratization. Pointing 
out the historical rivalry between democracy and its authoritarian alternatives, Huntington, 
argues that the modern history has witnessed three phases between democracy and 
authoritarian regimes thus far. He claims that the first democratization wave started in the 
1820s with the suffrage movement in the US and expanded to 30 countries of the world in 
a century's time. This movement was responded by the rapid rise of authoritarian regimes 
in the Europe in the beginning of the 20th century and the number of democratic countries 
declined to 12 in 1942. Following this anti-democratization movement, Huntington 
continues, a new democratization wave emerged by the end of the First and the Second 
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World Wars, and by 1962 the total number of democratic countries rose to 36. Between the 
early 1960s and mid-1970s, Huntington claims, the number of democratic governments 
declined, but immediately after this short interim period, democratization gained a new 
momentum again. The most recent global sway towards democracy, ‘the third wave of 
democratization’ as Huntington labels it, started with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal 
in 1974 and was followed by democratization movements in Spain, Poland and Hungary 
from the European continent and Mexico and Chile from South and Central America 
(Huntington, 1991). Further to the points made by Huntington, the third wave of 
democratization thesis was supported by more recent developments. The collapse of 
communist governments and their replacement with new democracies in the Central and 
Eastern Europe, current requests for democracy in the Caucasus, the Balkans and the 
Middle East, all together indicate a new wave of democratization.  
One might ask at this point whether the two trends, the recent rise in the global popularity 
of democracy and the increase in the number of democratic countries in the world, are 
linked. The adherents of the legitimacy approach within political culture research, would 
give an affirmative reply to this question by suggesting to a bottom-up causal mechanism 
operating from the increased demand for democracy to the increased number of democratic 
countries in the world. According to the legitimacy approach the greater the popular 
acclamation of democracy in a society, the greater the changes that the society in question 
will be governed by a democratic government (see Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Chaley et al., 
2000; Diamond, 2003; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Selingson, 2002; Shin & Wells, 2005). 
However, data show that, when system level democracy is predicted by this approach, the 
publics of some fledgling democracies appear to be more pro-democratic than the publics 
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of some established ones. Turkey constitutes perhaps one of the most interesting cases in 
this regard. Empirical data from 1990 to 2011 reveal that Turkish respondents endorse 
democracy as fairly and very good way of governing the country by above 90 percent. This 
is higher than the rates in all the established democracies in the world. This chapter aims to 
make sense of the bases of this high predisposition towards democracy in Turkey by 
looking at generation and social class structures.  
This chapter is composed of six sections. The remaining part is organized in the following 
way. The next section lays down the theoretical dimension of the research by delving into 
the literature on political support and legitimacy. It also briefly mentions Mannheim’s 
theory of generations and Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis by referring to the 
theory chapter. The third section discusses the data, construction of the variables and the 
method of the research. The fourth section presents the findings, particularly focusing on 
the generational and class effects on democracy preference. Finally, the fifth section 
discusses the findings in relation to the extant theory and the research hypotheses set 
previously.  
6.1. Theory 
The main issues addressed in the theory section are: (a) the legitimacy approach as one of 
the tripartite approaches operating within the political culture research and its emphasize 
on overt popular endorsement of democracy for the establishment of a well-functioning 
democratic political system, (b) the origins of the concept of legitimacy and its historical 
development as an idea, (c) political support, its objects and types and association with 
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legitimacy, (d) the potential bases of political support and (e) Mannheim’s and Lipset’s 
theories. 
A considerable amount of published work within the domain of political culture research 
has cast light on the relationship between aggregate-level value orientations and macro-
level systems. In fact, some of the most prominent works in the recent-era political science 
literature have investigated this relationship. Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba’s The Civic Culture: Political 
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy are perhaps the most reputed ones of this kind. Common 
to these works is the argument that some particular values and orientations prevalent in a 
given society are directly responsible for the macroeconomic or political systems 
established by its members. Although an inclusive theory, investigating this relationship 
comprehensively does not exist, a couple of approaches examine it from different 
perspectives. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel in their 2005 book, Modernization, 
Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, introduce three 
approaches at a great length. They label them: ‘the legitimacy approach’, ‘the 
communitarian approach’ and ‘the human development approach’. While the 
communitarian and human capital approaches, as Inglehart and Welzel argue, highlight 
some rooted values intrinsic to the culture, the legitimacy approach emphasizes overt 
popular acclamation of democracy and confidence in its institutions as determinants of 
system-level democracy. Central to the legitimacy approach is the idea that as the popular 
endorsement of a given political system and confidence in its institutions increase, so too 
does its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Inglehart and Welzel have also examined 
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whether the orientations suggested by the legitimacy approach are conducive to formal as 
well as effective democracy. Their analysis revealed that while confidence in state 
institutions in the early 1990s do not statistically correlate with formal democracy in early 
2000s, a positive and mild correlation between confidence and effective democracy holds. 
On the other hand, having countries’ prior democracy experiences controlled, a weak 
negative causal relationship operating from overall confidence in institutions in early 
1990s to formal democracy in early 2000s attracts the attention. Nevertheless, their 
autocracy-democracy preference measurement appears to be as a stronger and more 
significant determinant of both formal and effective democracy. Thus, their findings 
provide some evidence that the autocracy - democracy preference is preferable to the 
confidence measurement with respect to its power to predict system level democracy.  
As can be seen from above, there are both theoretical as well as empirical grounds to argue 
that the majority of the public’s preference of democracy over its alternative forms of 
government is associated with democracy at the system level. The importance of 
preference of democracy resides in the issue of legitimacy since all forms of systems 
necessitate legitimacy. Legitimacy has been viewed as particularly important for 
democratic governments since democratic governments, unlike the authoritarian ones, do 
not rely on coercive measures, but on people’s consent to maintain their survival (Easton, 
1965; 1975; Przeworski, 1991: p. 26: Linz and Stepan, 1996: p. 16; Inglehart, 2003: p. 55).  
Mark C. Suchman defines legitimacy as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, appropriate within some socially constructive 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: p. 574). Suchman 
continues and argues that ‘legitimacy is socially constructed in that it reflects congruence 
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between the behaviours of the legitimated entity and the shared (or assumedly shared) 
beliefs of some groups…’ (Suchman, 1995: p. 574).  From an organizational perspective, 
Dowling and Pfeffer view legitimacy as ‘the congruence between the organizational and 
social values’ (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975: p. 112). From a sociological aspect, Talcot 
Parsons defines it as the ‘appraisal of actions in terms of shared or common values in the 
context of the involvement of the action in the social system’ (Parsons, 1960: p. 175). As 
can be seen, it is common to all these authors' arguments that legitimacy represents 
congruence between the individual and the system.  
In the political science literature, the centrality ascribed to political legitimacy roots in the 
question of survival. It is likened to a ‘reservoir’ which serves to maintain political stability 
(Dahl, 1971; Easton, 1965; Almond, 1980) and therefore it is viewed as a fundamental 
component for all types of government. Citing the eminent British idealist Thomas Hill 
Green, Sharma and Sharma states that: ‘even the most powerful and the most despotic 
government cannot hold a society together by sheer force; to that extent there was a limited 
truth to the old belief that governments are produced by consent’ (Sharma & Sharma, 
2006: p. 104). In the political science domain, the intellectual roots of the concept of 
legitimacy can be traced back in the ancient philosophers’ writings. It is argued that the 
debate on legitimacy dates back to Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War 
(Zelditch, 2001). Thucydides’ imaginary dialogue between the Melanians and the 
Athenians who surrounded their city, involves the Melanians’ objection to the Athenians’ 
antagonistic action. As Thucydides notes, the Melanians said that the Athenians may attack 
and conquer their city, but this would not be a legitimate action. The idea of legitimacy has 
also been discussed in Plato’s writings. According to Plato, the legitimacy of a state is 
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originated from the qualification of its rulers. For his contemporary Aristotle, however, 
legitimacy is linked with the legitimate distribution of the rewards. Cicero, the great 
Roman linguist, philosopher and politician, uses the term judicial legitima, which stands 
for fair judgement. The idea of legitimate government was comprehensively studied in the 
pre-enlightenment and enlightenment periods too. Machiavelli, in his seminal book, The 
Prince, advises that ‘the best possible fortress is not to be hated by the people’ 
(Machiavelli, 1532 [2005]: p. 106). In the same vein, John Milton (1649 [1953]), in The 
Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, states that:  
The power of kings and magistrates is nothing else but is only derivative, transferred and 
committed to them in trust from the people to the common good of them all, in whom the 
power yet remains fundamentally and cannot be taken from them without a violation of their 
natural birthright (Milton, 1649 [1953]: p. 278-79).  
 
During the period of enlightenment, especially three prominent students of the social 
contract school, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, devoted a 
considerable amount of their attention on the issue of legitimacy. Hobbes, perhaps under 
the influence of his personal experience of fierce political disintegration during the English 
Civil War, puts the prevention of disorder and civil war in the centre of his ‘social contract 
theory’. In Leviathan, he argues that everyone should avoid ‘the condition of mere nature’, 
which, as he argues, is equal to ‘the state of war’ and commit to a common absolute 
authority what he describes as ‘sovereignty by institution’. According to him, nothing but 
only a strong and legitimate authority which is able to protect its subjects can prevent this 
happening (Hobbes, 1691 [1969]). John Locke, another prominent philosopher of the 
social contract school, introduces his positive theory of government in his seminal work, 
The Second Treatise of Government, where he notes, so to speak, the motto of the social 
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contract school: ‘The source of legitimacy is the consent of the governed’. According to 
Lock, in the ‘state of nature’ where there is no government, equal individuals have natural 
rights, i.e. the right to have life, liberty, health and property. However, different than 
Hobbes, Lock does not equate ‘the state of nature’ with ‘the state of war’. Lock idealizes 
the state of nature, but since, as he claims, it is still vulnerable to mean-spirited actions, he 
proposes civil society as superior to it. According to Lock, the main function of the civil 
society is to preserve rights when they are violated by some malevolent persons. The 
requisite of a legitimate government emerges from this point. The protection of the rights 
can only be practiced by a legitimate governmental body, either a magistrate or a king, or 
alternatively a group of administrators or the representatives of the people. Only a 
legitimate government can judge those who violate the others’ rights and execute their 
punishments. An illegitimate government, on the contrary, fails to protect its citizens' 
rights, what is worse than this is that it may claim them (Lock, 1689 [2001]). The issue of 
legitimacy occupied a great proportion of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s attention as well. In his 
prominent work, The Social Contract, Rousseau delves into the question of legitimacy and 
argues along the same lines with his successors in the social contract tradition. He notes 
that a state is legitimate only if it is based on the ‘general will’ of its members which ‘come 
from all and apply to all’.  In line with Hobbes and Lock, Rousseau also considers living 
under the protection of such a legitimate and sovereign power as superior to living in the 
state of nature (Rousseau, 1762 [1920]).  
In the 20th century, the legitimacy question protected its centrality in the political science 
literature. The idea that legitimacy is derived from the consent of the governed gained 
further prominence and served as the nucleus of today’s democratic government model. 
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Lively debates in the theoretical sphere yielded results in the practical world. The issue of 
legitimate government is undertaken in the article 21 of the United Nation’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The article reads: ‘The will of the people shall be the basis 
of the authority of government’. The question of legitimacy, in this context, evolved into 
the question of political support in democracies. David Easton, a prominent student of 
political support, became the first person who demonstrated political support as a multi-
faced phenomenon by distinguishing between its types and objects. According to Easton, 
political support is decomposable and can be incorporated into the political system through 
three objects: ‘the community’, ‘the regime’ and ‘the government’. According to Easton 
these three types of political support are not necessarily positively associated and can be 
distinguished by the people. In Easton’s theorizing, support for the community corresponds 
to the feeling of being a part of one’s own community; support for the regime to a 
widespread commitment among members of a society to an agreement defining the rules of 
the community; and support for the government to an agreement to give incumbent 
authorities legality to use power required to design general policies. Easton also 
distinguishes between two types of political support: ‘diffuse support’ and ‘specific 
support’. In his analysis, diffuse support implies subjective and emotional confidence in 
the authorities or the regime or an inclusive allegiance feeling towards the community. On 
the other hand, specific support denotes a rational evaluation of the incumbent authorities, 
a particular regime or appropriateness of living in a community (Easton, 1957; 1975; see 
also Parsons, 1967).  
At the beginning of the last quarter of the 20th century, the declining levels of political 
support and confidence in state institutions and the authorities in the Western democracies 
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fuelled ‘the crises of democracy’ discussions led by a group of scholars, i.e. Jurgen 
Habermas, who conceptualized this situation with the term ‘legitimacy crisis’ (See also 
Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki, 1975; Huntington, 1991). Thus, Easton’s decomposition 
of political support into its objects and types gained prominence among those who opposed 
these sceptics (see Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995; Klingemann, 1998; 
Mishler & Rose, 2001; Weil, 1989; Lehman, 1987). In response to the crisis theories, 
Hans-Dieter Klingemannn (1998), in his individual-level analysis, demonstrated that 
‘support for political community’, ‘approval of democracy as a form of government’ and 
‘evaluation of current performance of democracy’ represent three distinct types of system 
support. Klingemann argued that there was no evidence of a crisis of democracy when 
global trends of dissatisfaction with democracy were scrutinized, also no evidence of that 
dissatisfied democrats, those who think the current level of democracy falls short of the 
ideal form in their minds, posed a threat to democracy. Similarly, Weil (1989) 
demonstrated that the poor performance of the state may decrease confidence, but it is not 
likely to cause a crisis of democracy, at least in a direct manner. He argued that the crisis 
of democracy could be a matter of debate only if citizens begin to view that democracy as 
an overall political system did not work at all (Weil, 1989).  
One may not avoid asking the following question at this point: If political support is so 
important for a democratic political system, what are the factors underlying it? The factors 
underlying support for democracy have been explored empirically in several regional 
studies. Evans and Whitefield, in their analysis where they compared economic and non-
economic factors with respect to their influences on support for democracy, came to the 
conclusion that neither economic nor non-economic factors are solely enough to explain 
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support for democracy in the Eastern Europe. However, political factors, the evaluation of 
the functioning of democracy in the first place, explain the differences in support for 
democracy across countries more strongly than economic ones. Yet, economic factors still 
play a significant influence on support for democracy. Therefore, they suggest that 
economic and political factors underline support for democracy concomitantly (Evans & 
Whitefield, 1995). Similarly, Evans and Rose, in their analysis investigating micro bases of 
the education-democracy relationship in eighteen African countries, demonstrated that 
education effect on preference of democracy and the rejection of its alternatives 
(separately) supersede the effect of other indicators pertaining to modernization, i.e. 
occupation, economic resources and urbanisation (Evans & Rose, 2012). On the other 
hand, Mishler and Rose, in their research investigating support for democracy in five 
Central and European countries, showed that evaluations of the current and future macro-
economy and future living standards, as well as fears related to the old regime are strong 
determinants of the support for the current regime. Testing ‘the Churchil hypothesis’ in the 
Central and Eastern European political context, they found that the communist legacy is 
the strongest determinant of the rejection of authoritarian rule, followed by the political 
performance of the current regime. Their analysis revealed that most of the macro and 
micro economic factors seem to be unrelated to the rejection of the authoritarian 
alternatives of democracy (Mishler & Rose, 1996). In their comparative study, where they 
employed data from Ghana, Zambia and South Africa, Bratton and Mattes contend that 
support for democracy in these three African countries is supported by intrinsic 
motivations representing a genuine desire for democracy per se, not by instrumental 
motivations representing a desire for democracy in exchange for other conditions. (Bratton 
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& Mattes, 2001; see also, Schumpeter, [1950] 1975). Parallel to one of the hypothesis of 
the present chapter, Weil pointed to political upbringing as an important determinant of 
one’s future level of support for democracy. Weil’s analysis revealed that the generation 
which came to maturity during the Nazi period, are more likely to support Nazi 
government and less likely to show support for the new regimes than the younger and older 
generations (Weil, 1987). Similarly, Klingemann in his work, where he mapped support for 
democracy in Eastern Europe, demonstrated that political socialization played a role in 
support for democracy. In his analysis, older citizens of ex-communist countries who have 
lived a large part of their life under Communism seem to support democracy in lower 
levels than the members of the younger cohort who socialized under democratic political 
system. However, Klingemann also drew attention to that support for democracy does not 
necessarily originate from socialization under a democratic government since prevailing 
pro-democratic support can also be observed in non-democratic countries (Klingemann, 
1999).  
In this final section, we turn to mentioning briefly the two theoretical arguments which 
underpins our research hypotheses. The first one is Mannheim’s theory of generations. 
Remember from the theory chapter that the central premise of the theory of generations is 
that individual’s future attitudes and behaviour are shaped by major politico-historical 
events which took place during one’s most receptive period, namely adolescence and early 
adulthood. The first assumption of this argument is that those individuals who share a 
generational location also share alike values and can be discerned with regards to their 
attitudes and behaviours. Mannheim notes that ‘members of a generation are ‘similarly 
located’, first of all, in so far as they all are exposed to the same phase of the collective 
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process’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 297). However, it should be noted that, according to 
Mannheim, simply belonging to the same generational location is not enough criteria for 
individuals to consist a generation. In addition to that, those coevals should also share 
similar experiences. As he suggests: ‘mere contemporaneity becomes sociologically 
significant only when it also involves participation in the same historical and social 
circumstances’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 298). The second assumption, on the other 
hand, is that the experiences acquired in the early phase of life are so deep rooted that they 
persist throughout life shaping future attitudes and behaviour. In Mannheim’s own words: 
‘early impressions tend to coalesce into a natural view of the world. All later experiences, 
then tend to receive their meaning from this original set, whether they appear as that set’s 
verification and fulfilment or as its negation and antithesis’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 
298). Mannheim contends that the critical age for the formation of the first impressions of 
life is ‘round about the age of 17, sometimes a little earlier and sometimes a little later’ 
(Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 300).
10
 Finally, it should be noted since it is related to our 
inquiry that, according to Mannheim, social classes which corresponds to his generation as 
actuality phenomenon may react to macro-scale formative events such as wars and merge 
with other social classes which fuses them into the same generation as location 
(Mannheim, (1952 [1928]: p. 303-4). 
                                                 
10
 Nie and his friends defined this period as an interval between mid to late adolescence (Nie et al., 1996: p. 
138). Niemi and Hepburn proposed the age range between fourteen and twenty-five as being crucial for 
formation of participatory behaviour (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995: p. 4-5). Powell and Cowart specified this 
period between ages twelve and thirty (Powell & Cowart, 2003). Erikson suggested the period from fourteen 
to fifteen for the formation of political views and attitudes (Erikson, 1950). 
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The second key theory that our hypotheses were derived from is Seymour Martin Lipset’s 
working class authoritarianism. Recall that, Lipset, as a modernization theorist, tends to 
account for social attitudes by referring to their infrastructural bases. In his 1959 work, 
where he laid out the principles of his working class authoritarianism thesis, Lipset regards 
social class as responsible for authoritarianism discrepancies in the society. According to 
Lipset, the working class is more authoritarian than the middle class due to a series of 
factors, i.e. lower education, income insecurity, isolated work environment, family tension 
and etc. According to him, one of the distinguishing features between the working and 
middle classes is the relatively lower level of support the latter provide for democracy. 
Lipset, in his descriptive analysis of the German data, shows that the working class 
members and farm workers were less likely to support a multi-party system in Germany 
(Lipset, 1959: p. 489).   
Based on this theoretical background, first, the question whether high popular appraisal of 
democracy in Turkey follows generational lines is raised. To find an answer to this 
question, the guidance of Karl Mannheim’s theory of generations is followed. In line with 
the main argument of the theory, it is predicted that the members of the generations, who 
have spent their formative years under a democratic government and a juridical order, are 
more likely to prefer democracy over its authoritarian alternatives than those members of 
the generations who have socialized under an authoritarian politico-juridical order 
(Hypothesis I).  
In the second step, social class variable is included in the analysis in order to measure the 
indirect generational effect on democracy preference which operates via social class. 
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Initially, an answer is sought to the question whether this high inclination towards 
democracy is distributed homogenously across the social classes. Herein, Seymour Martin 
Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, which suggests that the members of the 
middle class are more likely to prefer democracy than the members of the working class, is 
exploited. Then, combining Mannheim’s general idea on the formation of generations as 
well as his particular argument on the transformation of generation as actuality into 
generation as location, with Lipset’s perspective on the class-democracy preference 
relationship, it is hypothesized that Lipset’s thesis may hold true for the members of those 
generations which came of age under non-authoritarian politico-historical context, but, not 
for the members of those generations that socialized under an authoritarian one, for which 
social classes are homogenized with respect to their appraisal of democracy (Hypothesis 
II). 
6.2. Data and Methods 
This section discusses the data, key variables and the methods employed in the analysis of 
the present chapter. 
6.2.1. Data 
The data of this chapter come from the five successive waves in the WVS which held in 
1990, 1996, 2001, 2007 and 2011. The variables for the analysis employed in this chapter 
are derived from the Turkish respondents’ valid answers. While constructing the sample, 
‘No answer’ and ‘don’t know’ answers were set to missing and those cases holding 
missing values on any variables have been deleted. The final sample consists of 4970 
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cases. A brief introduction of the dependent and the independent variables of primary 
interest is presented in the following.
11
   
6.2.2. Variables 
6.2.2.1. Dependent Variable 
In WVS, a battery-type question was administered to the respondents, which inquiries into 
their ideas about several government forms. The English translation of the question is as 
follows: I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think 
about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very 
good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?   
Several government types are then listed to allow respondents to assess their ideas about. 
Four government types are repeated on successive four rounds of the Turkish surveys. 
They are:  
(a) Having a democratic political system,  
(b) Having the army rule,  
(c)  Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best 
for the country,  
(d) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.  
 
                                                 
11
 A detailed overview of survey items used in the analysis is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendices 
section. 
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First, in order to elicit variation between the battery items a Principle Components Factor 
Analysis (PCF) is performed. PCF is a multivariate technique to investigate the 
dimensionality between related variables and their association with latent factors (Jackson, 
2005). The results are presented in the Table 6.1.   
 
 
Our factor analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues over 1.00 which means that the 
Turkish public’s support for these four types of regime can be categorized into two factors. 
The first factor is tapped by army rule, expert rule and strong leader by over the critical 
alpha value of .60. This means that support for army rule, expert rule and strong leader 
constitute three related dimensions of the same unobserved factor in the eyes of the 
Turkish public.  However, democracy does not seem to be associated with this factor since 
it only tapped into it by -. 32. On the other hand, the second factor which was tapped by 
democracy by . 81, was not tapped by any other items by over . 60. This supports the idea 
that democracy is viewed by the Turkish public distinctly than the other three forms of 
government. Nevertheless, army rule, seems to be the most powerful mirror concept of 
Table  6.1  
Factor analysis of regime types 
 
 
 
Battery Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
Democracy 
 
-0.32 0.81 0.22 
Army Rule 0.63 -0.40 0.43 
Expert Rule 0.74 0.43 0.25 
Strong Leader 0.78 0.25 0.31 
Eigenvalue 1.68 1.09  
Principal component analysis, N=4.970 
Source: World Values Survey, rounds (1990/1996/2001/2007/2011) 
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democracy since it taps most strongly (yet negatively) into the factor which democracy 
loads strongly with. Figure 6.1 presents the same story visually.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 
Factor loadings of four regime types 
 
As can be seen from Figure 6.1, while expert rule and strong leader items are located very 
closely on the right hand side of the platform, although still associated with these two items 
as factor analysis table has showed, army rule is located slightly far from them. On the 
other hand, democracy seems to be located distinctly from all these three items and army 
rule seems to be the most distant item to democracy which means that support for these 
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two regime types are conceptually further away in Turkish respondents’ minds. In other 
words, supporting army rule as the best form of government is the most powerful 
alternative of supporting democracy in Turkey. Following this empirical finding and a 
series of theoretical arguments and previous empirical findings in the literature (see, Rose, 
1995; Klingemann, 1999; Bratton & Mattes, 2001: p. 457; Inglehart, 2003; Sin & Well, 
2005: p. 94; Ingleart & Welzel, 2005: p. 252), a dependent variable that combines 
legitimization of democracy and delegitimization of army rule is constructed. This 
procedure consists distinguishing the respondents, who concomitantly stated that 
democracy is a fairly/very good and army rule is a fairly/very bad way of governing the 
country from the rest of the sample. This parsimonious analytic strategy saved us from 
misleading results pertaining to the exaggerated proclivity towards democracy which might 
have originated from a rhetorical commitment to democracy, or a belief that it is the most 
socially acceptable form of government, or alternatively a cognitive complexity between 
economic and social development in general and democratization as discussed in the 
previous literature. This way, it is believed that a more realistic measure of support for 
democracy is achieved.  
6.2.2.2. Independent Variables 
Two independent variables are of primary interest for our models. They are social class 
and generation. The construction of these variables were largely discussed in the data and 
methods chapter.  
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6.2.3. Method 
Ordered logistic regression models are called for to investigate the relationships between 
the dependent variable and the independent variables. Ordered logistic regression is a 
statistical model used to predict unknown parameters of an ordered dependent variable. An 
ordered variable is a special categorical variable for which possible values that the variable 
can take on are ordered. In cases where the difference between the categories are ordered 
but not identical, ordered logistic regression is used to estimate logs of being in a higher 
level of the dependent variable.   
6.3. Findings 
Table 6.2 presents the distribution of the answers given to the questions which the 
dependent variable is derived from.  
 
Table 6.2  
Descriptive statistics for regime types (%) 
Battery Item Very Bad Fairly Bad Fairly Good Very Good 
Democracy 2.17 6.76 39.74 51.33 
Army Rule 32.54 37.75 20.01 8.71 
N=4.970 
Data:  World Values Survey, rounds: 1996-2001-2007-2011 
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The first line of Table 6.2 indicates the percentage of respondents who identified 
democracy as very bad, fairly bad, fairly good and very good way of governing Turkey. It 
is seen from the table that the percentage of those who predicated support for democracy is 
considerably high in Turkey. Over the half of the respondents stated that they view 
democracy as a very good way of governing the country. Together with about the 40 
percent fairly good answers, those who consider democracy is a good way of governing the 
country exceeds 90 percent of the overall sample. On the other hand, slightly less than 9 
percent of the respondents stated that democracy is fairly bad or very bad way of 
governing the country. The second line similarly shows the percentage of respondents who 
stated their different ideas about army rule. It can be seen that, more than two third of the 
respondents stated that army rule is a fairly/very bad way of governing the country. Our 
analysis shows the percentage of respondents who assessed democracy as either fairly 
good or very good and army rule as either fairly bad or very bad is more than 70%.  
Having investigated the distribution of the answers pertaining to the items of the dependent 
variable, now we turn our attention to the cross-tabulation of the items used in making the 
dependent variable across the categories of the independent variables.  
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In the first line of the Table 6.3 the respondents who legitimized democracy are broken 
down into three generational and five social class categories. It is seen that the 
legitimization of democracy is well-distributed across both generational and social class 
categories. While the interim generation appears to be the most pro-democratic generation, 
it is followed by foundation and post-1980 generations respectively. On the other hand, all 
the class categories see democracy as either fairly good or very good by over 90 percent, 
except for the manual class which only marginally remained below the 90 percent line. The 
 
 Table 6.3 
Descriptive statistics for regime types by generation and social class (%) 
 
  Generations Social Class 
Regime Type Foundatio
n   
Interim Post-
1980  
Unemp. Farmer Manua
l 
Non-
manual 
Service/self-
employed 
 
Democracy*  
 
91.41 92.72 90.20 90.28 91.39 89.83 94.34 90.82 
Army Rule* 31.58 25.02 31.87 33.30 37.70 32.04 18.55 
 
27.88 
Dem. Pref.† 64.82 70.65 62.21 60.50 59.02 61.82 77.78 68.45 
Democracy Preference‡ 1.31 1.49 1.26 1.22 1.17 1.26 1.68 1.41 
N=4,970 
 
Source: Turkish Values Survey, rounds (1990/1996/2001/2007/2011) 
Data:  World Values Survey, rounds: 1996-2001-2007-2011 
*Fairly Good/Very Good 
† Democracy (Fairly Good or Very Good) and Army Rule (Fairly Bad or Very Bad) 
 
 
‡Mean Democracy Preference 
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second line of the table, similarly, shows the percentage values pertaining to army rule. As 
can be seen, a more varied picture emerges for this item. The interim generation 
legitimized army rule almost 7 percent lower than both foundation and post-1980 
generations which do so by over 31 percent. The differences between generational 
categories are greater for army rule. This holds true for the differences between social class 
categories as well. While over the one third of the farmer and unemployed respondents 
approved the statement that army rule is a good way of governing the country, they are 
followed by manual and service/self-employed classes and the non-manual class ranking 
the lowest. The third line shows the percentage of respondents who legitimized democracy 
and delegitimized army rule. The values show the percentages of the generation and class 
members who viewed democracy as fairly or very good as well as army rule as fairly or 
very bad way of governing the country. It is seen that when the two items are combined, 
support for the two forms of government counterbalance each other with respect to their 
distribution across the generational categories. The fourth line, on the other hand, shows 
mean scores of an additive scale constructed by democracy and army rule items by 
generation and social class. Similar findings can be observed by looking at mean scores.  
Table 6.4 presents the results pertaining to six ordinary least square analyses.  
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Table 6.4  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models predicting democracy preference 
 
 
          Mannheim’s model Lipset’s model Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined 
        Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Foundation Interim Post-1980 
            Coeff     Coeff    Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff 
Age       .01 (.00)  .02 (.00)**  .03 (.00)***  -.36 (.15)*  -.06 (.04) .02 (.02)  
Age
2
       -.00 (.00)  -.00 (.00)*  -.00 (.00)**  .00 (00)*  .00 (.00)  -.00 (.00)  
Gender (female)      -.19 (.04)***  -.18 (.04)***  -.12 (.04)**  -.32 (.20)  -.17 (.08)*  -.10 (.06)  
Survey Years (1996 omitted) 
   2001   -.13 (.05)*  -.06(.05)  -.11 (.05)*  .34 (.22)  -.04  (.08)  -.18 (.08)*  
   2007   -.10 (.06)  -.01 (.06)  -.06 (.06)  .68 (.27)*  -.05 (.11)  -.10 (.08)  
   2011   -.10 (.06)  -.03 (.05)  -.08 (.06)  .37 (.31)  .08 (.13)  -.12 (.09)  
Authoritarian child-rearing   -.08 (.01)***  -.07 (.01)***  -.04 (.01)**  .00 (.05)  -.05 (.02)*  -.04 (.01)*  
Perform prayer   -.02 (.00)**  -.02 (.00)*  -.01 (.00)  -.06 (.03)  -.02 (.01)  -.00 (.01)  
Education (Ref: Elementary) 
   Secondary     .31 (.04)***  .26 (.17)  .34 (.07)***  .31 (.05)***  
   University     .65 (.06)***  .55 (.32)  .72 (.11)***  .63 (.08)***  
Household Income      -.02 (.01)*  .00 (.04)  .02 (.01)  -.04 (.01)***  
Social Class (Ref: Manual) 
  Unemployed   .06 (.05)  .07 (.05)  -.26 (.26)  .11 (.10)  .10 (.06)  
  Farmer   -.08 (.09)  -.05 (.09)  -.56 (.28)*  -.16 (.14)  .19 (.12)  
  Non-manual   .37 (.05)***  .15 (.06)*  .17 (.27)  .09 (.10)  .18 (.08)*  
  Serv./self-employed   .11 (.06)  .04 (.06)  .25 (.26)  .10 (.11)  -.00 (.08)  
Generation (Ref: Interim) 
  Foundation -.28(.12)*            
  Post-1980 -.08 (.06)            
Intercept 1.34 (.32)*** .91 (.15)*** .59 (.16)*** 13.78 (5.06)** 2.55 (1.11) -.70 (.41) 
N (obs.) 4970 4970 4790 361 1547 3062 
Adjusted R
2
                 
 
.0216 .0300 .0490 .0693 .0779 .0357 
Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, p<.001.  Note: Entries are multivariate ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard error values in parentheses. 
Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1996-2001-2007-2011. 
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The first model illustrates the results of the analysis, which measures the direct 
generational effects on democracy preference. The analysis revealed that after variables 
measuring age, age squared, gender (female), year dummies, authoritarian child-rearing 
and perform prayer are held controlled, the members of the interim generation are more 
likely to prefer democracy than the members of the foundation generation (p=. 024), but 
they are not significantly different than the members of the post-1980 generation in this 
regard (p=. 194). On the other hand, the members of the post-1980 generation are also not 
significantly more likely to prefer democracy than the members of the foundation 
generation (p=. 218). The second model presents the results of analysis, which was fit to 
investigate the social class effect on democracy preference. The analysis shows that the 
non-manual class is more likely to prefer democracy than the manual class (p<. 000). 
Moreover, as the third model shows, the difference between the two classes still remains to 
be significant even after the education and income factors controlled (p=. 013).  
Our fourth model applies the same sort of analysis to three adjacent generations. The 
analysis of the data from the foundation generation revealed that belonging to the non-
manual or manual class is irrelevant to the legitimization of democracy and 
delegitimization army rule (p=. 524). Yet, it seems that the farmer class is significantly less 
likely to prefer democracy than the non-manual class (p=. 048) and the service/self-
employed classes (p=. 021 and . 007 respectively).  
The findings are quite different for the post-1980 generation. The non-manual class prefers 
democracy at higher odds than the manual class. The difference between the two classes is 
significant (p=. 024).  When the education and income variables are removed, the 
difference between the two classes becomes even more significant (p< .000). In this 
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scenario, the non-manual class seems to have higher odds than the unemployed and 
service/self-employed classes too (p=. 000 and . 000 respectively). 
Finally, when the results pertaining to the interim generation are observed, it is seen that 
there is no significant difference between the non-manual and manual classes (p=. 357). In 
fact, there is no significant difference between any two classes. Removing income and 
education makes the difference between the manual and non-manual classes significant 
and powerful though (p=.000).  In this scenario, the non-manual class becomes the most 
likely class to prefer democracy.  
6.4. Conclusion and Discussion 
The current chapter focused on one type of pre-democratic orientation: democracy 
preference, which includes the legitimization of democracy and the delegitimization of 
alternative forms of government. There are strong theoretical and empirical grounds to 
argue that the majority of the citizens’ favourable assessment of democracy and 
unfavourable assessments of its alternatives bolster the establishment and continuation of a 
democratic political system (Roses, 1995; Klingemann, 1999; Bratton & Mattes, 2001: p. 
457; Shin & Well, 2005: p. 94; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 252). Since the influence of 
democracy is pervasive in almost every aspect of life, it is expected that democracy and in 
our particular case pro-democratic culture is influenced by a large array of factors in 
return. In order to reduce complexity, democracy preference was analysed with respect to 
the two bases which were suggested previously as strong determinants of many human 
attitudes and behaviour: generation and social class. To assess generational and class 
effects on democracy preference, two theories’ guidance was exploited. They are: Karl 
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Mannheim’s theory of generations and Seymour Martin Lipset’s working class 
authoritarianism.  
It was suggested in the first hypothesis, which was designed in line with Karl Mannheim’s 
theory of generations that due to their political upbringing in a relatively less authoritarian 
political environment, the members of the interim generation are more likely to prefer 
democracy as a good way of governing the country than the members of the foundation 
and post-1980 generations. Our analysis found only limited empirical evidence for this 
hypothesis. It was found that the interim generation is more likely to prefer democracy 
than the foundation generation. However, this finding should be read with caution due to 
small sample size of the foundation generation. On the other hand, the two comparable-in-
size generations did not differ from each other with respect to their levels of democracy 
preference. This finding is telling about the new rising generation question in Turkey. By 
looking at this finding, one can argue that the youngest generation in Turkey is not more 
likely to prefer democracy than the previous one. It is believed that the lack of difference 
between democracy preference levels of the interim and the post-1980 generations can be 
explained by at least three alternative explanations or a combination of them. First, 
democracy is the most popular regime all over the world for decades. Thus, it is not too 
surprising that the members of the succeeding generations support democracy in close 
degrees. Second, in the Turkish case the military governments did not remain in power too 
long and passed the power to civilians as soon as possible. As a result of this, Turkey did 
not face too sharp regime changes which as a result might have produced relatively smaller 
gaps between Turkish generations by comparison with greater gaps between Weil’s 
generations in Germany and Klingemann’s generations in ex-communist countries. Third, 
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Turkish traditional culture might have dampened the attitudinal differences across 
generations which were generated by changes in the system level. It is recommended that 
further research be undertaken in these areas.  
The second and the third regression analysis tested Lipset’s thesis with data from three 
subsequent generations. Two successive models testing Lipset’s argument revealed that 
members of the non-manual class are significantly more likely to prefer democracy than 
the members of the manual class as Lipset discussed. Moreover, the significance and the 
power of the difference between non-manual and manual classes’ likelihoods of preferring 
democracy attenuates when education is controlled. Potentially, including some additional 
variables measuring urbanization, family tension and workplace isolation, which were 
suggested by Lipset as underlying factors of working class authoritarianism, would further 
reduce the magnitude and the significance of the class effect. By looking at this finding 
only, it is possible to argue that the Lipset’s thesis is largely confirmed in our case. 
However, the third group of analyses, testing Lipset’s thesis across generations provides 
completely different results. 
The second hypothesis suggested a mechanism operating with the joint contribution of the 
two theories. Combining Mannheim’s main argument on the formation of generations, his 
idea on the transformation of generational location into actual generation with Lipset’s 
argument on the relationship between the class structure and pro-democratic attitudes, it 
was hypothesized that authoritarian upbringing distorts the class-democracy preference 
relationship suggested by Lipset and homogenizes the social classes with respect to their 
democracy preference. The third group of analyses provided ample evidence that this is not 
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the case for democracy preference. Table 6.5 shows all the significant differences between 
social classes in the three generations for democracy preference. 
 
As it can be seen from Table 6.5, in the foundation generation three, in the interim 
generation zero and in the post-1980 generation two inter-class differences were found. 
This finding refutes our second hypothesis which envisaged homogenization of the social 
classes in the foundation and post-1980 generations in response to a macro-level 
authoritarian socialization. When the two comparable-in-size generations are considered, 
the higher number of the significant differences in the post-1980 generation relative to that 
in the interim generation supports disprove.  
Table 6.6 illustrates the significant differences between the social classes after the 
education and income variables are removed out of the analysis.  
Table 6.5 
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for 
democracy preference 
 Unemployed Farmer Manual Non-
manual 
Service./self-
employed 
Unemployed      
Farmer    1 1  1  
Manual    _  
Non-manual     _ 
Serv./self-
employed 
     
1 Foundation generation, 2 interim generation _ post-1980 generation 
Note: The differences are those produced by ordinary least square analysis after age, age squared, gender 
(female), survey year, authoritarian child-rearing, perform prayer, education and income variables held 
controlled. 
(Significance levels: *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001) 
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As can be seen from Table 6.6, the number of significant differences increased for all 
generations when education and income are removed out of the analysis. Thus, it can be 
argued by looking at this picture that, education and, as our findings showed, to a lesser 
extent income, play important roles in the stratification of the social classes in all 
generations and explain most of the class-based democracy preference in Turkey. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that these two variables are not responsible for the whole 
class effect on democracy preference as shown in the previous table. It should also be 
noted that, after education and income were removed out of the analysis, the number of 
differences between the manual class and the first two classes of the interim generation 
(which is one) becomes lower than the number of differences between the manual class 
Table 6.6 
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for 
democracy preference (education and income removed) 
 Unemployed Farmer Manual Non-
manual 
Service./self-
employed 
Unemployed    _ _ _ _ 
Farmer    _ _ _ _ _ 
Manual    _ _ _ 
Non-manual       _ 
Serv./self-
employed 
     
1 Foundation generation, 2 interim generation _ post-1980 generation 
Note: The differences are those produced by multivariate ordinary least square analysis after age, age 
squared, gender (female), survey year, authoritarian child-rearing and perform prayer variables held 
controlled. 
(Significance levels: *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001) 
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and the last two classes (which is three). This finding support the modernization theory’s 
classification of the social classes against that of Lipset’s. 
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 CHAPTER 7. AN INCLUSIVE GENERATION? THE 
GENERATIONAL AND CLASS BASES OF OUT-GROUP 
TOLERANCE IN TURKEY 
 
As discussed broadly in the theory chapter, Inglehart and Welzel argue that three 
approaches within the political culture research, namely legitimacy, communitarian and 
human development prioritize different sets of values and claims that the prevalence of 
these values in a given society indicates the extent of the presence of the social 
foundations entrenching democracy. In their examination of the human development 
approach, Inglehart and Welzel suggest that out-group tolerance (represented by tolerance 
of homosexuality), together with post-materialist liberty aspirations, political participation, 
life satisfaction and self-expression values syndrome serves as a significant determinant of 
system level democracy. In parallel to this argument, their examination of the data reveals 
evidence showing that country-level aggregated scores of tolerance of homosexuality 
are significant determinants of formal and effective democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005).  
The present chapter investigates the generational and social class bases of out-group 
tolerance in Turkey. While investigating a potential generational divide in out-group 
tolerance, Karl Mannheim`s theory of generations is followed as the theoretical guideline. 
Mannheim lays down the foundations of his theory in his 1923 essay. Remember, his main 
argument is that macro politico-historical events that one has faced during formative years, 
which corresponds to adolescence and early adulthood, shape future attitudes and 
behaviour. Similarly inter-class differences in out-group tolerance are investigated 
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following the theoretical guidance of Lipset’s working class authoritarianism. The working 
class authoritarianism thesis postulates that the working class members are more likely to 
develop authoritarian characteristics due to several reasons, including their low level of 
education and income than their middle class counterparts. One of this authoritarianism is 
intolerance against the dissident groups in society. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, the literature on the tolerance - 
generation relationship is examined in the theory section. At the end of the theory section, 
the research hypotheses are developed. Next, in the data and methods section, the data, 
variables and the method are introduced. In the analysis section, the above-mentioned 
ideas are put to empirical test and the findings are presented accordingly. Finally, in the 
conclusion and discussion section the findings acquired in the previous section are 
discussed and further avenues for research are recommended.  
7.1. Theory 
A large volume of published studies applies the generation phenomenon in the particular 
realm of tolerance. Samuel Andrew Stouffer`s landmark work, Communism Conformity 
and Civil Liberties, was the first empirical attempt made in this direction. Stouffer`s work 
is not only important because it is the first empirical study in the field, but also because it 
reflects American attitudes towards communism during the McCarthy period in which an 
explicit war was declared against domestic communism in the US. Using data derived 
from a 1954 survey, Stouffer examines to what extent Americans are ready to grant rights 
to the members of three popular disfavoured groups; communists, atheists and socialists. 
He asks the respondents should the members of these three groups be allowed to speak in 
 221 
 
the public, to teach or they should be thrown into the jail, should a book written by them 
removed from the library, should their telephone conversations be taped and citizenship 
be evoked. Stouffer finds that intolerance in the US is particularly high towards 
communists while it is relatively lower, yet still high, towards socialists and atheists. 
However, by looking at ever increasing trends in education, urbanization, mobility, 
exposure to mass media, Stouffer predicted a rise in tolerance in the future. He attributed 
particular importance to the role of generational replacement mechanism in this regard. 
According to him, generation effect, operating both directly and indirectly via education, 
would serve as the main mechanism for rising tolerance (Stouffer, 1955). 
A great deal of studies took an interest in testing Stouffer`s prediction of rising tolerance 
in the US. Some of these, i.e. Davis (1975), Nie et al. (1996), Nunn, Crocket and 
Williams (1978) and Mueller (1988) found evidence supporting Stouffer`s prediction. On 
the other hand, others, i.e. Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979; 1982), Sullivan, 
Marcus, Feldman and Piereson (1981), Barnum and Sullivan (1990), Mondak and 
Sanders (2003) found evidence opposing Stouffer’s thesis. 
James A. Davis (1975) found empirical evidence supporting Stouffer`s predictions. From 
1954 to 1972-73, Davis detects a 23% overall increase in tolerance. He reports that this 
increase is underlined by both direct and indirect generation effects as suggested by 
Stouffer. While a 5% increase is due to the direct generation effect, a 4% increase is due 
to the indirect generation effect operating through education. On the other hand, a 13% 
increase originates from the changing pattern of tolerance in all educational and cohort 
groups (Davis, 1975). Davis`s 1992 research also provides support for the generation 
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effect on tolerance. Analysing liberal and conservative changes in the US between 1970s 
and 1980s, Davis reports a slight liberalization trend in values which occurs as a 
consequence of the replacement of generations (Davis, 1992). 
Thomas C. Wilson`s (1994) findings are parallel to that of Davis. In his analysis, where 
he decomposes tolerance across target groups, Wilson finds supportive evidence for 
Stouffer`s prediction regarding direct and indirect generation effects on tolerance. He 
employs three questions, derived from the GSS data between the years 1976 and 1988, 
asking whether militarists, racists, communists, atheists and homosexuals should be 
allowed to make a public speech, should teach in a university and should their book kept 
in the public library. His analysis reveals that while the large proportion of the generation 
effect on tolerance is direct and one third of the effect is originated from young cohorts` 
higher education attainment. However, distinguishing between the rightist and leftist 
groups, Wilson draws a varied picture of the changing pattern of tolerance. He reports 
that between 1976 and 1988, while the tolerance in the US toward the leftist groups 
increased, the tolerance towards militarists remained stable and tolerance towards racists 
decreased. What is more, tolerance toward leftists increased only between 1976 and 1984 
and between 1984 and 1988 it followed a constant course. Further decomposing the 
leftist group, he shows that between 1984 and 1988 while the tolerance toward atheists 
and homosexuals followed a stable trend, the tolerance toward communists decreased 
(Wilson, 1994).  
Sullivan and his colleagues levelled perhaps the most powerful criticism against 
Stouffer’s work. Their criticism focuses on Stouffer`s methodology as well as his 
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prediction of the rise in tolerance. The criticism of his methodology is based on the idea 
that the given groups that were found in the past by the public as the most disagreeable 
are replaced by some new ones. In other words, they argue that intolerance towards 
atheists, communists and socialists no longer represented the general intolerance in the 
US. To overcome this problem, they suggest their least-liked group measure, in which 
they allow respondents to designate their target group in advance, as an alternative to 
Stouffer`s fixed-group measure. Following the respondents` specification of their most 
disliked group, they direct them a battery of questions asking whether they would tolerate 
six different activities performed by the group members. By looking at their own 
findings, Sullivan and his friends argue that, when it is measured by their method, 
tolerance in the US does not seem to be increasing between 1955 and 1973. This is 
because their findings report a decrease in intolerance towards only a few groups, i.e. 
communists, atheists and homosexuals, but does not reflect an overall decrease in 
tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1979; 1982; Sullivan et.al., 1981). 
Alternative to Stouffer’s rising tolerance thesis, Duch and Gibson`s (1992) findings, 
relating to the democracy-tolerance relationship with a reference to generation as the 
main carrying mechanism, are particularly important for the current research. In their 
cross-cultural analysis of micro and macro-level determinants of political tolerance, Duch 
and Gibson (1992) ask their European respondents should fascists be allowed to run for 
public office, hold public office and should fascist political parties be banned. Their 
findings are informative for the relationship between democracy and tolerance on 
individual as well as system levels. Their analysis of the macro-level determinants of 
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tolerance reveals that the democratic experience correlates negatively with political 
tolerance. Contrary to their findings at the system level, their individual level analysis 
revealed a positive relationship between exposure to democratic values and tolerance. 
They divide the respondents from Greece, Spain and Portugal into four age groups by 
looking at what age they spent the year 1971, which is the beginning year of 
democratization processes in these three countries. The first age group was younger than 
10 in 1972, the second one was between 10 and 19, the third one was between 20 and 29 
and the fourth age group was older than 29. They find that those who were between 20 
and 29 ages at the beginning of the democratization period constitute the most tolerant 
age group. They conclude that social learning of democratic values by means of re-
socialization affects tolerance positively (Duch & Gibson, 1992). 
Based on the theoretical background introduced above, hereby we develop the following 
two hypotheses to investigate the generational and social class effects as well as their 
combined effect on out-group tolerance in Turkey. If Stouffer’s rising tolerance thesis is 
applicable in Turkey, we should find a rising trend as we move from the foundation to the 
interim and from the interim to the post-1980 generations. Alternative to this, it is 
hypothesized in line with Mannheim’s theory of generations which was discussed broadly 
in the theory chapter, and Duch and Gibson`s (1992) particular findings discussed above, 
that the members of the interim generation are more likely to tolerate out-groups than the 
members of the foundation and post-1980 generations (Hypothesis I).  
Having the direct generational effect on out-group tolerance is assessed; in the second step 
of the investigation first the inter-class differences on out-group tolerance are examined. In 
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line with Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, which was also introduced in the 
theory chapter, it is expected that the non-manual class is more likely to tolerate out-groups 
than the manual class when the generations are not considered. However, when the 
generation factor is at work, we expect a completely different picture to emerge. Thus, 
combining the main argument of Mannheim on the formation of generations, his particular 
argument on the transformation of generation as location into actual generation with 
Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, it is predicted that Lipset’s thesis is only 
valid for the interim generation which was socialization by relatively less authoritarian 
politico-juridical order. On the contrary, for the foundation and post-1980 generations, the 
social classes are expected to be homogenized with respect to their out-group tolerance due 
to their authoritarian socialization (Hypothesis II). 
7.2. Data and Method 
7.2.1. Data 
The present chapter employs five waves of cross-sectional World Values Survey (WVS) 
data for Turkey. After deletion of the cases holding missing values, the sample consists of 
6,488 cases.
12
 Construction of the dependent and independent variables are discussed 
below. 
7.2.2. Variables 
As mentioned in the above sections, our investigation requires measurement of the 
dependent variable, out-group tolerance and the key independent variables, generation as 
                                                 
12
 A detailed overview of survey items used in the analysis is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendices 
section. 
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well as social class in the first place. The construction of the dependent and the key 
independent variables are discussed in the following lines. 
7.2.2.1. Dependent Variable 
We derived our out-group tolerance measurement from a battery-type question, which was 
replicated over the five succeeding waves of the World Values Survey in Turkey. The 
question asks: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please indicate any that 
you would not like to have as neighbours. Following the question the following groups are 
given to the respondents. Six groups are repeated in the five waves of the Turkish surveys. 
They are: drug addicts, people of a different race, people who have AIDS, 
immigrants/foreign workers, homosexuals, heavy drinkers. In order to assess the 
dimensionality across the battery items, a Principle Components Factor (PCF) Analysis is 
performed. The PCF analysis is an efficient scale reduction technique to reveal variability 
between variables and their association with unobserved factors (Jackson, 2005). The 
findings of the PCF analysis are shown in Table 7.1. 
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Our analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues over 1.00, which means that tolerance 
against six out-groups can be categorized into two separate clusters. It can also be seen 
from the values in the first and second panels of Table 7.1 that the first four and the last 
two questionnaire items tapped into the first and the second factors respectively by over 
the critical alpha value of .60. While the first factor contained ‘heavy drinkers’, ‘people 
who have AIDS’, ‘drug addicts’ and ‘homosexuals’, the second one contained ‘people of a 
different race’ and ‘immigrants/foreign workers’. Figure 7.1 shows how each 
questionnaire item tapped into each factor visually. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1  
 
Factor analysis of the out-groups 
 
Tolerance Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
Heavy drinker 
 
0.60 -0.18 0.60 
People who have AIDS 0.69 -0.11 0.49 
Drug addicts 0.65 -0.43 0.38 
Homosexuals 0.70 -0.33 0.39 
Different race 0.53 0.67 0.26 
Immig./foreign worker 0.51 0.68 0.26 
Eigenvalue 2.31  1.04  
N=6,488. 
Source: World Values Survey, rounds (1990-1996-2001-2007-2011). 
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Figure 7.1 
Factor loadings of six out-groups 
 
Empirical findings imply a meaningful distinction. By looking at the strong face validity of 
the items, it is clearly seen that while the first four items have a social and the last two 
items have nationalistic connotation. Based on empirical and logical grounds, we generated 
two separate dependent variables; ‘nationalistic out-group tolerance’ and ‘social out-group 
tolerance’. Additive scales are constructed for each variable. While for the nationalistic 
out-group tolerance the scale ranges from 0 to 2, for social out-group tolerance it ranges 
from 0 to 4.  
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7.2.2.2. Independent Variables 
Two key independent variables are employed in the analysis of this chapter. They are 
generation and social class. The construction of the generation and social class variables 
were discussed widely in the data and methods chapter. Different from the previous 
empirical chapters’ here cynicism was employed to isolate a group-specific intolerance 
from general distrust.  
7.2.3. Method 
The ordered logistic regression procedure was employed in the analysis of this chapter. 
This is due to the ordered character of the two dependent variables. 
 
7.3. Findings 
Table 7.2 presents the distribution of the answers pertaining to the each item. In the last 
two lines, it shows the percentage of respondents who exhibited tolerance to all the 
groups and who failed to do so.  
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Table 7.2 indicates a dramatic gap between the percentage of respondents who showed 
tolerance towards the first four and the last two groups. While the latter groups were 
tolerated by 69% and 71% of the respondents, toleration of none of the former groups 
surpassed 22%. This, along with the factor analysis findings presented above, reinforces 
the appropriateness of our decision to distinguish between the two forms of out-group 
tolerance. The discrepancy is reflected in the remarkable difference between the 
percentage of the social and nationalistic toleration as well. While almost 60% of the 
respondents showed nationalistic out-group tolerance, only around three percent showed 
social out-group tolerance. Table 7.3 cross-tabulates the tolerance items with generation 
and class categories. 
 
Table 7.2  
Descriptive statistics of the out-groups (%) 
Battery Item 
Heavy drinker 
Mentioned 
84.22 
Tolerance 
15.78 
People who have AIDS 78.81 21.19 
Drug addicts 93.34 6.66 
Homosexuals 87.35 12.65 
Different race 28.53 71.47 
Immig./foreign worker 30.72 69.28 
 Social out-group tolerance* .56  
 Nationalistic out-group tolerance* 1.40  
N=6.488 
 
Data: World Values Survey, rounds (1990-1996-2001-2007-2011) 
* Mean scores for social and nationalistic out-group tolerance (Additive indexes rank from 0 to 4 for social 
out-group tolerance and from 0 to 2 for nationalistic out-group tolerance). 
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A general increasing trend can be observed in the first panel of Table 7.3. As we move 
from the foundation to the interim, and from the interim to the post-1980 generations, 
social out-group tolerance, on average, rises in large percentages while nationalistic out-
group tolerance`s average rise remains relatively small. The second panel of the table, on 
the other hand, presents the percentage of tolerant respondents across social class 
categories. While farmers appear to be the most intolerant segment of society, the non-
manual category is the most tolerant of all the groups save with regards to the drinkers. On 
 
Table 7.3  
Descriptive statistics of the tolerance for out-groups by generation and social class 
categories (%) 
 
 Generations Social Classes 
 Foundation Interim Post- Unemp. Farmer  Manua
l 
 Non-manual Service/se
lf-    1980     employed 
Heavy drinker 10.25 16.64 16.19 12.86 7.71 17.15 19.34 21.23 
People who have AIDS 12.40 18.55 24.13 18.68 9.71 19.71 29.60 25.23 
Drug addicts 3.97 6.31 7.37 5.28 3.14 6.76 9.58 8.28 
Homosexuals 7.11 10.00 15.07 11.41 4.86 11.08 18.83 14.29 
Different race 60.17 72.62 72.64 66.69 55.71 72.53 83.80 73.83 
Imm./foreign worker 65.12 70.37 69.33 65.85 56.29 70.65 76.76 72.63 
Nationalistic out-group 
tolerance* 
1.25 1.42 1.41 1.32 1.12 1.43 1.60 1.46 
Social out-group tolerance* .33 .51 .62 .48 .25 .54 .77 .69 
 
N=6. 488         
 Data: World Values Survey, rounds (1990-1996-2001-2007-2011)  
* Mean scores for social and nationalistic out-group tolerance by generational and class categories (Additive 
indexes rank from 0 to 4 for social out-group tolerance and from 0 to 2 for nationalistic out-group tolerance). 
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the other hand, the manual class is located at the middle of these two extremes. While 
service/self-employed members hold only a sledge edge over the manual class members, 
unemployed members marginally surpass the farmers. Having the descriptive statistics 
presented, next we turn to run two sets of ordered logistic regressions predicting the two 
dependent variables, nationalistic and social out-group tolerance. Table 7.4 presents the 
results pertaining to our first dependent variable, nationalistic out-group tolerance. 
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Table 7.4 Ordered logistic regression models predicting nationalistic out-group tolerance 
 
 
 Mannheim’s Model Lipset’s models Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Foundation Interim Post-1980 
 Coeff OR Coeff OR Coeff OR Coeff OR Coeff OR Coeff OR 
Age      .00 (.01) 1.00 .00 (.00) 1.00 .02 (.01)* 1.02 .31 (.14)* 1.36 .02 (.05) 1.02 -.03 (.03) .96 
Age
2
     .00 (.00) 1.00 -.00 (.00) .99 -.00 (.00)* .99 -.00 (00)* .99 .00 (.00) 1.00 .00 (.00) 1.00 
Gender (female)    -.43 (.05)*** .64 -.27 (.07)*** .76 -.19 (.07)** .82 .32 (.26) .72 .00 (.14) 1.00 -.23 (.09)* .79 
Survey Years (1990 omitted) 
   1996  -.10 (.10)         .90  -15 (.09)           .85 -.19 (.10)      .82 -.53 (.25)* .58   -.34 (.16)*       .70 -.07 (.17)        .92 
   2001  -.09 (.09) .91  .05 (.08) 1.06 .01 (.08) 1.01 -.24(.29) .78 -.16 (.17) .85 -.00 (.15) .99 
   2007  .03 (.10) 1.03  .18 (.09) 1.19 .10 (.09) 1.11 -.23 (.37) .78 .04 (.22) 1.04 -.02 (.16) .97 
   2011  -.26 (.11)* .76  -.12 (.09) .88 -.46 (.09)*** .62 -.65 (.39) .52 -.51 (.24) .59 -.62 (.16)*** .53 
Authoritarian child-rearing  -.25 (.01)*** 1.29 -.23 (.01)*** 1.26 -.17 (.02) 1.19 -.16 (.06)* 1.17 -.19 (.03)*** 1.21 -.17 (.02)*** 1.18 
Perform prayer  -.13(.01)*** .87 -.12 (.01)*** .88 -.10 (.01) .89 -.13 (.04)** .87 -.13 (.02)*** .87 -.09 (.01)*** .91 
Distrust  .13 (.07) 1.14 .15 (.07)* 1.17 .12 (.08)* 1.22 .75 (.25)** 2.13 -.19 (.14) .82 -.32 (.10)** 1.38 
Education (Ref: Elementary) 
   Secondary     .55 (.06)*** 1.74 .43 (.21)* 1.54 .68 (.11)*** 1.98 .51 (.07)*** 1.68 
   University     .96 (.10)*** 2.62  1.69 (.49)** 5.45 .89 (.20)*** 2.45 .99 (.12)*** 2.69 
Household Income      .08 (.01)*** 1.08 .07 (.05) 1.08 .07 (.02)* 1.07 .09 (.01)*** 1.09 
Social Class (Ref: Manual) 
  Unemployed   -.27 (.07)*** .75 -.24 (.07)** .78 -.34 (.30) .70 -.49 (.15)** .61 -.12 (.09) .88 
  Farmer   -.53 (.11)*** .58 -.41 (.11)*** .65 -.30 (.29) .73 -.68 (.18)*** .50 -.19 (.18) .82 
  Non-manual   .38 (.08)*** 1.46 -.05 (.09) .94 -.55 (.33) .57 .20 (.16) 1.22 -.16 (.12) .84 
  Serv./self-employed   .05 (.09) 
 
) 
1.05 -16 (.09) .84  -.49 (.30) .60 -.05 (.16) .94 -.13 (.12) .87 
Generation (Ref: Interim) 
  Foundation -.52 (.14)***  .58           
  Post-1980  04 (.09) 1.04           
Cut 1 -2.13 (27) -1.99 (.22) -.91 (.24) 8.50 (4.46) -1.25 (1.15) -1.56 (.57) 
Cut 2 -1.02 (27) -.87 (.22) .23 (.24) 9.66 (4.47) -.02 (1.15) -.43 (.57) 
Log likelihood -5969.04 -5931.85 
 
 
-5835.93 -586.51 -1840.06 -3371.08 
N (obs.) 6488 6488 6488 605 2140 3743 
Pseudo R
2
                 
 
.0341 .0401 .0556 .0626 .0842 .0455 
Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Note:  Entries are ordered logistic regression logit estimates with standard error values in parentheses and odds ratios 
 Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990-1996-2001-2007-2011. 
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Our hypotheses stipulated fitting six ordered logistic regressions on nationalistic out-group 
tolerance. The first panel of the table illustrates the results of the first regression, which 
was fit to analyse the generation effect on nationalistic out-group tolerance. The analysis 
reveals that the members of the interim generation are significantly more likely to exhibit 
nationalistic out-group tolerance than the members of the foundation generation (p<. 000) 
but no significant difference can be observed between the interim and the post-1980 
generations (p=. 607). When the reference category is switched to the foundation, it is also 
found that the members of the post-1980 generation has higher odds to show nationalistic 
tolerance than the members of the foundation generation (p=. 002).  
The second model assesses class effects on nationalistic out-group tolerance. The second 
regression reveals that the manual class is more likely to exhibit out-group nationalistic 
tolerance than the unemployed and farmer classes (p<. 000 and . 000 respectively) but less 
likely to do so than the non-manual class (p<. 000). In fact, farmer seems to be the lower-
most tolerant class. Following the farmer comes the unemployed class which is also 
significantly less likely to exhibit nationalistic out-group tolerance than all the remaining 
three classes. The third regression, on the other hand, analyses pure class effects. The 
analysis reveals that, when education and income are controlled no significant difference 
remains between the manual and non-manual classes with respect to their nationalistic 
tolerance (p=. 536). However, the manual class is still more likely to exhibit nationalistic 
out-group tolerance than the unemployed (p=. 002) and farmers (p<. 000). Similarly, the 
non-manual class is also more likely to show nationalistic tolerance than the unemployed 
and farmer classes (p=. 046 and .007 respectively).  
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The fourth panel of the table is divided into three sub-panels, each containing the results of 
a regression analysis that was run with data coming from separate generations. It reports 
the impact of belonging to the manual class on nationalistic out-group tolerance relative to 
belonging to the other social classes across three adjacent generations. When the results 
pertaining to the foundation generation are viewed, it is seen that the manual class is no 
different than the non-manual class (p=. 100). The situation does not change when 
education and income factors are removed out of the analysis. The insignificant 
difference between the manual and non-manual classes remain insignificant in this 
scenario too (p=. 983). The results of the post-1980 generation also show that there is no 
significant difference between the manual and non-manual classes and no other class 
pairs as well. However, when the significant education and income factors are removed, 
it is seen that the members of the non-manual class is 1.32 times more likely to display 
nationalistic out-group tolerance than their manual class counterparts (p=. 011). When 
the reference category is switched to the non-manual class, it is seen that the manual 
class is significantly more likely to display nationalistic tolerance than the unemployed, 
farmer and service/self-employed classes (p>. 000, . 001 and .011 respectively). Finally, 
the interim generation’s results reveal that there is no significant difference between the 
manual and non-manual classes (p=. 206). However, the manual class is more likely to 
display nationalistic out-group tolerance than the unemployed and farmer classes (p=.  
001 and . 000 respectively). Similarly the non-manual class is also more likely to show 
nationalistic out-group tolerance than these two classes (p<. 000 and . 000 respectively). 
However, when the education and income factors are removed out of the analysis, the 
non-manual class becomes almost twice more tolerant than the manual class (p=. 000). 
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Moreover, in this scenario, the non-manual class becomes more tolerant than the 
unemployed, farmer and service/self-employed classes (p<.000, . 000 and .007 
respectively). 
Table 7.5 presents the results pertaining to our second dependent variable, 
social out-group tolerance. 
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Table 7.5  Ordered logistic regression models predicting social out-group tolerance 
 
 
 Mannheim’s Model Lipset’s models Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Foundation Interim          Post-1980 
 Coeff OR Coeff OR Coeff OR Coeff OR Coeff OR     Coeff OR 
Age                 -.02 (.01) .97 -.02 (.01) .97 -.01 (.01) .98   .24 (.18) 1.27 -.04 (.05)      .95 -.02 (.03) .97 
Age
2
                 .00 (.00) 1.0
0 
.00 (.00) 1.00 .00 (.00) 1.00   -.00 (00) .99 .00 (.00)      1.00 .00 (.00) 1.00 
Gender (female)                 -.37 (.06)*** .68 -.22 (.07)** .79 -.19 (.07)** .82   -.54 (.32) .58 -.20 (.13)      .81 -.17 (.08) .84 
Survey Years (1990 omitted) 
   1996 .74 (.11)***       2.10 .66 (.11)***   1.95 .61 (.11)*** 1.85   -.44 (.33) .64   .65 (.18)*** 1.92 .86 (.19)***    2.37 
   2001 -.38 (.10)***  1.4
6 
  .46 (.10) 1.59 
. 
  .45 (.10)*** 1.57 -.38 (.38) .68 .58 (.19)** 1.80 .52 (.17)** 1.68 
   2007 .60 (.12)*** 1.8
2 
  .67 (.10) 1.95   .61 (.10)*** 1.84 .39 (.45) 1.49 .74 (.24)** 2.11 .63 (.18)** 1.87 
   2011 .82 (.12)*** 2.2
7 
  .89 (.26) 2.44   .62 (.10)*** 1.85 1.27 (.48)** 3.58 .84 (.26) 2.31 .53 (.18)** 1.71 
Distrust -.11 (.08) .89   -.08 (.08) 91   -.04 (.08) .95 -.28 (.31) .75 -.01 (.14) .98 -.03 (.11) .96 
Authoritarian child-rearing -.29 (.02)*** 1.3
3 
  -.27 (.02)*** 1.31    -.22 (.02)*** 1.25 -.01 (.08) 1.01 -.23 (.03)*** 1.26 -.24 (.02)*** 1.27 
Perform prayer -.16 (.01)*** .84   -.15 (.01)*** .85    -.14 (.01)*** .86 -.10 (.05) .90 -.14 (.02)*** .86 -.15 (.01)*** .86 
Education (Ref: Elementary) 
   Secondary     .34 (.06)*** 1.41 .37 (.27) 1.45 .32 (.11)** 1.38 .41 (.08)*** 1.51 
   University     .65 (.09)*** 1.92 1.17 (.45)* 3.24 .42 (.17)* 1.53 .83 (.12)*** 2.29  
Household Income      .08 (.01)*** 1.09 -.06 (.06) .94 .09 (.02)** 1.09 .09 (.01)*** 1.10 
Social Class (Ref: Manual) 
  Unemployed   -.19 (.08)* .81 -.17 (.08)* .84   .05 (.39) 1.05 -.12 (.16) .88 -.15 (.09) .85 
  Farmer   -.48 (.15)** .61 -.39 (.15)* .67   -.07 (.39) .92 -.18 (.24) .83 -.75 (.24)** .47 
  Non-manual   .29 (.08)*** 1.34 -.04 (.09) .95   -.06 (.41) .93 .18 (.15) 1.19 -.16 (.11) .84 
  Serv./self-employed   .32 (.09)***   1.38 -.10 (.09) 1.11   .37 (.37) 1.45  .24 (.16) 1.27 .07 (.12) 1.07 
Generation (Ref: Interim) 
  Foundation .32 (.17) .71           
  Post-1980 -02 (.09) .97           
Cut 1 -26 (.29) -.12 (.24) .71 (.26) 7.25 (5.72)          .21 (1.28) .53 (.60) 
Cut 2 .95 (.29) 1.11 (.24) 1.96 (.26) 8.39 (5.73)         1.56 (1.28) 1.77 (.60) 
Cut 3 1.87 (.29) 2.03 (.24) 2.90 (.26) 9.11 (5.73)          2.44 (1.28) 2.76 (.60) 
Cut 4 2.73 (.30) 2.89 (.25) 3.76 (.27) 9.83 (5.73)          3.29 (1.29) 3.64 (.61) 
Log likelihood -6179.74 -6150.44 -6094.73 -417.06             -264.04 -513.37 
N (obs.) 6488 6488     6488 605               2298     3921 
Pseudo R
2
                 
 
.0487 .0532    .0618 .0363              .0500    .0728 
Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Note: Entries are ordered logistic regression logit estimates with standard error values in parentheses and odds ratios.   
Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990-1996-2001-2007-2011. 
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The first regression looked at the direct generational effect on social out-group tolerance. It 
revealed no significant difference between the foundation and interim (p= . 061) as well as 
between the foundation and the post-1980 generations (p=. 173). Similarly, the interim and 
post-1980 generations did not appear to be discernibly different (p=. 778). The second 
regression on the other hand, is designed to test the social class effect on tolerance. The 
analysis revealed that the members of the non-manual class are more likely to exhibit social 
out-group tolerance than their manual class counterparts (p< . 000). While the manual class is 
significantly more likely to exhibit social tolerance than the unemployed and farmer 
categories, it is less likely to do so than the non-manual and service/self-employed ones. In the 
third model, however, the significant difference between the manual and non-manual classes 
disappeared when education and income are controlled (p=. 581). Yet, the members of the 
manual category remain to be significantly more tolerant than the foundation and farmer 
categories (p=.035 and .011 respectively). The fourth model presents the results of the three 
regression analysis run with data coming from three adjacent generations. The analysis 
revealed no significant class-based social out-group tolerance disparities in any of the 
generations except for the significant differences appeared between the farmer class and the 
unemployed, manual, non-manual and service/self-employed classes of the post-1980 
generation (p=.018, .002, .023 and .001 respectively) However, it seems that different than the 
nationalistic out-group tolerance, social out-group tolerance is more widespread across 
generational and class lines. 
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7.4. Conclusion and Discussion  
First, it should be noted that, our analysis distinguished between two types of out-group 
tolerance. They were called nationalistic and social out-group tolerance. This unexpected 
finding relates to ‘the independence of social and political intolerance’, which was suggested 
by Gibson (2006) as one of the enigmas of tolerance. Since we were restricted by the 
availability of the data, we were unable to distinguish more forms of tolerance, but future 
surveys involving a higher number of potential unpopular groups may well develop a wider 
picture of the tolerance phenomenon. The future studies, can also take the breadth and depth 
of tolerance, which we also ignored due to the limitations of our data, into consideration. 
The first finding to emerge from our research is related to the socialization of generations. 
Our first hypothesis, which was designed in line with Mannheim`s theory of generations in 
general and Duch and Gibson`s (1992) argument in particular, suggested that coming of age 
under authoritarian politico-juridical order makes individuals more likely to develop 
intolerance towards out-groups. The analysis showed that the interim generation is more likely 
to show nationalistic out-group tolerance than foundation generation. This finding supported 
our hypothesis based on Mannheim’s theory of generations as well as Stouffer’s rising 
tolerance thesis. Yet, this finding must be read carefully due to the foundation generation`s 
small sample size, which shifts our essential focus to the comparison of the interim and post-
1980 generations. The insignificance of the difference between the two comparable-in-size 
generations, namely the interim and the post-1980, prevents us from accepting either theory. 
Moreover, it should also be noted that no significant differences were detected between any 
two generations for social tolerance. In practice, this finding speaks to the new rising Turkish 
generation debate. Although our investigation is insufficient for raising a comprehensive 
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argument about the new rising generation, by limiting our focus on the issue of tolerance, we 
can confidently say that our finding, in no way, heralds a new rising tolerant generation. 
In the second and third groups of models, Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis was 
tested with pooled data from all the subsequent generations. It was found that members of the 
manual class are less likely to exhibit both forms of out-group tolerance than their non-manual 
class counterparts. It was also found that higher intolerance in the manual class is linked to 
lower level of education attainment and income as Lipset suggested (see also Grabb, 1979). 
This finding seems to show that Lipset’s thesis holds true in our case. However, testing 
Lipset’s thesis across generations drew a more complicated picture. In the second hypothesis, 
which combined Mannheim’s theory of generations, his argument on the transformation of 
generation as location into actual generation and Lipset’s working class authoritarianism 
thesis, it was predicted that the class - tolerance relationship is conditional to the generational 
location. More particularly, it was suggested that the members of the interim generation which 
were socialized by a relatively less authoritarian governments and legal order is more likely to 
show tolerance than the members of the foundation and the post-1980 generations which were 
exposed to authoritarian politico-juridical order. Table 7.6 shows the significant differences 
between social classes in the three generations for nationalistic and social out-group tolerance. 
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As it can be seen from Table 7.6, the number of significant differences of nationalistic 
tolerance in the interim generation (which is 6) is higher than those in the foundation 
generation (which is 0) and than in the post-1980 generation (which is 0). This finding 
supports our argument that a generation`s exposure to authoritarian governments and 
legislations during its socialization period plays a role in the homogenization of its members` 
nationalistic out-group tolerance discrepancies in the future. The finding is telling about how 
authoritarian governments in Turkey homogenize social classes a with respect to their 
nationalistic out-group tolerance. When considered from this point of view, one can argue that 
this finding challenges Lipset`s static working class authoritarianism thesis from a 
generational perspective. Nevertheless, the same hypothesis was not supported for social out-
group tolerance. The number of significant differences pertaining to social out-group tolerance 
in the post-1980 generation (which is 4) is higher than those in the interim generation (which 
Table 7.6 
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for nationalistic 
and social tolerance  
 Unemployed Farmer Manual Non-
manual 
Service./self-
employed 
Unemployed   1 1 2 1 
Farmer    1 2 1 2 1 2 
Manual      
Non-manual      
Serv./self-
employed 
     
Nationalistic out-group tolerance=1, social out-group tolerance=2 
1 Foundation generation, 2 interim generation _ post-1980 generation 
Note: The differences are those produced by ordered logistic regression analysis after age, age squared, gender 
(female), survey year, education, income, authoritarian child-rearing, perform prayer and distrust variables held 
controlled. 
(Significance levels: *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001) 
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is 0). This can be explained as a recent clash between social classes in intolerance against 
socially ‘dissident’ groups. It can also be seen from the table that in the interim generation in 
which we expect Lipset’s thesis may hold true, the number of the differences between the 
manual class and the first two classes is higher than the number of the differences between the 
manual class and the last two classes for both nationalistic and social forms of out-group 
tolerance. This finding implies that the modernization theory’s categorization of the social 
classes which is based on the traditional/modern dichotomy explains better the nationalistic 
out-group tolerance in Turkey than does Lipset’s categorization of the social classes which 
locates manual in the low class category.  
Table 7.7 shows the significant differences between the social classes when education and 
income factors are removed from the analysis. 
Table 7.7 
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for nationalistic 
and social tolerance (education and income removed) 
 Unemployed Farmer Manual Non-
manual 
Service./self-
employed 
Unemployed  2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 
Farmer    1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 
Manual    1 1 2 2 2 2 
Non-manual     1 1  
Serv./self-
employed 
     
Nationalistic out-group tolerance=1, social out-group tolerance=2 
1 Foundation generation, 2 interim generation _ post-1980 generation 
Note: The differences are those produced by ordered logistic regression analysis after age, age squared, gender 
(female), survey year, education, income, authoritarian child-rearing,  perform prayer  and distrust variables held 
controlled.  
(Significance levels: *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001) 
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As can be seen from Table 7.7 the number of significant differences between class categories 
increases when education and income are removed out of the analysis. From this, it could be 
argued that mostly education and, as shown by our analysis, in some cases income, stratifies 
the social classes’ nationalistic out-group tolerance in all generations. Most of the class-based 
out-group tolerance in Turkey can be explained by the education factor alone. On the other 
hand, it was found that after removing education and income from the analysis the number of 
the differences between the manual class and the last two classes is now higher the number of 
the differences between the manual class and the first two classes for both forms of out-group 
tolerance. Remember the the situation was reverse before removing the two variables. This 
finding shows that when education and income were left uncontrolled, the manual class 
becomes further different from the last two classes. In other words, normally manual class 
resembles to lower classes in a greater degree than it does to higher classes, but when 
education and income variables are considered it resembles to the higher classes than it does to 
the lower classes. This shows that much of the modernization effect that stratifies the social 
classes as unemployed, farmer and manual on one side and non-manual and service/self-
employed on the other can be largely explained by education, and to a lesser level income, 
factor.  
Another point that should be mentioned is that an unexpected finding to come out of the 
analysis was the underlying dimensionality distinguishing between two types of out-group 
tolerance; nationalistic and social out-group tolerance. This finding speaks to ‘the 
independence of social and political intolerance’, which Gibson (2006) discussed as one of the 
enigmas of tolerance. The empirical distinction between the two types of out-group tolerance 
should come as a complete surprise since rejecting an immigrant neighbour and rejecting a 
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homosexual neighbour can reasonably be understood to originate from different types of value 
bases. Our analysis showed that while tolerance in Turkey is considerably higher for 
nationalistic groups, it is very low for the social ones. Although, it is a positive finding that 
Turkish people are ready to welcome foreigners in their immediate surroundings, the extent 
how intolerant Turkish public towards the socially ‘deviant’ groups is concerning. Given rapid 
socioeconomic change, it is unrealistic to expect a significant rise in social out-group tolerance 
in Turkey in the near future. However, as younger generations replace older, more 
conservative ones that are dying out the socialisation of a new, younger generation with more 
liberal social values may speed up this socio-cultural change in the country through inter-
generational replacement in distant future. 
A few points regarding the methodology need to be clarified here. It should not be ignored that 
the methodology we employed while constructing the nationalistic and social out-group 
tolerance measurements was slightly biased against the latter. This is because the number of 
items combined for this variable is higher than the number of those for the nationalistic out-
group tolerance variable which generates a larger gap between the percentage of ‘social 
tolerents’ and the mean percentage of the tolerants of the groups making the variable. Yet, this 
does not conceal the fact that tolerance against nationalistic groups is way higher in the 
Turkish society than tolerance against social groups. There were also some problematic points 
that should be expressed about the wording of the question that we derived our dependent 
variables from. The first one relates to its face validity. We understand the respondents` 
unwillingness about sharing a neighbourhood with people from the groups they tick from the 
list, but we don’t know whether a respondent`s rejection of a group is due to some bad prior 
neighbourhood experiences with people from these groups or some abstract prejudice. After 
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all, there is no chance of knowing what respondents` reactions would be if they had 
neighbours from the groups in question in real life. My impression is that real face-to-face 
neighbourhood relationships may alter these preferences considerably.  Therefore, lack of real 
neighbourhood experience should be noted as an important factor that would have caused 
somewhat overestimation of the results. Conversely, one should also be aware of the 
possibility that some respondents might have been hiding their true ideas about these groups to 
give the socially acceptable answer which would this time cause to an underestimation of the 
true scores. Another point is that, here we only assume that mentioning a group`s name in the 
unwelcomed neighbour list indicates intolerance towards the members of this group. Yet, a 
more detailed examination investigating respondents` support for the political, civic and 
economic rights of the members of the unpopular groups might have ascertained different 
results. People may only be not happy with sharing the same social domain with a particular 
group`s members, but at the same time be supportive of their rights. Last but not the least, 
there is also no way of knowing with data in hand, whether a respondent sympathize with a 
group because he or she belongs to the group in question himself/herself. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter is composed of a brief summary of the findings of the empirical chapters, their 
theoretical and practical implications and some suggestions for potential avenues for future 
research. Several theoretical and country specific implications can be drawn from the findings 
of the present research. As it can be remembered, the main aim of the current thesis was to 
investigate the generational and social class bases of pro-democratic culture in Turkey. In 
pursuit of this objective, Karl Mannheim’s theory of generations and Seymour Martin Lipset’s 
working class authoritarianism were tested in the Turkish political context. In all empirical 
chapters the first hypotheses were set in line with Mannheim‘s understanding of the formation 
of generations. On the other hand, the second hypotheses were designed following the 
implications of both Mannheim‘s theory of generations and Lipset’s working class 
authoritarianism thesis.   
In the analyses, the first group of models which were designed to predict six different 
indicators of pro-democratic culture found limited empirical evidence for the first group of 
hypotheses. Significant differences were found between the foundation and interim 
generations in democracy preference and nationalistic out-group tolerance. However, due to 
the low number of the cases in the foundation generation, we essentially focused on the 
comparison of the interim and the post-1980 generations. The findings showed evidence of a 
significant difference between the interim and the post-1980 generations only for attending a 
lawful demonstration.  
The lack of significant differences between the interim and post-1980 generations for five out 
of six orientations implies that Mannheim’s theory of generations is largely not applicable to 
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our particular area of investigation. This finding can be accounted for by means of two groups 
of potential explanations or a combination of them. While the first group of potential 
explanations relates to the insignificance of the event which was expected to socialize, the 
second group relates to those who were expected to be socialized. The first explanation could 
be that the influence of the post-1980 regime on an average young person was not as dramatic 
as it was thought to be. If this is the case, the Turkish army’s quick withdrawal from power, 
unlike its counterparts in the Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, might have played 
an important role in this. The Turkish military governments’ willingness to give power back to 
the civilians might be due to Turkey`s intense economic and political ties with the Western 
democracies or the Turkish society’s or military members’ commitments to democracy. 
Whatever the reason, the military government’s tendency to give power back to the civilians 
might have reduced the power of the post-1980 period to socialize the youth. The second 
explanation could relate to another feature of the regime established after the 1980 coup. 
Following the coup, the military government went to the polls in three years and a civilian 
government was established. The civilian government introduced a series of structural reforms 
which brought prosperity to the economy. Owing to this, beside its authoritarian characteristic, 
the post-1980 period was also marked by rapid social and economic development. Thus, one 
can well argue that the negative effect of system level authoritarianism have been 
counterbalanced by the positive socioeconomic development effect.  
Alternative to the first group of potential explanations, the second group relates to those who 
was socialized. The lowess figures clearly showed that as one moves from the years of birth of 
the members of the interim generation to the years of birth of the members of the post-1980 
generation, four out of six dependent variables show a decrease as predicted but they lack 
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statistical power. This may indicate that the event was not insignificant, but the post-1980 
generation resisted change. If this is the case, at least two potential factors might have played a 
role in this. The first one is that system level authoritarianism only mattered to a small 
segment of the society, namely urban professionals and employees who felt directly the 
economic and political consequences of the event but the effect was hampered when it was 
averaged for all the social classes. I suggest this by looking at the dramatic differences 
between the social classes. Then, an overwhelming majority of the Turkish population was 
living in distant villages and towns and had limited access to the formal education and the 
mass media. This idea is supported by the Turkish Statistical Institute`s data, which showed 
that, by 1980, the rate of the population living in the countryside was 56.1%, which declined 
to 22.7% only recently. The second potential factor underlying the post-1980 generation’s 
indifference to authoritarian socialization could relate to the embeddedness of the attitudes 
towards democracy in the traditional Turkish culture. To give an example, the Turkish 
public’s hesitation to take part in elite-challenging political activities are telling about its 
respect for state authority. This understanding might have prevented the majority of the 
citizens to exercise their rights between 1960 and 1980 even if, in Beck and Jennings’ (1979, 
p. 748-49) words, ‘the opportunities of involvement’ were provided. In addition to its 
influence on political participation, traditionalism can give results for the preference of 
democracy and out-group tolerance in different ways as previous research showed (for the 
negative relationship between traditionalism and support for democracy in Turkey see Tessler 
& Altınoğlu, 2003: p. 35). The importance that the majority of the Turkish public attached on 
authoritarian child rearing attitudes also support this view. Yet, more research is needed to 
understand whether traditional world view dampens the socialization effect of macro-scale 
developments.  
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In addition to these two groups of explanations, another, which is worthy of notice, is related 
to our selection of dependent variables. Note that although we did not detect generational 
differences, it does not mean that they do not occur in any other attitudes. For instance, 
authoritarian upbringing of the 1980 generation may show results in its members` relationship 
with their family, children or their colleagues or their voting behaviour. All these do not go 
beyond pure speculations until they are tested. Nevertheless, each of these potential outcomes 
also portends interesting avenues for future academic research.  
It should be noted that our finding showing that generation does not play an important role on 
the most of the pro-democratic attitudes also relates to the key question of whether a new 
generation is on the rise in Turkey. After the Gezi Protests in 2013, ‘the new generation in 
Turkey’ became one of the main topics of political conversations. It was speculated in the 
media and academic circles that the participants of the protests are the members of the new 
rising Turkish generation. Portrayed as more participatory, pro-democratic and tolerant than 
the previous generation, this alleged new generation was indicated as the face of a new 
Turkey. However, this research did not detect a full-scale evidence of a rising generation in 
Turkey (except for the finding pertaining demonstrations), within its area of investigation. 
With these results in hand, we can either argue that there is no such a generation or 
alternatively either that the members of this generation are too young to be captured by our 
data (when the recent rapid rise in social tolerance is considered) or their attitudes are not so 
clearly differentiated. Only time will tell as new studies with more recent data and focus on 
younger generation will be able to repeat this investigation for younger individuals and further 
test for the above effects. 
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Although the first group of findings revealed that the replacement of generations does not 
automatically make Turkish respondents more activity prone, supportive of democracy and 
tolerant against the ‘dissident’ groups of the society, this finding should not come to mean that 
generation did not play any role at all. In order to investigate indirect generational effects, the 
second group of analyses included social class in the equation. The analysis of the pooled data 
from all the successive generations analysed the nature of the relationship between the social 
class structure and pro-democratic attitudes in Turkey. The analyses revealed that for five out 
of six indicators (except for attending a lawful demonstration), the non-manual class members 
are significantly more pro-democratic than their manual class counterparts. Moreover, the 
significant difference completely disappears for four out of five indicators and attenuates with 
respect to its power and significance for democracy preference when education and income 
variables are controlled. The finding implies that when the generational dividing lines are 
ignored, Lipset`s working class authoritarianism thesis, which suggests that the members of 
the non-manual class are more pro-democratic than the manual class, holds true in the Turkish 
context. However, as the third group of analyses revealed, when the generational factor was 
considered the picture changed considerably. The third group of analyses tested Lipset’s thesis 
across generations by means of regression models with data coming from three subsequent 
generations. It should be noted that our treatment of each generation as separate samples 
served as an efficient technique to estimate cohort effects net of age and period effects. It was 
found in the third group of analyses that the relationship between social class structure and 
pro-democratic attitudes differed remarkably across generations. Table 8.1 summarizes the 
findings of the three empirical chapters regarding to the significant differences between all 
possible class pairs. 
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As it can be seen from Table 8.1, the number of the inter-class differences of the interim 
generation (which is eighteen) is higher than the numbers pertaining to the foundation (which 
is 4) and the post-1980 (which is 6) generations. The high number of the significant 
differences in the interim generation shows that inter-class variability is the highest in the 
interim generation. On the contrary, the low numbers of the significant differences in the 
foundation and the post-1980 generations show that inter-class variability is low in these 
generations. This finding lends support to the second group of hypotheses suggesting that 
exposure to authoritarian governments and legal order homogenize social classes in terms of 
their pro-democratic attitudes. This finding clearly poses a ‘generational challenge’ to Lipset’s 
static working class authoritarianism thesis.  
Table 8.1 
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for all the 
dependent variables  
 Unemployed Farmer Manual Non-
manual 
Service./self-
employed 
Unemployed  1 1 1 2 3 5 1 5 6 1 5 
Farmer    2 3 5 4 6 4 4 5 6 4 5 6 
Manual    4 4 3 
Non-manual     4 4 
Serv./self-
employed 
     
Signing a petition=1, joining a boycott=2, attending lawful demonstrations=3, democracy preference=4, 
nationalistic out-group tolerance=5, social out-group tolerance=6. 
1 Foundation generation, 2 interim generation _ post-1980 generation 
Note: The differences are those produced by multivariate logistic regression, ordinary least squares and ordered 
logistic regression analyses after age, age squared, gender (female), survey year, education, income, interest in 
politics*, importance of politics*, self-positioning*, post-materialism*, distrust†, authoritarian child-rearing and 
perform prayer variables held controlled. 
*Controls applied in the first empirical chapter only. 
†Controls applied in the third empirical chapter only.   
(Significance levels: *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001) 
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Yet, for the interim generation, which was not socialized by authoritarian macro-level effects 
and therefore where we expect Lipset’s thesis to hold for, the findings are not what the theory 
would predict. It was found in the analysis with data from the interim generation that for five 
out of the six orientations, the manual and non-manual classes are not significantly different 
from each other. There is another important implication of this finding. This is that the manual 
class resembles to the non-manual and service/self-employed classes in greater degree than it 
resembles to the unemployed and farmer classes. When looking at the significant differences 
between the manual and the other classes in the interim generation, it can be seen that the 
number of the significant differences between the manual class and the unemployed/ farmer 
classes (which is 7) is higher than the number of the significant differences between the 
manual class and the non-manual/ service/self-employed classes (which is 2). This contradicts 
with Lipset’s categorization of the social classes, since in his understanding; the manual class 
belongs to the lower group of classes together with i.e. farmers, miners and fishers. Instead, it 
supports modernization theory’s categorization of the social classes which locates the manual 
class in the modern end of the traditional/modern dichotomy. In line with the categorization 
modernization theory implies, the present research found that the essential democratic 
cleavage in Turkey is between traditional and modern classes. Whether they are manual or 
non-manual, those classes which involve in modern modes of production are more pro-
democratic than those who remain out of modern production. This finding is in accord with 
those studies indicating that as the society transforms from a traditional to a modern outlook, 
individuals are more likely to prefer democracy (Inkeles, 1974; for the relationship between 
education and global and specific evaluations of democracy in Turkey see; Dixon, 2008: p. 
693, 694), involve in politics (Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995) and show tolerance (Inglehart & 
Baker, 2000; for the relationship between education and ethnic tolerance in Turkey see Dixon, 
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2008: p. 697). As a contribution to these works, this thesis demonstrated that generations’ 
socialization allows for modernization to influence the development of pro-democratic 
attitudes. This finding, on the other hand, implies that that Lipset’s thesis is not applicable 
especially for the generations which were exposed to system level authoritarianism. Moreover, 
it also shows that even for generations which were not socialized by system level 
authoritarianism, the manual class does not belong to the group of the lower classes as Lipset 
suggested. Another important finding of the analyses is that education and, to a lesser extent, 
income are responsible for further stratification of the social classes. Table 8.2 shows inter-
class differences for six orientations when education and income factors are not controlled for. 
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Table 8.2 
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for all the 
dependent variables (education and income removed) 
 Unemployed Farmer Manual Non-
manual 
Service./self-
employed 
Unemployed  1 1 1 2 5 1 1 2 3 4 4 
4 5 5 6 6 
1 1 2 3 4 5 
Farmer    2 3 5 4 2 3 4 4 5 5 
5 6 6 
2 4 4 5 5 
Manual    1 2 4 4 4 5 
6 6 
4 5 6 6 
Non-manual     1 2 3 4 4 5 5 5 
Serv./self-
employed 
     
Signing a petition=1, joining a boycott=2, attending lawful demonstrations=3, democracy preference=4, 
nationalistic out-group tolerance=5, social out-group tolerance=6. 
1 Foundation generation, 2 interim generation _ post-1980 generation 
Note: The differences are those produced by multivariate logistic regression, ordinary least squares and ordered 
logistic regression analyses after age, age squared, gender (female), survey year, education, income, interest in 
politics*, importance of politics*, self-positioning*, post-materialism*, distrust† variables held controlled. 
*Controls applied in the first empirical chapter only. 
†Controls applied in the third empirical chapter only.   
(Significance levels: *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001) 
 
As it can be seen from the Table 8.2, when education and income factors are not controlled 
for, the total number of significant differences increased from eighteen eight to sixty. This is 
to say that when these factors are controlled for, the number of inter-class variability 
decreases. This holds true for all the generations. This is proof that, education and in some 
cases income, is accounted for most of the inter-class differences. This finding implies that 
normally there is less difference between social classes, but the social classes’ different levels 
of education and income play a role in the furtherance of inter-class differences. In brief, these 
two factors further stratify the social classes. More specifically, it is also seen that these two 
factors play a role in the differentiation of the manual class from the non-manual and 
service/self-employed classes. When these factors are controlled for, the manual class’ 
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differences from these classes diminish. This shows that education and income also play an 
important role in furthering modernization’s stratification of the classes. However, it should 
not be forgotten that class factor still matters and not all the inter-class differences can be 
accounted for through education and income alone.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
  
Table A.1   Variables of the Analyses 
 
 
Variable Name Original Value Recoded Value Questionnaire Wording 
Petition 1=Have done 0=Not done Here are some forms of 
political action that people 
can take. Please indicate, for 
each one, whether you have 
done any of these things, 
whether you might do it or 
would never under any 
circumstances do it. 
Boycott 2=Might do 1=Done 
Demonstration 3=Would never do  
Having a democratic 
political system 
1=Very good 
2=Fairly good 
3=Fairly bad 
4=Very bad 
1=Very good  
2=Fairly good 
3=Fairly bad 
4=Very bad 
I'm going to describe 
various types of political 
systems and ask what you 
think about each as a way of 
governing this country. For 
each one, would you say it 
is a very good, fairly good, 
fairly bad or very bad way 
of governing this country? 
Having the army rule 1=Very good 
2=Fairly good 
3=Fairly bad 
4=Very bad 
1=Very good  
2=Fairly good 
3=Fairly bad 
4=Very bad 
Having experts, not 
government, make 
decisions according to 
what they think is best 
for the country 
1=Very good 
2=Fairly good 
3=Fairly bad 
4=Very bad 
1=Very good  
2=Fairly good 
3=Fairly bad 
4=Very bad 
Having a strong leader 
who does not have to 
bother with parliament 
and elections 
1=Very good 
2=Fairly good 
3=Fairly bad 
4=Very bad 
1=Very good  
2=Fairly good 
3=Fairly bad 
4=Very bad 
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Table A.1  Variables of the Analyses (continued, page 2 of 6)    
 
 
 
 
Variable Name Original Value Recoded Value Questionnaire Wording 
    Heavy drinkers 1=Mentioned 
2=Not mentioned 
0=Mentioned 
1=Tolerance 
On this list are various groups of 
people. Could you please mention any 
that you would not like to have as 
neighbours. 
    People who have  AIDS           1=Mentioned 
2=Not mentioned 
0=Mentioned 
1=Tolerance 
    Drug addicts 1=Mentioned 
2=Not mentioned 
0=Mentioned 
1=Tolerance 
    Homosexuals 1=Mentioned 
2=Not mentioned 
0=Mentioned 
1=Tolerance 
    People of a different race 1=Mentioned 
2=Not mentioned 
0=Mentioned 
1=Tolerance 
    Immigrants/foreign workers 1=Mentioned 
2=Not mentioned 
0=Mentioned 
1=Tolerance 
Social out-group tolerance Heavy drinkers+People who have AIDS+Drug addicts+Homosexuals (0-4 Scale) 
Nationalistic out-group 
tolerance 
People of a different race+Immigrants/foreign workers (0-2 Scale) 
Generation 1907<Age<1944 
1945<Age<1964 
1965<Age<1994 
Foundation 
Interim 
Post-1980 
Can you tell me your year of birth 
please? 
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Table A.1  Variables of the Analyses (continued, page 3 of 6)    
 
 
 Variable Name Original Value Recoded Value Questionnaire Wording 
Social Class 13=employer 
manager of 
establishment with 
10 or more 
employed 
13/16=5 
‘service/self-
employed’ 
In which profession/occupation do 
you work? If more than one job, the 
main job? What is/was your job 
there? 
 16= employer, 
manager of 
establishment with 
less than 10 
employed 
  
 21=professional 
worker 
21/22/23/24/25/31=
4 ‘non-manual’ 
 
 22=middle level 
non-manual office 
worker 
  
 23=supervisory 
non-manual office 
worker 
  
 24=junior level 
non-manual 
  
 25=non-manual 
office worker 
  
 31=foreman and 
supervisor 
  
 32=skilled manual 
33=semi-skilled 
manual 
34=unskilled 
manual 
32/33/34=3 
‘manual’ 
 
 41=farmer: has 
own farm 
41/42=2 ‘farmer’  
 42=agrarian 
worker 
  
 51=member of 
armed forces 
51=4 ‘non-manual’  
 61=never had a 
job 
61=‘unemployed’  
    
    
 288 
 
 
  
Table A.1  Variables of the Analyses (continued, page 4 of 6)    
 
 
 
Variable Name Original Value Recoded 
Value 
Questionnaire Wording 
Education 1=Inadequately 
completed 
elementary 
education. 
1/2=1 
‘elementary’ 
What is the highest education level that you 
have attained? (NOTE: if the respondent 
indicates to be a student, code highest level 
s/he expects to complete) 
 2=Completed 
elementary 
education. 
 3=Incomplete 
secondary school 
(technical). 
3/4/5/6=2 
‘secondary’ 
 4=Complete 
secondary school 
(technical). 
 5=Incomplete 
secondary school 
(university prep.) 
 6=Complete 
secondary school 
(university prep.) 
 7=Some university 
without degree    
8= University with 
degree 
7/8= 3 
‘university’ 
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Table A.1  Variables of the Analyses (continued, page 5 of 6)    
 
 
 
Variable Name Original Value Recoded Value Questionnaire Wording 
Household Income 1/10 1/10 Here is a scale of household incomes 
on which 1 indicates the lowest 
income decile and 10 the highest 
income decile in your country. We 
would like to know in what group 
your household is. Please, specify the 
appropriate number, counting all 
wages, salaries, pensions and other 
incomes that come in. 
(Gender) female 1=Male 2=Female 0=Male 1=Female  
Age 18/85 18/85 Can you tell me your year of birth 
please? This means you are ___ years 
old. 
Age squared Age*age Age*age Age squared 
Post-materialist index 0/5 0/5  
    
Self-positioning 0/10 0/10 In political matters, people talk of 
‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would 
you place your views on this scale, 
generally speaking? 
    
Interest in politics 1=Very interested 1= Not at all 
interested 
How interested would you say you 
are in politics? Are you… 
 2=Somewhat 
interested 
2= Not very 
interested 
 3=Not very interested 3= Somewhat 
interested 
 4=Not at all interested 4= Very interested 
    
Distrust 1=Most people can be 
trusted 
0=Most people can 
be trusted 
Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or 
that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people?  2=Need to be very 
careful 
1=Need to be very 
careful 
    Independence  0= Not mentioned                       
1=Mentioned 
0= Not mentioned                       
1=Mentioned Here is a list of qualities that children 
can be encouraged to learn at home. 
Which, if any, do you consider to be 
especially important? Please chose 
up to five! 
    Feeling of responsibility 0=Not mentioned                          
1=Mentioned 
0= Not mentioned                       
1=Mentioned 
    Imagination 0Not mentioned                  
1=Mentioned 
0= Not mentioned                       
1=Mentioned 
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Table A.1  Variables of the Analyses (continued, page 6 of 6)    
 
Variable Name Original Value Recoded Value Questionnaire Wording 
    
    Hard work 0= Not mentioned                       
1=Mentioned 
0= Not mentioned                       
1=Mentioned 
Here is a list of qualities 
that children can be 
encouraged to learn at 
home. Which, if any, do 
you consider to be 
especially important? 
Please chose up to five! 
   
    Religious faith 0= Not mentioned                       
1=Mentioned 
0= Not mentioned                       
1=Mentioned 
   
    Obedience 0= Not mentioned                       
1=Mentioned 
0= Not mentioned                       
1=Mentioned 
    
Authoritarian child-
rearing 
 (Hard work+Religious faith+Obedience)- (Independence+Responsibility+Imagination)  
    
Perform prayer 1=More than once a week 1=Never, practically never  
 2=Once a week 2=Less often Apart from weddings and 
funerals, about how often 
do you attend religious 
services these days?  
 3=Once a month 3=Once a year 
 4=Only on special holy days 4=Only on special holy days 
 5=Once a year 5=Once a month 
 6=Less often 6=Once a week 
 7=Never, practically never 7=More than once a week 
 
            
  
